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Abstract 
In an era of ‘global’ oceans crisis, marine conservationists have issued a 
resounding call to increase the spatial scale of ocean conservation. This dissertation 
examines the drivers and implications of recent efforts to scale up ocean conservation in 
places simultaneously celebrated for their revival of community-based conservation: the 
Pacific Islands region, the Micronesian sub-region, and the nation of Palau. Toward this 
end, this research engages and advances critical human geography theory on scalar 
politics and institutional theory on the governance of common pool resources to address 
the overarching questions: why and how are state and non-state actors rescaling ocean 
conservation, and with what social, political, and institutional consequences? These 
questions are approached empirically through a multi-sited case study that 
ethnographically tracks institutions, actors, funding, and agendas from the 10th 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to five Pacific Island 
nations and territories, revealing the links among macro and micro level processes in 
diverse political and geographical spaces. 
This research conceptualizes the rescaling of ocean conservation as an integral 
component of social struggles for empowerment. Results illustrate how state and non-
state actors pursue their contextually specific goals by working together to scale up the 
objects of ocean conservation. The means through which they achieve rescaling include 
discursive framings, performative acts, and institutional changes. Most significantly, 
these ‘scalar practices’ have resulted in empowerment of environmental non-
  
v
governmental organizations and Pacific Island governments within multi-level 
conservation governance processes; accumulation of international attention and funding 
at the regional level in Micronesia; and reduced local autonomy for conservation 
governance in Palau. 
Overall, this work contributes an empirically grounded, theoretically engaged, 
and policy-relevant analysis of the scalar politics and institutional dynamics that are 
reshaping the actors, objectives, and institutions of contemporary ocean conservation 
across multiple levels of governance. Conclusions advance theory on the scalar 
dimensions of environmental governance by conceptualizing regions as strategically 
constructed tools of environmental politics; expanding understanding of the form and 
function of multi-level regimes for the governance of large common pool resources; and 
advancing constructive theoretical dialogue between critical human geographers and 
institutional theorists. This work may also inform policy discussions by illuminating 
complex tradeoffs that result from scalar rearrangements.   
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1. Introduction 
“We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together 
use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically 
and psychologically, in the tiny spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole 
appointed places and from which we have recent liberated ourselves. We must not allow 
anyone to belittle us again, and take away our freedom.” Epeli Hau’ofa (2008, p. 39)  
 
Are Pacific Islands small? The combined land area of twenty-one countries and 
territories commonly included within the Pacific Islands region1 is about 550,000km2, 
84% of which is in Papua New Guinea (Tutangata and Power 2002, p. 873-4). Only ten 
Pacific Islands have total land areas greater than 700 km2, while three have less than 30 
km2 (Tutangata and Power 2002, p. 873). Historically there exists a prevailing discourse 
of Pacific Islands as tiny, isolated, and dependent: “According to this view, the small 
island states and territories of the Pacific [. . . ] are too small, too poorly endowed with 
resources, and too isolated to rise above their present condition of dependence on the 
largesse of wealthy nations” (Hau’ofa 2008, p. 29). 
On the other hand, are Pacific Islands vast?  Their combined 550,000 km2 of land 
represents just 2% of the region’s total area (Tutangata and Power 2002, p. 873). The 
remaining 98% is ocean. As a whole, the Pacific Islands region occupies about 5.8%2 of 
the Earth’s surface (Chasek 2005, p. 127). Moreover, individual Pacific Island exclusive 
economic zones dwarf their respective land areas, ranging from 120,000 km2 in Samoa 
up to 3.1 million km2 in French Polynesia (Tutangata and Power 2002, p. 874). Epeli 
                                                        
1 American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis & Futuna.  
2 This percentage will depend on what entities are included in the Pacific Islands region (see Chapter 2).  
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Hau’ofa (2008, p.37) has argued that when exclusive economic zones are taken into 
account, the Pacific Islands of Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, and French 
Polynesia “are among the largest countries in the world.”  
This dissertation considers how and why certain Pacific Island governments, 
together with environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are forging new 
answers to the above questions in the context of a ‘global’ oceans crisis and associated 
imperatives to scale up ocean conservation (Gray 2010; Sievanen et al. 2013).  Recent 
research has declared a “worldwide decline of coral reefs” (Bellwood et al. 2004, p.827), 
concluding that no ocean area is unaffected by humans impacts (Halpern et al. 2008).  In 
the context of society’s growing attention to ocean health and governance, the oceans 
have become increasingly prominent on the global conservation agenda, as reflected by 
new conferences devoted to marine conservation; investment in oceans research and 
conservation by major philanthropic organizations and big, international NGOs; and 
calls for a global network of marine protected areas by the 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, the 2003 World Parks Congress, and the Convention of 
Biological Diversity’s 2010 and 2020 protected areas targets (Gray 2010). In each of these 
fora, as well as in the scientific literature, one finds resounding imperatives to increase 
the spatial scale of ocean conservation (Gray 2010; Gaines et al. 2010 ; Roberts et al. 2003; 
Bellwood et al. 2004; Sievanen et al. 2013).  
In this context, state and non-state actors working in the Pacific Islands are 
attempting to supplant the “belittling” view of Pacific Islands as small, isolated, and 
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irrelevant (Hau’ofa 2008, p. 29) with discursive framings, performative acts, and 
institutional changes that rescale Pacific Islands into large ocean states and/or regions 
capable of advancing the global ocean conservation agenda.  Rescaling refers to: 
“[T]he process in which policies and politics that formerly took place at one scale 
are shifted to others in ways that reshape the practices themselves, redefine the 
scales to and from which they are shifted, and reorganize interactions between 
scales” (McCann 2003, p. 162).  
Specifically, this dissertation examines the drivers and implications of interlinked efforts 
to scale up the spaces and agents of ocean conservation in the Pacific Islands region, the 
Micronesian sub-region, and the nation of Palau – places simultaneously celebrated for 
their “renaissance of community-based marine resource management” and 
reinvigoration of local marine tenure (Johannes 2002, p. 317; Cinner and Aswani 2007; 
Aswani and Ruddle 2013).  In so doing, this dissertation contributes an empirically 
grounded, theoretically engaged, and policy-relevant analysis of the scalar and 
institutional dynamics that are currently reshaping the actors, objectives, and 
institutions of ocean conservation across multiple levels of governance. While results are 
relevant to conservation practitioners and policy-makers, they are not prescriptive. The 
analysis herein conceptualizes the rescaling of ocean conservation as an integral 
component of struggles for empowerment and control (Swyngedouw 2000), and may 
inform ocean policy discussions by illuminating complex tradeoffs that result from 
scalar rearrangement.   
 
  
 
4 
1.1 Research Questions 
The research presented in this dissertation addresses three overarching 
questions:   
(1) Why are state and non-state actors rescaling ocean conservation?  
(2) How are state and non-state actors rescaling ocean conservation? 
(3) What are the social, political, and institutional3 outcomes of rescaling ocean 
conservation?   
I approach these questions through a multi-sited case study that ethnographically tracks 
interlinked rescaling processes across global, regional, national, and local governance 
levels, revealing the links among macro and micro level processes in diverse political 
and geographical spaces: 
A. Chapter 2, Global level: What are the incentives for and implications of Pacific 
Island regionalism in the context of global governance processes relating to 
the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity?  
B. Chapter 3, Regional level: How and why has interstate cooperation for 
environmental governance emerged at the regional scale in Micronesia? How 
is regional environmental governance functioning within, for, and against 
participating jurisdictions? 
                                                        
3 Institutions herein refer to the formal and informal rules, norms, and strategies that structure human 
interactions (Ostrom 2005). 
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C. Chapter 4, National/Local level: How and why is local environmental 
governance being scaled up in Palau through a national protected area 
network?  
1.2 Theoretical approach  
I conceptualize ocean conservation as a form of environmental governance tied 
to the global biodiversity conservation agenda (Sievanen et al. 2013). In asking and 
addressing the above questions, this dissertation draws from and contributes to a 
growing and multi-disciplinary body of literature on the scalar dimensions of 
environmental governance. The terrain of literature on environmental governance, 
including conservation, is large and diverse, ranging widely in core questions, values, 
assumptions, disciplines (i.e. geography, political science, anthropology, sociology, 
economics, etc.), and methodologies. However, it is united by a general understanding 
of environmental governance as a broad suite of formal and informal institutions and 
processes through which state and non-state actors influence incentives, knowledge, 
institutions, decision-making, and behavior relating to human-environment interactions 
(Lemos and Agrawal 2006). A defining feature of research on environmental governance 
is its attention to agents of influence beyond formal systems of laws and regulation and 
centralized governments. A review of scholarship on environmental governance offered 
the following summary:   
“[W]e use “environmental governance” to refer to the set of regulatory processes, 
mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence 
environmental actions and outcomes. Governance is not the same as 
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government. It includes the actions of the state and, in addition, encompasses 
actors such as communities, businesses, and NGOs. [. . .] International accords, 
national policies and legislation, local decision-making structures, transnational 
institutions, and environmental NGOs are all examples of the forms through 
which environmental governance takes place. Because governance can be shaped 
through nonorganizational institutional mechanisms as well (for example, when 
it is based on market incentives and self-regulatory processes), there is no 
escaping it for anyone concerned about environmental outcomes. Environmental 
governance is varied in form, critical in importance, and near ubiquitous in 
spread” (Lemos and Agrawal 2006, p. 298).  
 
As a result of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s-1990s that emphasized civil society 
participation in state policy and cutbacks in government resources (McCarthy and 
Prudham 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998; MacDonald 2010a, 2010b; Corson 2010; Corson et 
al. 2013), many environmental governance functions formerly of centralized 
governments are purportedly shifting up to international and transnational institutions, 
down to local authorities; and out to non-state actors through multi-level institutions 
(McCarthy and Prudham 2004; Reed and Bruyneel 2010; Lemos and Agrawal 2006).  
Human geographers, institutional theorists, political scientists, anthropologists and 
other scholars of environmental governance are increasingly focused on the concept of 
scale as they attempt to inform and understand attendant changes in the geographies of 
environmental governance (Andonova and Mitchell 2010; Bulkeley 2005; Lemos and 
Agrawal 2006; Reed and Bruyneel 2010). Geographers Bridge and Perreault (2009, non-
paginated eBook), for example, identified “re-scaling” as one of six key problematics of 
the expanding field of research in environmental governance. 
While it is true that “[t]he literature on environmental governance has 
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increasingly emphasized the importance of scale” (Andonova and Mitchell 2010, p.256), 
there is a disciplinary divide in how scale is conceptualized therein. A majority of the 
literature on environmental governance treats spatial scale as a constant, objectively 
knowable variable to which governance institutions must be appropriately matched 
(Andonova and VanDeveer 2011; Silver 2008; Reed and Bruyneel 2010; Cash et al. 2006; 
Bridge and Perrault 2009).  For example, a particularly prominent research agenda 
within the interdisciplinary “resilience literature” has organized around the problem of 
fit, defined as the mismanagement that occurs when the spatial, temporal, and/or 
functional bounds of governance institutions do not match, or fit, ecosystem boundaries 
(e.g., Cash et al. 2006; Folke et al. 2007; Olsson et al. 2007).  This conceptualization of 
spatial scale as ontologically given is markedly different from that in critical human 
geography, where scale is understood as socially constructed. For critical human 
geographers, that is, scale is “continuously being defined, contested, and reconstructed 
based on power relations between actors” (Silver 2008, p. 925).  
These different conceptualizations of scale inform divergent objects of analysis 
within research on the scalar dimensions of environmental governance. As Bridge and 
Perreault (2009, non-paginated eBook) summarized:  
“A distinction can be made, however, between research in which processes of re-
scaling are the things to be explained (and where scalar outcomes are uncertain), 
and work in which different scales of governance are already assumed and 
governance jumps one or more notches in the scale hierarchy.”   
 
As an example of the former, this dissertation contributes theoretical and applied 
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understanding of the scalar politics and associated institutional dynamics that are 
shaping new geographies of ocean conservation. Toward this end, I engage and advance 
critical human geography theory on scale and scalar politics (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), and 
institutional theory on the governance of common pool resources (Chapter 4).  Sections 
1.2.1 and 1.2.2 provide a very brief summary of these literatures; each is reviewed at 
depth in Chapters 2, 3, and 4.  Section 1.3 further describes how I contribute to each 
literature while addressing my overall research questions. 
1.2.1 Critical human geography: scale and scalar politics 
A growing literature in critical human geography, and more recently, within the 
sub-discipline of political ecology, has focused on scale as an object of theoretical inquiry 
(Brown and Purcell 2005; Neumann 2009).  In this literature, and herein, scale is 
understood as “the focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for a specific 
social claim, activity, or behavior’’(Agnew 1997, p. 100). This conceptualization of scale 
has informed three main principles of scale theory: scale as both fluid and fixed; scale as 
relational; and scale as socially constructed (Brown and Purcell 2005). Critical human 
geographers have expanded upon these concepts in scale theory to frame a related body 
of literature on politics of scale or scalar politics (scalar politics herein) (MacKinnon 
2011).  
The scalar politics literature outlines an agenda for research on the “scalar 
practices of social actors” (Moore 2008, p. 212, as quoted in Neumann 2009) in which 
analytical attention is directed to the ways in which state and non-state actors 
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manipulate scale – through practices of rescaling - to serve particular agendas, including 
regime formation and change (McCarthy 2005; Brown and Purcell 2005).  Rescaling is a 
powerful tool of politics in governance processes that may lead to significant, though 
contingent, outcomes (McCann 2003). 
There has been a call for closer attention to the environment in the theorization of 
scale and scalar politics, particularly with regard to environmental politics and 
governance, non-state actors, and non-human actors (Swyngedouw and Heynen 2003; 
Neumann 2009; McCarthy 2005; Brown and Purcell 2005). An emergent body of work on 
the scalar politics of environmental governance has demonstrated, for example, that 
incentives for rescaling environmental governance processes may be drawn from a 
desire to affect the way environmental compensation is delivered (Cowell 2003), limit 
access to resources by particular groups (Campbell 2007; Campbell and Godfrey 2010), 
or redefine the objectives of conservation governance (Sievanen et al. 2013). Sievanen et 
al. (2013), for example, show how efforts to rescale community-based marine 
governance to ecoregional and ecosystem scales in Fiji reflect interest in biodiversity 
conservation as a key governance objective.  
With a few recent exceptions, “much of the scale literature focuses 
overwhelmingly on states and capitals as the major architects of scales” (McCarthy 2005, 
p. 733). As mentioned earlier, the literature on environmental governance has identified 
influential roles for non-state actors, including environmental NGOs, in decision-making 
processes traditionally relegated to states (Keck and Sikkink 1998; MacDonald 2010a, 
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2010b; Price 1994; Sundberg 1998; Duffy 2006; Betsill and Corell 2008; Sievanen et al. 
2013). Neoliberal reforms in the 1990s have been linked to a particularly prominent rise 
in the role of transnational environmental NGOs in environmental policy-making and 
governance, where:  
“[E]nvironmental governance [has been diffused] among states, individuals, 
NGOs, private companies, transnational institutions and local communities. In 
particular, as the boundaries among the state, private sector and nonprofit 
worlds have become more porous under neoliberalism, certain NGOs have 
stepped into the vacuum of state social provision (Corson 2010, p. 579).  
 
For example, Duffy (2006) argues that the increasing influence of international 
environmental NGOs and the World Bank on national environmental politics and policy 
in Madagascar has created a “governance state” whereby governments of the 
developing world “become one partner among a complex array of other actors who 
operate together to provide specific policy outcomes” (Duffy 2006, p. 740).  The 
influence of environmental NGOs in international decision-making processes has also 
“escalated” over the past two decades (Betsill and Corell 2008, p. 1). An edited volume 
on “NGO Diplomacy,” for example, demonstrates how NGOs shape policy-making 
relating to the environment and sustainable development by engaging directly in formal 
international negotiations (Betsill and Corell 2008). While there is a growing 
interdisciplinary literature on the diverse roles of environmental NGOs in 
environmental governance processes (e.g., Jepson 2005; Corson 2010, Price 1994; 
Sundberg 1998; West 2006; Weber and Christopherson 2002), there has been relatively 
limited attention to the role of environmental NGOs in the reconfiguration of scale 
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within environmental governance (but see McCarthy 2005; Gruby and Campbell In 
Press; Gruby and Basurto In Press; Sievanen et al. 2013). 
This dissertation engages scalar politics to examine the diversity of actors and 
agendas driving projects of rescaling within environmental governance processes 
relating to ocean conservation, as well as the consequences thereof. A key contribution 
of this dissertation is its “theoretically informed and explicit analy[sis] of how scale and 
scalar politics are central to understanding human-environment relationships” (as called 
for in Brown and Purcell 2005, p. 614). Particular attention to the role of environmental 
NGOs therein is a related part of this contribution.  
1.2.2 Institutional theory on the governance of common pool 
resources 
In 1961, V. Ostrom et al. observed that some federalist systems were organized as 
polycentric political systems with many centers of decision-making, arguing that they 
could constitute a potential alternative to the theoretical ideal of monocentric systems 
with a dominant center of decision-making power. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, an 
empirical research agenda on polycentricism focused on the role of local institutions for 
the governance of common pool resources. This research resulted in a common pool 
resource theory that suggested the tragedy of the commons was not inevitable, and that 
people were capable of self-organizing to supply long-lasting, robust institutions for the 
governance of common pool resources (Ostrom 1990). Common pool resource (CPR) 
theory as defined by Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Bloomington School (Aligica 
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and Boettke 2011) emerged mainly from research in local, small-scale settings (Ostrom 
1990). Today, a critical research frontier is the governance of larger CPRs, which requires 
analysis of interdependencies among different levels and scales of more complex 
systems (Ostrom 2009; Heikkila et al. 2011).  
Arguably dominated by ‘collective action’ perspectives (Young 2002) that assume 
methodological individualism (McCay 2002), common pool resource theory has been 
critiqued as being apolitical and de-contextualized, focusing on the internal structure of 
institutions at the expense of the formative context within which they are embedded 
(Mosse 1997; McCay 2002; Agrawal 2003; Clement 2010). This dissertation responds to 
this criticism by bringing a “thicker” (or, more ethnographic) historical, political, and 
geographical perspective to institutional change (McCay and Jentoft 1998, p. 21; see also 
Geertz 1973). In summary, this dissertation advances the research agenda on large-scale 
CPR governance by bringing together institutional theories of polycentricity and critical 
human geography theory on scalar politics to provide a thick, interpretive institutional 
analysis of recent efforts to rescale ocean conservation in Palau (Chapter 4).  
1.3 Chapter summaries and theoretical contributions 
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Global level 
Global environmental governance meetings are sites of institutional and 
ideological work that shape ocean conservation around the world. These meetings are 
thus important not only as venues for negotiating multilateral environmental 
agreements, but also as stages upon which subaltern states may reshape their positions 
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within and influence on the global processes that impact ocean conservation back home. 
Chapter 2 examines the process through which a region was enacted and politically 
mobilized at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP10) to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity (CBD). This chapter draws on concepts from scalar politics to 
theorize the enactment of an oceanic Pacific Region as a scalar strategy directed toward 
transcending the practical and imagined smallness of Pacific small island developing 
states (SIDS) within the CoP10 meeting context and global imaginations.   
This chapter concludes that the Pacific Region construct enhances Pacific SIDS’ 
capacity to participate in CoP10, although their ability to influence decision-making 
remains relatively limited compared to others. Perhaps more important, the Pacific 
Region imaginary of a vast ocean space and network of people committed to the CBD 
and biodiversity conservation positions Pacific Islanders to play a crucial role in 
conserving a significant portion of the world’s oceans.  In the context of increasing 
global attention to marine conservation, the enactment of such a Pacific Region is likely 
to aid in attracting recognition, attention, and support from NGOs, foundations, and 
donors.  By conveying how and why a diverse group of state and non-state actors 
enacted an international and oceanic region at CoP10, this chapter contributes 
understanding of strategic regionalization within the scalar politics literature and 
further disrupts understandings of an ontologically given, land-based region 
conceptualized on continental or subcontinental spatial scales.   
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1.3.2 Chapter 3: Regional level 
Chapter 3 re-engages critical human geography scale theory to examine the 
institutionalization of a region through an instrument of regional environmental 
governance. Specifically, the chapter presents a descriptive, empirical analysis of the 
emergence, form, and function of the Micronesia Challenge, an institution for regional 
environmental governance characterized by cooperation among micro states and 
territories, thematic breadth, regional conservation targets linked to global ones, and 
major coordinating and financing roles for environmental NGOs. By outlining the 
political work that a region achieves through regional environmental governance, this 
chapter offers related contributions, first, to our understanding of a new and influential 
form of regional environmental governance outside of Europe, and, second, to the 
emerging research agenda on regional environmental governance within global 
environmental politics. Results indicate that, similar to the Pacific Region (Chapter 2), 
the version of Micronesia that is remade through the Micronesia Challenge is shaped in 
part by external actors and agendas that both complement and conflict with 
heterogeneous priorities of individual Pacific Islands. 
1.3.3 Chapter 4: National/local levels 
Finally, Chapter 4 brings together institutional theories of polycentricity and critical 
human geography theory on scalar politics to advance understanding of the form and 
function of nested, polycentric regimes for the governance of large-scale common pool 
resources. Empirical analysis focuses on institutional changes associated with a national 
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marine protected area network in Palau through which national government and 
environmental NGOs gain influence in local decision-making processes. This chapter 
finds that influence is gained in part through an attempt to scale up common-pool 
resource governance to ecologically-relevant spatial scales in an effort to protect coral 
reef resilience and biodiversity across Palau.  An institutional approach informed by 
scalar politics brings into focus potential tradeoffs between organizing reform around 
ecologically versus institutionally relevant scales, including: tradeoffs between 
governance goals, tradeoffs between jurisdictional nestedness and autonomy, and 
tradeoffs between biological and institutional diversity. 
 This chapter concludes that prioritization of ecologically-relevant scales in 
institutional reform resulted in nested but less polycentric institutional arrangements 
governing the network, and cautions that less distributed decision-making in the overall 
nested governance system could threaten coral reef biodiversity and fisheries outcomes 
in the long-term by constraining institutional innovation and diversity. This chapter also 
demonstrates the potential for interdisciplinary dialogue to advance the research 
frontier on multi-level governance for large common pool resources. 
1.4 Methodology 
This dissertation research undertakes a multi-sited, “distended case-study 
approach” that embodies the ethnographic tracking of policies, actors, agendas, and/or 
funding “through globalizing networks and across translocal settings” (Peck and 
Theodore 2012, p. 22). A distended case study relies on multi-sited research that reveals 
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the links among processes in diverse political and geographical spaces –from a floating 
marine protected area monitoring outpost off the coast of Palau, to a United Nations 
policy-making meeting.  In pursuing multi-sited research, I join a growing number of 
social scientists who are challenging traditional understandings of the field as a single, 
geographically bounded place (e.g., Marcus 1995; Peck and Theodore 2012; McCann and 
Ward 2012; Freidberg 2001; Brosius and Campbell 2010). Field sites for this dissertation 
included the 10th Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the 17th Micronesian Chief Executive’s Summit, and five nations and 
territories participating in the Micronesia Challenge: the Federated States of Micronesia, 
the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the unincorporated U.S. 
territory of Guam, and the U.S. jurisdiction of the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands. 
Specific methods used to collect data within each of these sites are described in 
detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, and include various combinations of the following: 
collaborative event ethnography, semi-structured interviews, observation of policy 
meetings, and review of policy documents, conceptualized broadly to include laws, 
speech transcripts, meeting minutes and reports, promotional material, fact sheets and 
other documents (Shore and Wright 1997).4  Data collection and analysis was guided by 
constructivist grounded theory, an iterative process of theoretical sampling whereby 
analyses of data takes place during and after data collection and guides the collection 
                                                        
4 Policy documents cited in this dissertation are on file with author and generally are not included in the 
reference list. 
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effort (Charmaz 2000). All interviews were transcribed and, along with policy 
documents and participant observation notes, uploaded to QSR NVivo software for 
interpretive, qualitative analysis. Analysis included a combination of thematic coding, 
process tracing (Venesson 2008), and/or conjunctural analysis of the actors and 
institutions that come together at specific historical conjunctures to produce particular 
political trajectories (Hart 2004; Corson 2008). Chapter 4 also complements interpretive 
qualitative analysis with formal institutional analysis (Ostrom 2005).  
1.5 Dissertation structure  
This dissertation is written in a manuscript format. While the chapters are 
broadly united topically (the scalar dimensions of ocean conservation), geographically 
(Pacific Islands), and theoretically (critical human geography and institutional theory), 
each chapter also reflects a coherent, stand-alone research product that draws from a 
unique combination of methods and theoretical frameworks, the specifics of which are 
detailed in the chapters themselves. 
Chapter 2 is co-authored with Lisa M. Campbell, and is in press in Environment 
and Planning A.   Chapter 4 is co-authored with Xavier Basurto, and is in press in a 
special issue of Environmental Science and Policy entitled “Illuminating the Commons: A 
Special Issue on the Legacy of Elinor Ostrom.” Both are reprinted here with permission. 
Chapter 2 was completed as part of a larger, interdisciplinary project that 
examined global environmental governance processes at the 10th Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity from a collaborative ethnographic 
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perspective. Our research team was comprised of 17 researchers who worked together to 
refine research questions, to observe hundreds of events associated with the 10th 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity over 12 days, to 
analyze (shared) data, and to write up results.  Although the team approached several 
broad topics as large groups (e.g. climate and protected areas), the goals of the project 
included relating our collective work to our more specific, individual research interests, 
and chapter 2 is one such example. 
The overall research design, data analysis, and text within this dissertation reflect 
my original intellectual work.  I collected data individually, with the exception of that 
collected through collaborative event ethnography.  
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2. Scalar politics and the region: Strategies for 
transcending Pacific Island smallness on a global 
environmental governance stage 
The material in Chapter 2 is reprinted herein with permission, and may be cited as:  
Gruby R., and Campbell L.M., In Press. Scalar Politics and the Region: Strategies for 
Transcending Pacific Island ‘Smallness’ on a Global Environmental Governance Stage. 
Environment and Planning A.1 
 
In a 1998 essay, The ocean in us, Pacific scholar/activist Epeli Hau’ofa encouraged 
Pacific Islanders to act autonomously within global political-economic systems by acting 
together as a region. Hau’ofa attempted to counter a view of Pacific Islands as isolated, 
small, and dependent by outlining a new, “genuinely independent regionalism” distinct 
from the “imposed” regionalism of a recent colonial past and neocolonial present 
(Hau’ofa 2008, p. 47). At the center of his vision was a new regional identity 
characterized not by the smallness of distinct island territories, but rather, the vastness 
of a shared, unbounded ocean: 
“In portraying this new Oceania I wanted to raise [. . . ] the kind of consciousness 
that would help free us from the prevailing, externally generated definitions of 
our past, present, and future. I wish now to take this issue further by suggesting 
the development of a substantial regional identity that is anchored in our 
common inheritance of a very considerable portion of Earth’s largest body of 
water: the Pacific Ocean” (Hau’ofa 2008, p. 41).  
 
In this paper, we treat regionalization as a scaling process, and contend that 
something resembling Hau’ofa’s Pacific Region is being enacted on the global 
                                                        
1 The authors thank Matthew T. Bowers for map-making assistance, and Luke W. Fairbanks and three 
anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.   
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environmental governance stage.2  Specifically, Pacific small island developing states 
(SIDS) are working with environmental NGOs and a regional intergovernmental 
organization to enact an oceanic region ordered around a “sea of islands”3 tied together 
by an extensive ocean space and network of people and institutions committed to global 
biodiversity targets and a shared, “Pacific” way of life. Like Hau’ofa, we are concerned 
with the politics set in motion by (and underlying) the scaling of the Pacific Region as a 
united social and geographical space.   
In this paper, we examine the processes through which the Pacific Region was 
enacted at the 10th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP10) to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). We bring together concepts from new regional geography 
and scalar politics to theorize the enactment of an oceanic region as a scalar political 
project directed toward contextually specific ends. In so doing, we address the questions 
of whom the Pacific Region was speaking on behalf of at CoP10, and for whom and 
what is the region being put to work? 
 Throughout the paper, we use the term “enactment” and a metaphor of 
performance to convey our focus on the practices through which a particular version of 
the Pacific Region was strategically brought into existence on the global environmental 
governance stage set at CoP10 (cf Hajer 2009, p. 7).  As such, we treat CoP10 as one 
                                                        
2 We use the term global environmental governance rather than international environmental governance to refer to 
the governance process described herein, including that of the UN, in acknowledgment that it includes 
various state and non-state actors working across multiple scales (Fisher and Green 2004). We adopt the UN 
term multilateral to refer to international agreements. 
3 Hau’ofa (2008, p. 32) coined this phrase in an attempt to break away from the notion of Pacific Islands as 
small, isolated “islands in the sea”. 
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context in which to understand how a region was enacted, for particular purposes and 
in response to particular incentives.  Thus, the CBD CoP10 itself is not the focus of the 
analysis, but important insofar as it shapes or constrains the specific form and function 
that the region takes, as would other settings in likely different ways.    
“Even to begin to confront the question, What is the Pacific?, it is necessary to 
define our terms by specifying whose Pacific --and when” (Dirlik 1998, p. 15). In this 
paper, Pacific Region refers to that enacted by a network of Pacific SIDS and partners at 
CoP10, unless otherwise specified.  
2.1 Scalar politics and the region 
Despite a lingering tendency in human geography to understand the region as a 
fixed scale between the national and local, treatments of regions as pregiven, bounded 
spaces have long been challenged (Paasi 2002; Paasi 2004). A new regional geography 
emerged in the 1980s in which regions are theorized as “historically contingent social 
processes emerging as a constellation of institutionalized practices, power relations and 
discourse” (Paasi 2004, p. 540; see also Pred 1984). Critical human geographers have not 
only questioned the ontological status of regions, but also that of scale (Marston 2000), 
theorizing scale as a social construction that must be understood in terms of the 
processes, political agendas, and power relationships that produce it (Silver 2008; 
Swyngedouw 2000; McCann 2003).  Like region, scale is fluid and contingent – even if it 
may become associated with particular processes, or fixed, over certain periods and in 
particular contexts (Brown and Purcell 2005; McCann 2003; Sievanen et al. 2013).  
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 The literature on scalar politics argues that scales are strategically reworked in 
policy processes for political purposes, including regime formation and change 
(Bulkeley 2005; Neumann 2009; McCarthy 2005; McCann 2003; Sneddon 2003; 
Swyngedouw 2000).  McCarthy (2005), for example, demonstrates how actors can use a 
variety of scalar strategies to influence the outcomes of environmental governance 
processes. From this perspective, scale is not just an outcome of social process but also 
an instrument for reshaping power dynamics (Mansfield 2001). Analytical attention to 
scalar politics thereby focuses on the processes through which scales are constructed as 
part of political strategies (Swyngedouw 2000).  
Region is seldom explicitly considered in the scale debate, and efforts to relate 
region and scale have resulted in calls to view the region through “the prism of scale” 
(Paasi 2004, p. 536; see also Neumann 2010).  Here, we answer this call in part by 
examining the process of regional enactment through the prism of scalar politics, which, 
we contend, may be achieved by foregrounding the politics driving and resulting from 
the scaling processes through which a region is (re)constituted over time. We take this 
approach in our analysis of the discursive and performative practices through which 
actors enacted the Pacific Region at CoP10 in an effort to enhance their ability to 
participate in the CBD governance process and increase their visibility among global 
conservation actors, particularly donors.  Our focus on the enactment of the Pacific 
Region “means constantly trying to relate discursive work [ . . .] to situations (settings, 
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stagings). […] It is through this discursive and dramaturgical4 work that political actors 
perform or enact a situation, either reconfirming an existing and powerful way of seeing, 
or breaking away from it and rendering other perspectives in crisis” (Hajer 2009, p. 7).  
As a result, our analysis finds regions to be not only the outcome of historically 
contingent social practices (Paasi 2004) but, more specifically, tools of a scalar politics 
that affects developing country and civil society participation in a UN environmental 
governance process and the position of Pacific SIDS more broadly within global 
environmental governance. Although we consider some consequences of the scalar 
politics, both observed and potential, it is the incentives for and execution of the scalar 
strategies that are of central concern here.  By conveying why and how a diverse group 
of actors enacted a vast international and oceanic region at CoP10 (one both similar to 
and different than other versions of the Pacific Region), we contribute understanding of 
regionalization within the scalar politics literature and further disrupt understandings of 
an ontologically given, fixed, and land-based region conceptualized on continental or 
subcontinental scales. 
2.2 Field site and methods  
The CBD is a product of the 1992 UN Earth Summit, and entered into force in 
                                                        
4 In common language, the term “dramaturgy” means: “the art of technique of dramatic composition and 
theatrical representation” (Websters New Collegiate Dictionary 1997, p. 345). As Hajer (2006, p. 48, emphasis 
in original) contends: “Invoking dramaturgical terms such as ‘performativity’ and ‘performance’ actually 
opens up a dimension to policy analysis that we could not capture with the discourse-analytical tools alone. 
The dramaturgical terms convey the understand that certain meanings constantly have to be reproduced, 
that signification must be enacted, and that this takes place in a particular ‘setting.’” 
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1993. With currently 193 parties, the CBD is one of the major multilateral conventions on 
the environment. Since 2002, the CBD has produced global biodiversity targets, but 
National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans are the principal instruments for 
implementing the convention. In recognition of the costs to individual nation states 
tasked with protecting globally valued biodiversity, a mechanism for funding the CBD 
was established and is administered through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), 
which increases the convention’s influence. CBD decisions shape biodiversity 
conservation ideology and practice in Pacific Islands, as state and NGO actors align their 
work with CBD priorities to meet conservation targets, secure legitimacy, and access 
funding through GEF and other sources. 
The main governing mechanism for the CBD is the Conference of the Parties 
(CoP). The CBD CoP convenes every two years, to review progress on programs of 
work, take decisions on particular issues, and set new priorities. Although only party 
delegates can vote on CBD decisions, the CoP and all of its meetings are open to 
observers accredited as members of ‘major groups’, including business, NGOs, and the 
scientific community. Observers may participate in proceedings (e.g. offer comments or 
opinions) unless one third of parties to the convention objects. At CoP10, proceedings 
included plenary sessions; two concurrent working groups; and simultaneous, smaller 
‘contact groups’ and ‘friends of the chair’ meetings for negotiating the text of specific 
decisions on 15 substantive issues ranging from protected areas to the Global Taxonomy 
Initiative, and 10 procedural issues related to the evaluation and implementation of the 
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CBD, including the revised strategic plan and associated biodiversity targets. 
The CoP is much more than its official proceedings. CoP10 activities included a 
high-level ministerial segment restricted to senior representatives of signatory states and 
invited presenters; hundreds of side events organized by NGOs and other civil society 
actors, to highlight research, examples, or arguments of relevance to decisions before the 
CoP; exhibit space occupied by interest groups; public events designed to communicate 
the CBD mandate; and numerous informal gatherings. Thus, the CBD brings together a 
diversity of actors interested in biodiversity conservation, and “like all international 
agreements, is more than simply a document; it is an institution that calls into being an 
active political space” (MacDonald and Corson 2012, p. 167). The CoP10 thus presents a 
novel opportunity to observe scalar strategies in context, as they are performed in public 
venues for a specific audience and toward often clearly articulated ends.  We treat the 
meeting as a field site that presents a window into often less visible social processes. 
This research stems from a larger project that examines global environmental 
governance processes at meetings like CoP10, from an ethnographic perspective. Large 
global meetings like the CoP constrain ethnographic approaches by their size and short 
duration. Our response to these constraints is Collaborative Event Ethnography (Brosius 
and Campbell 2010), a methodological innovation that brings together a group of 
researchers working within a shared analytical framework who collaborate to achieve 
research objectives. Our team was made up of 17 researchers, who worked together to 
refine research questions, to observe hundreds of events associated with CoP10 over 12 
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days, to analyze (shared) data, and to write up results. Ethnographic coverage of events 
involved recording the dialogue, making observational notes, collecting documents, 
photographing presentation slides and the event setting, and sometimes conducting 
short interviews with key participants (for more on the CEE method, see Brosius and 
Campbell 2010).  
Although the team tackled several broad topics as large groups (e.g. climate 
(Hagerman et al. 2012) and protected areas (Corson et al. In Press)), the goals of the 
project included relating our collective work at CoP10 to our more specific, individual 
research interests, and this paper is one such example. At CoP10, the first author 
attended 6 side events specifically related to Pacific SIDS, 2 press briefings, and an 
“Island Fiesta” party organized by the Global Island Partnership. She was invited to a 
number of informal events and eventually to the daily strategic meeting of the Pacific 
SIDS. The Pacific Region was also visible during more formal plenary and working 
group meetings, and at contact group meetings for specific decisions. These events were 
covered by the authors, or by other members of the CEE team. The first author 
complemented CEE data by conducting interviews with 8 of the 13 members of the 
Palauan delegation to CoP10 while in Palau in July-October 2011, to deepen our 
understanding of delegate experiences with the enactment of the Pacific Region at the 
CoP. We further complemented CEE data by reviewing documents that described the 
strategy of the Pacific SIDS and their partners.  
 We coded resulting data thematically (using QSR Nvivo software), focusing on 
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the form and function of the Pacific Region and the activities, discourses, and settings 
through which it was enacted. Although we focus on the enactment of the Pacific 
Region, we acknowledge that Pacific SIDS delegations and their partners have other 
strategies to achieve their agendas at CoP10. We also acknowledge and that the Pacific 
Region was not the only version presented at the CoP10; for example, there were related 
efforts to enact and draw support for smaller (Micronesia) and larger (Asia-Pacific) 
regions. Here, we focus on the Pacific Region as the most publically visible enactment at 
CoP10. 
2.3 Setting the stage for the Pacific Region 
Recognizing regions as the tenuous products of historicized and contextualized 
processes, we begin our analysis with an account of post-colonial regionalism in the 
Pacific and the structural forces that incentivized the Pacific Region as enacted at CoP10: 
UN institutions and the structure of the CoP10 meeting.  In the sections that follow, we 
unpack the specific practices and discourses through which the Pacific Region was 
enacted at CoP10.  
2.3.1 Postcolonial Pacific regionalism5    
 Regionalism has characterized the economic and social development planning of 
most Pacific Island governments for more than 60 years (Fischer 2002; South and Low 
2008). In historical accounts of Pacific regionalism, some focus on the agency of Pacific 
                                                        
5 Though a full review of Pacific regionalism is beyond the scope of this paper (cf. Bryant-Tokalau and 
Frazer 2006), we highlight arguments about a pre-existing, neo-colonial regionalism as important historical 
context for understanding the development and function of the Pacific Region. 
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Island governments in working together to pursue collective diplomatic and 
development goals (Campbell 2003).  More critical analyses argue that contemporary 
regionalism “is a direct creation of colonialism,” beginning in 1947 when Australia, 
France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United States established 
and set the agenda of the South Pacific Commission (renamed the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC) in 1997) (Hau’ofa 2008, p. 47).  Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau 
(2006) go further to characterize the promotion of regionalism by former colonial powers 
in the 1940s through the SPC as a self-interested neo-colonial security strategy. 
Frustrated with external domination in SPC, indigenous leaders of newly 
independent Pacific Island countries formed the South Pacific Forum in 1971 (renamed 
the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2000) as an “exclusive club” that did not include 
Britain, France, or the United States (Hau’ofa 2008, p. 48). Though the PIF was formed 
“in opposition to colonialism and neo-colonialism” (Fischer 2002, p. 284), the 
organization’s autonomy was arguably also compromised by the involvement of 
Australia and New Zealand, as they provide most of the funding and direction for the 
cooperation and thereby “put themselves in the best position to shape regionalism, and 
use it as a means for securing their strategic interests” (Frazer and Bryant-Tokalau 2006, 
p. 2). Crocombe (2001, p. 594) has described this arrangement as a “metropolitan/islands 
regionalism.” These two intergovernmental organizations, the SPC and the PIF, have 
dominated Pacific Island regionalism for decades (Fischer 2002), and it is within this 
context of a complex and fraught history of Pacific regionalism that Hau’ofa advanced 
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his call for “a new sense of the region that is our own creation,” one that is “anchored in 
our common heritage of the ocean” (Hau’ofa 2008, pgs. 47 and 55).  
2.3.2 UN Institutions  
The UN Environment Program’s (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme, the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development and the organizations and institutions arising from these have also been 
described as “driving forces” of regional cooperation in the Pacific Islands (South and 
Low 2008, p. 576). Initiatives linked to these broader programs and multilateral 
agreements have institutionalized the broader SIDS grouping at global, regional, and 
sub-regional levels. Within the UN, the 51 islands considered to be SIDS are defined as: 
“[L]ow-lying coastal countries that share similar sustainable development 
challenges, including small population, limited resources, remoteness, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, and excessive 
dependence on international trade” (UNDESA 2012). 
 
UN sustainable development institutions have long singled out SIDS as a special case in 
terms of their unique vulnerabilities and relationship to the oceans; for example, Agenda 
21, the plan of action on sustainable development adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992, encourages SIDS to cooperate with one another and international organizations in 
support of sustainable development goals. The objectives in Agenda 21 have been 
translated into specific policy actions through SIDS-specific institutional processes, 
beginning in 1994 with the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small 
Island Developing States, which led to the adoption of the Barbados Programme of 
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Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States.  
Within the CBD, the SIDS grouping was institutionalized mostly notably in 2006 
through the programme of work on island biodiversity, which supports the 
development of national or regional targets to achieve program objectives (CBD CoP 8 
VIII/1/8.). UNEP is supporting SIDS participation in negotiating and implementing 
multilateral environment agreements (including the CBD) in the Pacific, Africa, and 
Caribbean regions through a four-year multi-million Euro capacity enhancement project 
funded by the European Union, titled: “Capacity Building related to Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries.”   
2.3.3 The CBD CoP 10: Setting constraints and incentives  
The UNEP project mentioned above stems from understanding that Pacific SIDS’ 
participation in CoP processes is constrained by limited capacity (Key and Peteru 2011). 
Fisher and Green (2004) suggest the disenfranchisement of developing countries in 
multilateral regimes for sustainable development is a function of a nation’s endogenous 
human resources, transnational connectivity to policy-relevant information, and 
geopolitical status.  Here, we focus on the constraints posed by the limited endogenous 
resources (Fisher and Green 2004) of individual Pacific SIDS within the CoP10 meeting 
setting, to convey specific situational incentives for acting together as a region.  
As described above, CoP meetings are large and complex, with many events 
occurring simultaneously. Informal meetings started at 8 AM, formal events began at 10 
AM, and negotiations sometimes ran through the night.  The CBD Secretariat provided 
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funding for one delegate from each Pacific Island party to attend CoP10; those countries 
that sent more than one delegate secured funding from other sources (SPREP NDa), 
including NGOs and foreign countries. Of the 14 Pacific SIDS parties to the CBD, 13 sent 
delegations to CoP10. The average delegation was 3 to 4 people and the most common 
delegation size was a single person. Most of those individuals are responsible for 
representing their country in more than one multilateral environmental meeting (Key 
and Peteru 2011). Given the simultaneous events structure of CoP10 and the wide 
ranging historical, technical, and procedural knowledge necessary to act purposively 
within that structure, the size of a delegation and the level of knowledge, experience, 
and training held by individual delegates are determining factors in a nation’s capacity 
to participate. When asked about the challenges that individual SIDS delegations face at 
the CBD, one Palauan delegate explained: 
“We can’t afford to bring many people. And certainly we’re limited in terms of 
technical capacity in all the areas that are discussed at the CoP. And thirdly, the 
human sustainability within those thematic areas, or maybe the turnover, is so 
constant here in Palau that there is no particular person that could …follow 
through, considering the history of the process” (interview, July 2011). 
 
In addition to historic regionalism and broader UN institutional processes, the CoP10 
meeting structure itself provides strong incentives for Pacific SIDS to work together. As 
we will describe, Pacific SIDS enrolled one another and NGOs into what amounted to a 
regional delegation.  Together, the official Pacific SIDS delegations to CoP10 were 52 
people, and the UN and EU interest in both SIDS and regionalism meant that funds to 
support development and enactment of the Pacific Region were available. 
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2.4 Enacting the Pacific Region at CoP10 
 Preparations for CoP10 among Pacific SIDS began two months before the event, 
when the Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) brought 
together eleven Pacific SIDS, four conservation NGOs, environment agencies in New 
Zealand and Australia, SPC, the University of the South pacific, and UNEP for a Pacific 
regional preparatory meeting in Fiji on August 16-18, 2010. SPREP is the regional CBD 
focal point, with the mandate to assist member countries in preparing for CoP meetings 
and implementing CBD objectives, and an overall mission “to serve as the conduit for 
concerted environmental action at the regional level.” SPREP originated in 1982 as a 
small program attached to SPC, but was established as an autonomous body through an 
intergovernmental agreement in 1993.  
Organizers of the preparatory meeting provided an overview of the regional and 
global context of the CBD, lessons learned from past meetings, and a review of the 
meeting agenda, establishing a transnational connectivity and information flow that is 
considered to be a prerequisite for overcoming disenfranchisement (Fisher and Green 
2004,).  Participants in this preparatory meeting laid the groundwork for a coordinated 
physical and discursive presence at CoP10 by negotiating regional positions on nine 
CBD issues, and assigning specific delegates to represent the region in negotiations on 
those issues at CoP10. As a Palauan delegate explained, “we had a lead country and a 
back-up country, so if the lead country was not there, the back-up country was there 
prepared with the Pacific position on the issue” (interview, July 2011).  Participants also 
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developed a communications campaign – dubbed “One Pacific Voice” or the “Pacific 
Voyage” – to elevate their visibility at CoP10. The preparatory meeting effectively 
rescaled the positions, actions, and discourse of Pacific SIDS and their partners from the 
national to the regional, structuring the Pacific Region within the imaginations of those 
who would enact it at CoP10 and thereby producing an interdependent regional 
delegation: 
“The national priorities are still important for the countries, but the 
[preparatory] meeting helped to facilitate these to a discussion on the regional 
level, so they can be promoted together as a Pacific Voice at the international 
level” (Easter Galuvao, Biodiversity Adviser for SPREP, quoted in SPREP 2010a).   
 
Participating Pacific SIDS and their partners solidified their regional delegation 
at CoP10 through continuous interactions at the event, as they renegotiated their 
priorities in the dynamic meeting context and coordinated their distribution among 
simultaneous events.  Pacific delegates and partners gathered each morning for strategic 
meetings, which a Palauan delegate described thus: 
“[E]very morning we would all meet, all the Pacific Islands, and we get to talk 
about issues that were discussed in the plenary the day before, kind of brief 
everybody, and … coordinate issues that were coming up, who is gonna say 
something about it” (interview, July 2011). 
 
Pacific delegates and partners also whispered to one another during formal 
proceedings and side events, gathered in a designated Pacific hub area, and met in 
hallways and cafeterias. They kept in touch continuously through Skype, as a Palauan 
delegate described: “People in different rooms, they were just kind of keeping people up 
to date on what was happening and there were a couple times that I would say, ok this 
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is happening, should I say anything?” (interview, July 2011). In other words, Pacific 
SIDS and their partners enacted a Pacific Region in part by acting as a region, depending 
on one another to represent the group. The first author observed this strategy play out 
during a marine ‘contact group’ meeting (October 22) when a Palauan delegate walked 
into the room, late and out of breath. He scanned the room and upon noticing that the 
Pacific had representatives in the room, immediately departed, presumably to expend 
effort elsewhere.  Indeed, in formal negotiations, Pacific SIDS delegates often spoke for 
the entire region: e.g., “we in the Pacific … are concerned about issues related to status 
of highly migratory species and species vulnerability on the high seas” (Palauan 
delegate intervention, marine contact group, October 22, 2010).  
In addition to conducting “collective diplomacy” (Fry 1994, p. 70), what did this 
regional delegation do and say with its ‘one Pacific voice’ at CoP10 to scale and fortify a 
Pacific Region within the imaginations of other CoP10 participants? We identified three 
pillars around which a connected, expansive, and engaged Pacific Region was brought 
into public existence at CoP10: a shared regional identity, a common commitment to 
global biodiversity conservation, and a large and boundary-less ocean territory.  
2.4.1 Performing One Pacific Voice 
As delegates, observers, and the first author walked into the side event, “Pacific 
SIDS: Value Island Biodiversity: It’s our life” (Side Event 2215, October 22, 2010), we 
were greeted by a Fijian woman wearing a flowered dress, a lei, and a flower in her hair. 
She handed us a necklace of white seashells, and explained that we would be going on a 
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“Pacific voyage.”  Surrounded by the vibrant and stereotypically island-themed textiles 
and dress, we were indeed enrolled into a celebration of (a shared) culture that felt 
worlds away from the swirl of suits and science that characterized so many of the events 
at CoP10. 
  The presenters in the side event were from Samoa, Kiribati, Fiji, SPREP, and the 
GEF, but they referred frequently to the centrality of biodiversity to the traditions, 
livelihoods, and institutions of the Pacific people and their shared way of life. The 
Director of the SPREP, for example, described the meaning of the “Value Island 
Biodiversity: It’s our life” slogan thus:  
“This theme reflects the reality of life in the Pacific – Biodiversity is indeed the 
lifeblood of Pacific peoples and our island nations. Pacific people have lived in 
harmony with the land and the sea for thousands of years and have adapted and 
developed approaches to safeguard the environment and to ensure sustainable 
use of natural resources. Biodiversity and the Pacific way of life is under threat” 
(David Sheppard, “Pacific SIDS: Value Island Biodiversity: It’s our life” Side 
Event 2215, October 22, 2010). 
 
A Fijian delegate invoked a similar picture in his intervention to the working 
group discussion of the protected areas decision (October 19, 2010), when he described 
the ocean and terrestrial ecosystems of “our islands” as the foundations of “Pacific 
livelihoods.”  We are not commenting on the truth-value of these representations, but 
rather, on the ways they are strategically invoked in support of a particular vision of the 
Pacific Region. Strategy is suggested by how closely the above statements reflect the 
message of the “Pacific Voyage” communications campaign: 
“As part of the “Pacific Voyage” we ask that you clearly highlight the following 
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message at whatever media opportunity you may have available: […] “The 
Pacific region is working hard to conserve our nature as it supports Pacific 
livelihoods, culture and way of life, we can do much more if we had more 
support from the international community” (Pacific Voyage Passport to the CBD 
CoP10, briefing document, SPREP NDb). 
 
The ocean also occupied a particularly prominent place in the Pacific Region 
discourse.  In contrast to Western and Indian Ocean societies’ conceptions of ocean 
space, some Pacific Islanders have traditionally conceptualized the ocean as territory 
(Steinberg 2001). Micronesians, for example, “see the world as a web of ocean pathways, 
connecting places” (Steinberg 2001, p. 54). At CoP10, Pacific SIDS and their partners 
drew upon such an understanding of ocean space to perform a discourse that assembled 
island and ocean territories into one oceanic region that, as a whole, supports a large 
portion of the world’s biodiversity.  
Presenters in the side event “Pacific SIDS: Value Island Biodiversity: It’s our life,” 
(Side Event 2215, October 22, 2010) for example, delivered their talks in front of floor-to-
ceiling sized posters boasting a variety of statistics on “One Ocean” (see Figure 1). These 
statistics situate a group of small islands, together, at the center of a vast, productive, 
and globally important ocean, to make the case that these islands and the ocean that 
unites them deserve recognition and support. As David Sheppard summarized, “In this 
region our biodiversity is of global significance” (“Pacific SIDS: Value Island 
Biodiversity: It’s our life” Side Event 2215, October 22, 2010.) 
  
 
37
 
Figure 1: “One Ocean” poster displayed in side events, exhibits, and hallways at 
CoP10 (Reprinted with permission from the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme). 
The oceans have long been a focus for Pacific SIDS in global governance 
processes and otherwise, but they have been eclipsed on the global conservation agenda 
more generally. In recent years, however, the oceans have become increasingly visible at 
the global level, as reflected by new conferences devoted to marine conservation (e.g. the 
International Marine Conservation Congress, first held in 2009); investment in oceans 
research and conservation by major philanthropic organizations (e.g. the Gordon and 
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Betty Moore Foundation, the Pew Environment Group) and big, international, NGOs 
(BINGOs); and calls for a global network of marine protected areas from the 2002 World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, the 2003 World Parks Congress, and in the CBD’s 
2010 and 2020 protected areas targets (Gray 2010).   
As ocean conservation increases in prominence, it brings new actors, institutions, 
and outcomes to venues like CoP10, and increases space on the agenda therein for small 
islands with large ocean territories. This is important because, in the context of UN 
sustainable development processes, SIDS have historically been unable to attract 
international support (Fry 2005). Given the existing, high-profile commitment to marine 
conservation by Pacific SIDS6, the concentration and diversity of marine biodiversity 
there, and concerns for the impacts of climate change, there is now more impetus for 
donors, BINGOs, and others interested in marine conservation to recognize, value, and 
support conservation in the Pacific Islands, particularly when these islands are 
construed as a region comprising a relatively large ocean space.    
Recognizing opportunity, Pacific SIDS and their partners often juxtaposed the 
large ocean territory of the Pacific Region with the limited capacity of Pacific Islands to 
manage the portion under their jurisdiction:  
“22% of the pacific ocean is under jurisdiction of 22 small pacific island nations. 
These countries are very small yet they control such a large part of the world .… 
                                                        
6 For example, Pacific SIDS have been at the forefront of large-scale protected area commitments, such as the 
Phoenix Islands Protected Area in Kiribati, the regional Micronesia Challenge, the Cook Islands Marine 
Park, and the New Caledonian Coral Sea MPA. 
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They also have limited capacity to govern their own exclusive economic zones.” 
(Bernard O’Callaghan, IUCN’s Oceania Programme Coordinator, “Pacific Ocean 
2020 Challenge – A Healthy Ocean for Future Generations” Side Event 2281, 
October 28, 2010).  
 
In other cases, Pacific SIDS and their partners invoked an extensive, shared ocean 
territory to illustrate their commitment to the CBD, the significance of their conservation 
achievements, and their relevance to global biodiversity conservation efforts. In the 
working group discussion of the protected areas decision (October 19, 2010) a Palauan 
delegate highlighted Pacific-wide progress thus: 
“In the Pacific a number of small islands have taken massive steps toward global 
goals for marine protected areas. … In order to sustain this type of effort in our 
Pacific ocean to meet the 2012 marine protected area target, long-term global 
support will be needed.”  
 
This discursive framing signals an attempt to shift attention from the vulnerabilities of 
SIDS – indeed, as mentioned above, UNDESA defines SIDS in terms of their shared 
challenges – to their collective role as important constituents of the global marine 
biodiversity conservation effort.  
The examples discussed above reflect the main components of the performative 
acts and discourses that presented a kindred Pacific people who are both defined and 
united spatially by one ocean and socially by their dependence on natural resources, 
longstanding conservation ethic, and associated traditional tenure and management 
institutions. Rescaling Pacific SIDS from many small island nations to one large 
international oceanic region at CoP10 thus meant enrolling not only people, but also 
territory – a vast ocean territory than unites rather than isolates the Pacific people-as-
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stewards. The Pacific Region therefore embodies a new scalar arrangement on two 
dimensions: scale as level (in terms of sociopolitical hierarchy) and scale as size (in terms 
of territorial extent) (Sayre 2009). Rescaling Pacific SIDS on both dimensions  
proved relatively useful in the struggle to be seen and heard in at the CoP10, a point we 
return to in our conclusions.   
2.5 A contingent and heterogeneous region 
In this section, we further support our case that this Pacific Region is a 
contingent scalar construction by comparing it to other institutionalized forms of Pacific 
regionalism. Recognizing scale as the product of a historical political process that is 
“always deeply heterogeneous and contested” (Swyngedouw 2000, p. 70), we also 
highlight the diversity of interests served, but also ignored or misrepresented, through 
the Pacific Region. 
2.5.1 Pacific Region as unbounded 
In 2007, 11 Pacific Island countries with representation in the UN established an 
informal group of Pacific SIDS to advance common interests within the UN system. This 
group includes Fiji, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Republic of Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. However, according to 
the SPREP, there are 14 Pacific SIDS parties to the CBD: the 11 nations listed above plus 
the Cook Islands, Kiribati, and Niue. It is this larger grouping (minus Niue, which did 
not send a delegate) that, with partners, participated in the enactment of the Pacific 
Region at CoP10. These Pacific SIDS groupings, whether 11, 13 or 14, exclude powerful 
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members of pre-existing regional organizations in the Pacific – Australia, New Zealand, 
France, and the United States – and thus represent a departure from institutionalized 
regional groupings in the Pacific Islands described earlier, groupings perceived as 
dominated by former colonial powers. Table 1 shows shifting participation in these 
different Pacific regionalisms, and illustrates the contingency of a region.  
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Table 1: Inclusion and exclusion in groupings of Pacific Islands and non-island 
countries as of August 2012. Check marks denote inclusion.  
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The enactment of the Pacific Region at CoP10 did not make the distinctions 
discussed above and shown in Table 1. Rather, the boundaries of the Pacific Region were 
blurred; Pacific SIDS and their partners spoke for and about the Pacific people and 
territory, and rarely outlined exactly who or what was included or excluded therein. In 
keeping the boundaries of the Pacific Region blurred, Pacific SIDS and their partners 
enrolled and simultaneously obscured Pacific Island territories that are not represented 
at the CBD as independent Pacific SIDS. The effect was invoking more extensive 
geopolitical support than was directly represented by the 13 Pacific SIDS that attended 
CoP10. Figure 2 illustrates this discrepancy by highlighting the exclusive economic 
zones (ocean territories) of the 13 Pacific SIDS that participated in CoP10. Homogenizing 
interests runs counter to the (perhaps idealistic) vision promulgated by Hau’ofa of a 
unifying oceanic identity that is something additional to diverse loyalties that should be 
not only recognized, but embraced (Hau’ofa 2008).  
 
  
Figure 2: State exclusive economic zones in the Pacific Ocean.
We observed only one instance of pushback against this representation, during 
the “Pacific SIDS: Value Island Biodiversity: It’s our life” side event (2215, October 22, 
2010).  When delegates from Samoa and Kiribati highlighted invasive species problems 
                                                       
7Map credit: Matthew Bowers. Data sources: U.S. National Park Service; VLIZ (2012). Maritime Boundaries 
Geodatabase, version 6. Available online at http://www.vliz.be/vmdcdata/marbound. Consulted on 2012
2. This map was created using ArcGIS® software by Esri. ArcGIS® and ArcMap™ are the intellectual 
property of Esri and are used herein under license. 
7Bougainville Island is part of the Autonomous Region of
not a CBD party (though PNG is). This individual is not listed as part of the PNG delegation; he introduced 
himself as a representative of the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity.
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in their presentations, an audience member from Bougainville Island8 countered that: 
“In other corners of Pacific, like where I come from, apart from rats and snails 
[invasive species], people’s islands are about to sink. [ . . .] While we talk about 
assistance from international agencies, we need to have these agencies to hear the 
rest of the Pacific and not just some corners of the Pacific ocean.”  
 
Such sentiments may be felt more widely, although we did not observe other acts of 
contestation at the meeting. Non-participating Pacific Islands could neither contribute to 
the representation nor contest it.   
We can also envision challenges to the unity of the Pacific Region from within, 
stemming from potential incongruities between national and regional priorities and 
unequal representation and power among participating Pacific SIDS.  The 13 and 9 
member delegations of Palau and Papua New Guinea respectively, for example, 
dwarfed the one-person delegations of the Marshall Islands, Tonga, Vanuatu, and 
Nauru. Which Pacific SIDS voices were reflected in that of the Pacific Region, and which 
were subsumed? As a Palauan delegate summarized, Pacific SIDS comprising the Pacific 
Region had “different levels of concern for different issues [at CoP10], but … were able 
to come up with something that we all agree on” (interview, July 2011). The compromise 
we observed as political unity may not always be desirable for all participants. The 
Pacific Region is also contingent upon the dynamics among 14 countries with diverse 
histories, cultures, priorities, and post-colonial ties to major world powers (Campbell 
2003). 
                                                        
8Bougainville Island is part of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and is 
not a CBD party (though PNG is). This individual is not listed as part of the PNG delegation; he introduced 
himself as a representative of the International Indigenous Forum on Biodiversity. 
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2.5.2 Role of non-state actors  
Recognizing that there has been little attention to the scalar politics of 
environmental NGOs (McCarthy 2005), we also draw attention to the key role that 
Pacific SIDS’ partners played in enacting the Pacific Region. In addition to SPREP’s role 
in orchestrating the groups’ activities and discourses as described previously, its work to 
support the Pacific Region was supported by larger funders, including Fonds Pacifique, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the CBD 
Secretariat, and the EU (SPREP 2011a). Representatives from national and international 
environmental NGOs, as well as foundations also worked closely with Pacific SIDS 
before and during CoP10. In a post-meeting report, SPREP noted that “In addition to the 
[Pacific Island] Parties, the following agencies and organizations were also present as 
part of the Pacific delegation to CoP10: SPREP, SPC, Wildlife Conservation Society, 
WWF, IUCN, Greenpeace and TNC” (SPREP NDa). These groups organized and 
attended regional preparatory meetings and side events during the meeting, 
participated in the Pacific SIDS strategic planning meetings in Nagoya, drafted 
interventions, briefed delegations, joined party delegates at lunch tables, and were active 
participants in the Skype discussions that kept Pacific SIDS in contact throughout the 
meeting. In some cases, NGO representatives were official members of Pacific Region 
party delegations. The Palauan delegation numbering 13, for example, included at least 
six representatives who either work for an NGO or whose attendance was funded by an 
NGO. For example, Pew Environment Group, Birdlife International, and SPREP 
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contributed funding for Palauan delegates to CoP10.  As one Palauan delegate 
summarized: “We were huge, but you know what, it wasn’t the Palauan government. It 
was all different organizations” (interview, July 2011).  
Many of the BINGOs that participated in enacting the Pacific Region are already 
active in individual island states and in other regional conservation initiatives (e.g. the 
Micronesia Challenge, the Coral Triangle Initiative; see Chapter 3). Thus, NGO interests 
in promoting a regional vision is not surprising, but here we consider how that support 
plays out in the context of the CBD. As already explained, most power in the CBD CoP 
process remains with parties. Thus, NGOs that participated in enacting the Pacific 
Region as advisors or as delegates on individual state delegations gained a more 
influential position in the CBD process than they have as observers. Moreover, the 
influence of NGOs increases as a function of Pacific SIDS influence. While this 
arrangement may increase the capacity of Pacific SIDS to participate more broadly in the 
meeting, one Palauan government official described the tensions that accompany 
mutual gains thus: 
“For small island countries, when we go [to CoP10], we don’t have the resources, 
we don’t have lawyers, we don’t have scientists …. And SPREP’s role there was 
actually to help us because when a country would introduce a whole new text 
and we didn’t have time to review it, I would give it to SPREP and SPREP 
organized …the NGOs to help … like IUCN, WWF, SPC. … So while I’m at the 
meeting, SPREP has taken that document, circulated it to our colleagues, the 
NGOs who are based in the Pacific, they get a chance to review it and they come 
back and tell us these are the pros and cons, and this is their position. And at the 
same time I have to determine if their recommendation is it good for my country 
or is it going to harm my country? …So we have to find that balance because 
number one we want to make sure that we do justice to our partners, our NGOs, 
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that they get something out of it. But number two, the second and foremost, is 
that whatever we do is not going to harm what’s happening at the national level, 
find that balance” (interview, July 2011). 
 
The official summarized, “half of the time we would say … your recommendation 
actually contradicts with our national interest” (interview, July 2011). 
Although Pacific SIDS are participants in the enactment of the Pacific Region, 
there is still substantial involvement from external actors and institutions, including a 
network of non-state actors with their own priorities that include but are not limited to 
increasing the capacity of Pacific SIDS to participate in the CoP10.  
2.6 Conclusions 
Muni (2005) has conceptualized an ocean region as a regional identity among 
countries along an ocean rim.  In contrast, this paper develops understanding of an 
encompassing oceanic region as a tool of a political scaling project. In this paper, taking 
the region seriously (Neumann 2010) has meant focusing our analysis on the practices 
through which Pacific Islands, as small and isolated, were rescaled into a Pacific Region 
at CoP10, and toward what ends.  
For Pacific SIDS, the Pacific Region served as a scalar fix (in the sense of problem-
solving; see McCann 2003) for two forms of smallness. The first is a practical smallness, 
referring to the size of Pacific SIDS delegations within the CoP10 meeting setting, and 
their associated limited capacity to participate as individual delegations. As summarized 
in SPREP (NDa, p. 4), “a specific success was the strong Pacific delegation to COP10 that 
was actively engaged in the negotiation processes.”  Participating as a Pacific Region 
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does empower Pacific SIDS and their partners relative to what they could achieve as 
independent delegations or observers in the context of the CoP10 meeting setting; as one 
Palauan delegate noted “this is actually the first time that I can recall in a CoP that 
Pacific Island countries are actually making interventions; the last CoP, hardly” 
(interview, October 2010). According to SPREP, Pacific SIDS made 33 interventions on 17 
issues; and CoP10 was the first time that designated delegates made opening and closing 
statements on behalf of the Pacific Islands (SPREP 2011b).  
Though this level of participation may have been unprecedented, it is still 
relatively limited in the context of a 12-day meeting and in contrast to actions by other 
parties. Pacific SIDS and their partners claim to have successfully participated in the 
negotiations, but they did not claim influence; still, together, they are a relatively small 
delegation of 52 representatives from NGOs and 13 states. While a delegation of 52 is a 
significant increase from the average individual Pacific SIDS delegation of 3 or 4, it is far 
smaller than other political groupings. The EU, for example, sent 458 delegates – more 
than 8 times the Pacific SIDS regional delegation. Organizations with observer status 
also dwarfed the Pacific SIDS; Birdlife International sent 109 people in addition to staff 
serving on party delegations. Recognizing that influence is not solely a function of 
delegation size, we note that even as a regional delegation, Pacific SIDS remain at a 
disadvantage when it comes to influencing negotiations at CoP10. 
But clearly, one of the ears that Pacific SIDS and their partners hoped would hear 
the “One Pacific Voice” was that of donors. Thus, the second smallness that the Pacific 
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Region fixed is a conceptual one linked to the global imagination of Pacific Island 
territories and populations as small, isolated, and somewhat irrelevant to achieving 
global conservation goals. The ocean conservation agenda is not the sole or even main 
driver of the Pacific Region. However, this context marks contingency in the political life 
of a region, or put another way, the specific form(s) into which it is brought into being. 
By collaborating to speak about one ocean as a region with one voice to highlight their 
collective contributions to marine biodiversity conservation, the Pacific Region sought to 
be seen, heard, and valued by potential partners and donors, as well as negotiation 
chairs at CoP10 – an audience increasingly interested in the oceans.  
By some accounts, these goals were achieved. SPREP’s evaluation of the 
performance at CoP10 was positive, and a metric used for this success was publicity, 
visibility, and recognition by development partners (SPREP 2011c.) The Pacific Region 
imaginary of a vast ocean space and network of people committed to the CBD and 
biodiversity conservation suggests that Pacific Islanders are willing and able to play a 
pivotal role in the conservation of a significant portion of the world’s oceans. In the 
context of increasing global attention to marine conservation, the enactment of such a 
Pacific Region is indeed likely to attract attention and support from donors.  
Viewing the region through the prism of scalar politics has enabled us to 
understand the region not only as a product of social processes, but also as a very 
deliberately constructed tool for reshaping them. Moreover, our findings are suggestive 
of an important role for global environmental meetings not only as venues for 
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negotiating policy, but also as stages upon which subaltern groups may have an 
opportunity to reframe – indeed, rescale – their positions within global imaginations and 
the global environmental governance agenda. The Pacific Region implicitly recognizes 
this when it assesses its success in terms of being seen and heard by donors, and the 
sense of empowerment associated with this, rather than in documenting specific 
influence on CoP decisions. 
However, not all view the Pacific Region as serving their interests.  Scales like 
regions are “institutionalized in complex ways in de/reterritorializing practices and 
discourses that may be partly concrete, powerful and bounded, but also partly 
unbounded, vague or invisible” (Paasi 2004, p. 542). It is in unbounded, vague or 
invisible components of the Pacific Region as enacted at CoP that both gives it rhetorical 
power – to speak with “One Pacific Voice” – and are potentially problematic.  In keeping 
the boundaries of the Pacific Region large and blurred within the global imagination, 
participating Pacific SIDS and partners invoke a sense of unity that is useful for some 
but contested by others, like the representative from Bougainville Island whose interests 
were spoken for but not fully represented under the Pacific Region banner. Contestation 
reflects a recognition that “the alliances social groups …forge over a certain spatial scale 
will shape the conditions of appropriation and control over place and have a decisive 
influence over relative socio-spatial power positions” (Swyngedouw 2000, p. 70).  In the 
case herein, contestation reflects recognition that the Pacific Region, once enacted, will 
likely do work at the CBD and beyond, by scaling and rescaling the objects and agents of 
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environmental governance in the Pacific Islands, and by potentially reshaping the nature 
of the funding, actors, institutions, and ideology already in place (or absent).  
We must ultimately ask: Is the Pacific Region a manifestation of Hau’ofa’s vision 
of ocean-centered regionalism that will empower Pacific Islanders to act with autonomy 
in international processes (Hau’ofa 2008)? Or is the Pacific Region an instrument of that 
same system, of nations, BINGOS, and funding agencies currently driving the global 
marine conservation agenda, one that has largely been focused on the creation of large 
networks of marine protected areas (Gray 2010)? Our analysis indicates that the answer 
lies somewhere between these extremes. Though the full impact of the Pacific Region is 
yet to be seen, its enactment by a network of Pacific SIDS, environmental NGOs, and 
SPREP, does represent a departure from some historic and current experiences with 
Pacific regionalism as institutionalized through regional organizations like the Pacific 
Island Forum and the SPC. However, the main organizers of the enactment, SPREP and 
its funders, are tied to former regionalizations that were seen as undermining autonomy. 
This autonomy is further undermined by the role of NGOs in not only supporting the 
enactment, but in participating as delegates for Pacific SIDS.  
Thus, although certain Pacific Islanders participate in and perceive benefits from 
the enactment of the Pacific Region, this version of the region, like the others in Pacific 
Island history, is not simply their own creation. The alliance we observed at CBD is 
predicated on the support of partners and the willingness of the Pacific Region to 
promote itself and be promoted as in line with global concerns for marine biodiversity 
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conservation. What happens to partner support if Pacific SIDS diverge from the marine 
conservation agenda?  In on-going and future work, we will continue to follow the 
scalar politics associated with the enactment of the Pacific Region to better understand 
the broader consequences of this particular version of Pacific regionalism.  At this 
juncture, we contend that even if the Pacific Region may help break away from a pre-
existing and powerful way of imagining Pacific Islands and Pacific regionalism (cf Hajer 
2009), it will likely fall short of Hau’ofa’s vision of self-determination.   
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3. Reconstructing Micronesia through regional 
environmental governance: What, why, and how is the 
Micronesia Challenge? 
3.1 Introduction 
On March 28, 2006, the President of Palau, Tommy Remengesau, introduced the 
Micronesia Challenge to an international audience of delegates, donors, and 
conservation organizations in a high level event at the CBD CoP 8 in Curitiba, Brazil: 
“[A]long with my counterparts across Micronesia, I have committed Palau to the 
‘Micronesia Challenge’ - a shared commitment by the countries and territories of 
Micronesia to a comprehensive system of protected area networks … Not only 
will this protect our future, it will contribute to global targets set forth at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity for protected areas, island biodiversity and to the sustainable 
livelihoods of island communities” (Tommy Remengesau, President of the 
Republic of Palau, High Level Event on “'Islands, Marine Biodiversity and 
Livelihoods: A Global Island Partnership,” CBD CoP 8, March 28, 2006).  
 
The representatives in the room that day included the presidents of Conservation 
International (CI) and WWF International, the vice president for external affairs of The 
Nature Conservancy (TNC), the executive coordinator of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF), and the executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). Minutes after President Remenegsau’s announcement, TNC stepped forward 
with a $3 million pledge of support to the Micronesia Challenge, challenging others to 
do the same: 
“the Micronesia Challenge is also a challenge to the rest of us. It is a challenge to 
lend a helping hand; to assist in providing both support and technical assistance 
to make the Micronesia Challenge a reality. And therefore, we would like to, The 
Nature Conservancy, TNC would like to issue its own challenge, an NGO 
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challenge, to all of you who are represented here. The Nature Conservancy 
pledges 3 million dollars towards sustainable financing of the Micronesia 
Challenge” (Nigel Purvis, vice president for external affairs for TNC, High Level 
Event on “'Islands, Marine Biodiversity and Livelihoods: A Global Island 
Partnership,” CBD CoP 8, March 28, 2006).  
 
The next speaker on the program was Russell Mittermeier, President of CI, who also 
publicly pledged $3 million dollars to the Micronesia Challenge, congratulating the 
region for its leadership in preventing biodiversity loss and meeting CBD targets.   
The Micronesia Challenge served multiple functions for a diverse network of 
policy actors in the context of this carefully staged policy performance at CBD CoP8 
(Hajer 2009). For President Remengesau, the Micronesia Challenge was a political tool 
that could attract the attention of powerful global actors and resources. For TNC, CI, and 
the CBD secretariat, it was a message to the world that the CBD program of work on 
protected areas, adopted at the previous CBD CoP 7 in 2004, was gaining traction. For 
the majority of conservation practitioners, resource owners, and fishers living and 
working in Micronesia, however, it was a surprise.  
This vignette introduces my interest in the Micronesia Challenge as a globally 
celebrated institution for regional environmental governance with linkages to global 
processes and actors, as well as local contexts in three countries and two U.S. 
jurisdictions in the tropical western pacific. Officially, the Micronesia Challenge is an 
international soft law1 agreement among the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), the 
                                                        
1International soft law is a broad (and debated) classification that is defined by what it is not; most 
commonly the term refers to “hortatory” obligations that are not legally binding (Guzman & Meyer 2010, 
p.172). 
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Republic of Palau (Palau), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (Marshall Islands), the 
unincorporated U.S. territory of Guam (Guam), and the U.S. Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), to “effectively conserve at least 30% of the near-
shore marine and 20% of the forest resources across Micronesia by 2020” (Micronesia 
Challenge Declaration of Commitment 2006). Unofficially, the Micronesia Challenge is 
an institution of environmental governance that means many things to diverse 
“interpretive communities” (Sayer 1994, p. 374).  It is a mobile policy that mutates as it is 
interpreted and articulated by and for a diverse network of actors in and across local 
and international contexts (Peck and Theodore 2012). Why and how it emerged, what 
form(s) it takes and functions it serves, and what it has come to mean to its champions, 
donors, and dissidents is the focus of analysis herein.  
3.2 Literature and key questions 
 Interstate cooperation for environmental governance at the regional level, or 
regional environmental governance, is not new to the Pacific Islands (Bryant-Tokalau 
and Frazer 2006) or ocean environments (Vallega 2002; Vandeveer 2002; Kutting 2000; 
Skjærseth 2000). Regional environmental governance in marine and coastal 
environments began more than 35 years ago, for example, with the launch of UNEP’s 
Regional Seas Programme in 1974, and has influenced international and comparative 
environmental politics and policy research agendas for more than twenty years 
(Vandeveer 2002).  However, there has been limited and unfocused scholarly attention 
to regional environmental governance as it relates to emerging scholarship within global 
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environmental politics regarding the diversification of governing authority and multi-
level governance (Balsiger and VanDeever 2012).  As Balsiger and VanDeveer (2012, p. 
2) summarize: “international coordination through governance arrangements that aim at 
regional rather than universal participation continues to proliferate, largely under the 
scholarly radar.”  This is true not only of the body of work studying global 
environmental politics but also within the international relations literature, where 
economic integration and security issues dominate research agendas focused on regions 
(Balsiger and VanDeever 2012). 
 In this context, a recent special issue of Global Environmental Politics (Volume 12, 
Issue 3, August 2012) has announced “the rise of the region in global environmental 
politics” (Conca 2012, p. 127), arguing that “It is time to bring the regional back in to the 
study of global environmental politics” (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012, p. 1). In an 
exploratory effort to explain the recent proliferation of regional environmental 
governance, one of the contributors, Conca (2012, p. 127), posited: “Clearly, some of the 
pull of the regional is rooted in the failure of the global.” For Conca, regional 
environmental governance is emerging as a potential alternative to global 
environmental governance in the context of “a profound sense of obstruction and drift at 
the global level” (2012, p. 129). The special issue outlines an interdisciplinary agenda for 
research on regional environmental governance with intellectual space for realist 
inquiries surrounding the forms that regional environmental governance takes and the 
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functions it performs, as well as constructivist attention to the question of how regions 
are made through environmental governance (Debarbieux 2012).  
 Recognizing that regional environmental governance “joins three essentially 
contested concepts” (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012), I draw on Lemos and Agrawal 
(2006) and Balsiger and VanDeveer (2012) to define regional environmental governance 
here as interstate institutions through which state and non-state actors influence 
environment-related incentives, knowledge, institutions, decision making, and 
behaviors across two or more countries. 
Within what Balsiger and VanDeveer (2010) have characterized as the emergent 
sub-discipline of regional environmental governance, most work to date has been 
focused on the European context, and regimes characterized by narrow thematic 
objectives, politically-based territoriality, and state actors.  Referring to their nascent 
typology of regional environmental governance (see Figure 3), Balsiger and VanDeveer 
(2010) have called for scholarly attention to emerging forms of regional environmental 
governance that address broader thematic issues (e.g. sustainable development), are 
founded upon so-called natural or ecoregional territoriality, and rely on nonstate actors 
as principal cooperating agents. This chapter answers their call by focusing on an 
instrument of regional environmental governance that embodies all three of these 
characteristics, in representation and/or practice.  
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Figure 3: Typology of regional environmental governance (Balsiger and VanDeveer 
2010, p. 6183). 
In light of the foregoing, there is much to learn from a case study of the 
Micronesia Challenge, a relatively new model of regional environmental governance 
that emerged in Micronesia in 2006 and quickly spread to multiple large ocean regions 
around the world. The Micronesia Challenge is credited as the inspiration for a growing 
number of similar initiatives, including the Caribbean Challenge (2008); the Coral 
Triangle Initiative (2007); and the Western Indian Ocean Coastal Challenge (under 
development as of 2013). Just four years after the launch of the Micronesia Challenge, a 
representative of the CBD Secretariat described the “Challenge” policy model – one 
characterized by interstate cooperation among island states and territories, thematic 
breadth, multi-million dollar endowments, regional conservation targets linked to global 
ones, and major coordinating and financing roles for non-state actors – as a movement:  
“One of the most exciting things about the Challenges is that they aren’t really 
isolated. This is increasingly becoming a movement. This is a movement that we 
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see is catalyzing implementation of the convention [on biological diversity] in 
general and is truly an inspirational prospect and hope for our convention” 
(Jason Spensely, CBD secretariat, Lifeweb Press Conference, CBD CoP 10, 
October 24, 2010).  
 
With the exception of a few recent studies of the emergence, effectiveness, and 
institutional structure of the Coral Triangle Initiative (Fidelman et al. 2012; Rosen and 
Olsson 2013; Green et al. 2011), there has been little social scientific attention to the 
prolific “Challenge” model of regional environmental governance.   
This chapter presents a descriptive, empirical case study of the Micronesia 
Challenge to offer related contributions, first, to our understanding of a new and 
influential form of regional environmental governance outside of Europe, and, second, 
to the emerging research agenda on regional environmental governance.  Chapter 2 
outlined the scalar politics inherent in the social processes of enacting a region on the 
global environmental governance stage set at the CBD CoP 10. The present chapter re-
engages constructivist human geography theory on regionalization to examine the scalar 
politics inherent in the social processes of institutionalizing a region through regional 
environmental governance.  In so doing, I seek to advance understanding of the political 
work of a region – defined here as in Chapter 2 as a product of “historically contingent 
social processes” (Paasi 2004, p. 540) – attempted and/or achieved through a popular 
model of regional environmental governance. Thus, with a focus on the regional within 
regional environmental governance, this chapter examines three interrelated questions: 
(1) Emergence: How and why did the Micronesia Challenge emerge? 
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(2) Form: What is the territoriality, coordinating agency, and thematic foci of the 
Micronesia Challenge? How is the Micronesia Challenge made regional, and 
how regional is the Micronesia Challenge? 
(3) Function: How is the Micronesia Challenge functioning within, for, and/or 
against participating jurisdictions?  
In identifying and answering these questions, I seek to understand not whether but how 
regional environmental governance works; and, by extension, not whether regional 
environmental governance succeeds, but how success is produced through it (Mosse 
2004).   
  Section 3.5 finds that the Micronesia Challenge emerged through a partnership 
of state and NGO actors who identified political opportunity in articulating large-scale 
conservation success in the context of broader institutional processes and agendas. This 
section argues that the emergence of the Micronesia Challenge reflects a mutually 
constitutive relationship between regional and global environmental governance. Next, 
Section 3.6 engages Balsiger and VanDeever’s (2010) typology of regional environmental 
governance to analyze the form(s) that the Micronesia Challenge has taken in both 
representation and practice. I argue for an extension of the typology to include 
governance, and conclude that that the Micronesia Challenge falls along multiple points 
of individual axes on the expanded typology. Finally, Section 3.7 describes how local 
actors, including local environmental NGOs, are putting the Micronesia Challenge to 
work for highly contextualized functions beyond most traditional conceptualizations of 
  
 
62
environmental governance. This finding calls into question research foci on regional 
environmental governance solely as instruments of environmental governance (as 
traditionally conceived), articulating a need for broader investigations of regional 
environmental governance as a means to more diverse ends. Before turning to the 
empirical analysis, Section 3.3 describes case study methods, and Section 3.4 situates the 
case within the political history of regionalism in Micronesia. 
3.3 Methods 
A comprehensive analysis of the Micronesia Challenge, as a regional institution 
linking the global to the local, calls for a distended case study, “sensitive both to 
movement [. . . ] and to those variable experiences of embedding and transformation 
underway in `downstream' sites of adoption/emulation” (Peck and Theodore, p. 24). As 
such, the field of research on the Micronesia Challenge necessarily challenges traditional 
understandings of the field as a single, geographically bounded place. My method for 
collecting data on the emergence, form, and function of the Micronesia Challenge may 
best be characterized as a “follow the policy” approach, which embodies the 
ethnographic tracking of mutable policy “through globalizing networks and across 
transnational jurisdictional spaces” (Peck and Theodore 2012, p. 22). In the following 
sections I describe how and why I followed the Micronesia Challenge from the United 
Nations CBD CoP 10 in Japan (October 19-29, 2010), to the 17th Micronesian Chief 
Executive’s Summit in Guam (March 12-14, 2012), and finally, to local contexts in each of 
the participating jurisdictions (March 14-April 27, 2012).  
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3.3.1 Collaborative Event Ethnography: the CBD CoP 10   
As part of a larger collaborative event ethnography project (see Chapter 2), I 
collected ethnographic data at the CBD CoP 10 on the linkages between the Micronesia 
Challenge and the global project of biodiversity conservation October 19-29, 2010. 
As a field site, the CBD CoP 10 event allowed me a window into the global processes, 
institutions, actors, and political agendas that structure relationships and incentives key 
to the production of the Micronesia Challenge. My primary method for collecting data at 
the CBD CoP 10 was participant observation at formal proceedings, side events, and 
informal meetings, including nine events that specifically showcased the Micronesia 
Challenge and associated policies (e.g. Palau’s Protected Area Network). As an observer 
at the CBD CoP10, I gained firsthand insight how the Micronesia Challenge is 
articulated on the global environmental governance stage, to what ends, and by whom. 
On a practical level, the CBD COP 10 also enabled me initiate relationships with a 
translocal network of actors whom I would later “follow” along with the policy to other 
regional and local contexts, where they engaged with the Micronesia Challenge on quite 
different terms (refer to Chapter 2 for a full discussion of collaborative event 
ethnography).  
3.3.2 Event ethnography: 17th Micronesian Chief Executive’s Summit 
in Guam  
The chief executives of Guam, CNMI, Palau, Marshall Islands, the FSM, and the four 
states comprising the FSM (Pohnpei, Chuuk, Yap, and Kosrae) meet bi-annually through 
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the Micronesian Chief Executive’s Summit to coordinate and implement regional 
strategies and policies, including the Micronesia Challenge. The Micronesia Challenge 
regional steering committee (described in detail later) organizes a series of policy 
planning meetings alongside the bi-annual Micronesian Chief Executive’s Summits, 
where a formal update on the status of the Micronesia Challenge is a standing agenda 
item. I conducted participant observation of the 17th Micronesian Chief Executive’s 
Summit in Guam on March 12-13, 2012 and four associated policy planning and grant 
review meetings pertaining to the Micronesia Challenge to “follow” the regional-level 
policy processes through which the Micronesia Challenge is interpreted and translated 
into plans of work, committees, scientific research agendas, communication campaigns, 
and island-specific projects. 
3.3.3 Interviews in five Micronesian nations and territories  
In both Peck and Theodore’s distended case study and this one, “[t]he questions of 
how policies-from-elsewhere are put to work by local actors, and how they are 
translated, contextualized, and embedded, must always be on the table” (Peck and 
Theodore 2012, p. 5).  Accordingly, I also followed the Micronesia Challenge to local 
sites of implementation (see Table 2), where I collected data on the emergence, form, and 
function of the Micronesia Challenge within each participating jurisdiction through a 
total of 82 semi-structured interviews and collection of policy documents, 
conceptualized broadly to include speech transcripts, meeting minutes, promotional 
material, and fact sheets (Shore and Wright 1997; Yanow 1996). 
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Table 2: Field work schedule in Micronesia Challenge jurisdictions, March 14-April 
27, 2012. 
Field site Dates (2012) Duration (nights) 
Guam March 14 – March 21 7 
Republic of Palau March 21- April 1 11 
Saipan, Commonwealth of 
the Northern Mariana 
Islands 
April 1- April 8 7 
Pohnpei, Federated States of 
Micronesia 
April 8- 14 6 
Chuuk, Federated States of 
Micronesia 
April 14-18 4 
Republic of the Marshall 
Islands 
April 18-27 9 
Total  44 
 
As revealed in Table 2, distended case study approach embodies an “inescapable 
trade-off between the situational depth (and connectivity with subjects and settings) 
achievable in long-duration, single-site ethnographies” and transnational reach (Peck 
and Theodore 2012, p. 25). However, my ability to approach methodological saturation 
through local depth and transnational reach was strengthened (though not fully 
achieved) through my focused scope of research and the enabling logistics of small 
island contexts. Participating jurisdictions had relatively small and accessible 
populations of key policy actors, whom I identified through snowball sampling and 
document review. Government and professional offices were clustered in compact 
urban centers, with the exception of FSM. Thus, interviewees included a near census of 
key policy actors historically and currently involved with conceptualizing, 
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communicating, and implementing the Micronesia Challenge in each participating 
jurisdiction, and they included two heads of state. 
Specifically, interviewees were policy actors working for transnational and 
national NGOs, research institutions, national (or equivalent) levels of government, and 
other organizations (e.g. the Guam Fishermen’s Cooperative). I reference interviewees 
here using a coding scheme that preserves confidentiality but reveals and calls attention 
to the situated opinions, interpretations, and experiences of people who would likely 
self-identify as Palauan or Marshallese, for example, before they would as 
“Micronesian.”  Interviewees who live and work primarily within one “home” island 
are coded and cited as follows: Guam (GM1-GM9); Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI1 –CNMI14); Federated States of Micronesia (FSM1-FSM12); 
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI1-RMI16); Republic of Palau (ROP1- ROP16). 
Interviewees working for international non-governmental or inter-governmental 
organizations are coded and cited as INGO1-INGO15; this group includes interviewees 
working for the Global Environment Facility (GEF), TNC, CI, the Micronesia 
Conservation Trust, the Micronesia Challenge Regional Office, RARE, the Global Island 
Partnership, and the Micronesian Image Institute.  
Semi-structured interviews were tailored to interviewee expertise and 
involvement. Interviews were designed to trace processes in an interpretivist approach, 
honing in not only on what occurred but how it occurred, as well as “the preferences 
and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values and their specification 
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of the situations that face them” (Venesson 2008, p. 233). Interviews with key 
institutional entrepreneurs (Rosen and Olsson 2013), for example, focused on their 
motivation for institutional change, interactions with other institutional entrepreneurs, 
the origin of and struggle over different ideas, the structure of policy design forums, the 
information the interviewee had about their situation, and the broader institutions that 
were used as models and impetus for institutional design (Ostrom 1990; McCay 2002).  
Data collection and analysis was guided by constructivist grounded theory, an 
iterative process of theoretical sampling where analyses of data takes place during and 
after data collection and guides the collection effort (Charmaz 2000). All interviews were 
transcribed and, along with the document research and participant observation notes, 
uploaded to QSR NVivo software for qualitative analysis encompassing a combination 
of thematic coding, process tracing (Venesson, 2008), and conjunctural analysis of the 
actors and institutions that come together at specific historical conjunctures to produce 
particular policy trajectories (Hart 2004; Corson 2008).  
3.4 Case study background 
3.4.1 Historical construction of Micronesia  
Micronesian lacks concrete definition 
An Inadequate 
Insufficient 
Identity 
Misplaced 
Bestowed Wrongly 
Upon a large and diverse 
Pacific Island Population 
Who are not under one flag 
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Who do not speak one tongue 
Who do not eat the same food 
And most of all who 
Do not want to be recognized as one. 
-Excerpt, Emelihter Kihleng “The Micronesian 
Question” 2005 (quoted in Hanlon 2009, p. 
99).  
 
Through a series of ill-informed (at best) discussions among a small number of 
French geographers and explorers in the 1830s, the peoples of the Pacific Islands were 
named, mapped, and grouped into Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia, meaning the 
black islands, many islands, and tiny islands, respectively (Hanlon 2009; Campbell 2003; 
Rainbird 2003).  In the earliest efforts to circumscribe Micronesia, Rainbird (2003) and 
Hanlon (2009) point to a particular absence of experience and knowledge, and an 
abundance of generalizations that nonetheless have produced “a persisting orthodoxy 
about a culture region that cannot be sustained as a single entity by any combination of 
archeological, linguistic, ethnographic, or local historical evidence” (Hanlon 2009, p. 94).  
While there are anthropologists who would disagree with this assessment (e.g., Kiste 
and Marshall 1999), the fact remains that the Micronesia “culture region” has been 
reified, or made real, over the past 180 years through dynamic discursive, political, and 
institutional regionalizing processes that reflect “Euro-American society’s concerns for a 
neat, manageable, efficient, and logical ordering of the world” (Hanlon 1989, p. 2).  It has 
also been reshaped by these processes. Acknowledging the dynamic, constructed, and 
contested nature of the term Micronesia, this section provides a non-exhaustive review of 
the shared and distinct political histories of five nations and two U.S. jurisdictions most 
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commonly understood as Micronesia today (hereafter, collectively referenced as 
“orthodox Micronesia”):  the unincorporated U.S. territory of Guam, the U.S. 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, 
the Republic of Palau, the Republic of Kiribati (Kiribati), and the Republic of Nauru 
(Nauru) (Kiste and Marshall 1999).  
3.4.2 Colonial history  
 This section focuses on dimensions of colonial history that underwrite the 
particular version of Micronesia that is re-made through the Micronesia Challenge; that 
is, a colonially delineated Micronesia tied to the U.S., which is one that does not include 
Nauru and Kiribati.  Formal U.S. ties to the region began in 1898, when Spain ceded 
Guam (along with Puerto Rico and the Philippines) to the United States after the 
Spanish-American War. After more than 60 years of military rule, Guam became an 
unincorporated U.S. territory in 1950 through the Organic Act of Guam (Leibowitz 
1989). U.S. holdings in Micronesia expanded greatly following World War II.  In 1947, 
after nearly five centuries of colonial rule by Spain, Germany, and Japan, the Japanese-
mandated holdings in the Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Island groups (present day 
FSM, CNMI, Palau, and RMI) were designated a Trust Territory of the U.S. through an 
agreement with the United Nations Security Council (McKibben 1990; Leibowitz 1989) 
(see Figure 4).  This “strategic” Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands included 2,000 
islands with a total land area of 700 square miles - about half the size of Rhode Island - 
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spread across an area in the tropical western pacific ocean larger than the continental 
United States (Leibowitz 1989). 
 From the outset, the U.S. endeavored to solidify the historically imposed political 
unity of these islands by treating them as one entity, both in name - formally, the Trust 
Territory of the Pacific Islands or informally, Micronesia - and in administration, for 
example, through the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia, a region-wide 
legislative body of elected indigenous representatives (Leibowitz 1989).  However, as 
many have since argued, “Micronesia is not an integrated whole and it never was” and 
the United States was to fail in its efforts to permanently impose formal political 
cohesion (for their purposes of administrative ease) (Leibowitz 1989, p. 503). 
  At the behest of indigenous leaders and the United Nations, negotiations 
regarding the future political status of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands began in 
1969 (Kiste and Marshall 1999).  Internal fragmentation quickly emerged between 
advocates for autonomy and those who preferred a permanent, close political 
relationship with the U.S. similar to that of Guam. In 1972, the Northern Marianas was 
the first to request separate status negotiations; they voted for a commonwealth political 
status in 1975, making the CNMI population American citizens and territory part of the 
U.S. (Kiste and Falgout 1999).  For those aspiring to sovereignty, however, full 
independence “was never entertained as a serious option by Washington,” given 
Micronesia’s strategically valuable location for U.S. military interests (Kiste and Falgout 
1999, p. 41).
  
7
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Figure 4: Political entities most commonly accepted as Micronesia, or “orthodox Micronesia.” Dotted lines denote island 
groupings included within the former Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the rough boundaries of present day 
CNMI (Northern Mariana Islands in Figure), Palau (Republic of Belau in Figure), Marshall Islands, and FSM (Caroline 
Islands minus Palau in Figure). Note that Guam, K
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, though they are typically included within maps of “Micronesia.” 
Copyright by University of Pittsburgh. Reprinted by permission 
 
iribati, and Nauru were not included within the U.S.
(Peoples 1993)
-administered 
 
. 
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Indigenous leaders also recognized the constraints imposed by decades of U.S. economic 
development policy and aid that placed their islands in a trajectory of “hopeless” 
economic dependency (Hanlon 1998, p. 158).  
 The potential for a political status of free association emerged as a possibility in 
1971 (Kiste and Falgout 1999). As the negotiations proceeded, U.S. military priorities 
further enhanced the movement toward political fragmentation among islands of the 
Trust Territory; those islands of relatively higher strategic military value for the U.S. – 
present day Palau and Marshall Islands – leveraged their increased bargaining power to 
negotiate independence while the remaining islands, together, became present day FSM 
(Leibowitz 1989; Kiste and Falgout 1999). After a protracted, deeply contentious, and 
sometimes violent series of negotiations, the Marshall Islands and FSM signed Compacts 
of Free Association with the U.S. in 1986, while Palau signed theirs in 1994 (Kiste and 
Falgout 1999).   
 In summary, the five Micronesia Challenge jurisdictions are all currently 
politically tied to the U.S., and to one another through a variety of U.S. programs and 
self-organized regional initiatives. As of 2000, they are all members of the U.S. Coral 
Reef Task Force (though the freely associated states are non-voting members while 
Guam and the CNMI are full members), an interagency body established “to lead U.S. 
efforts to preserve and protect coral reef ecosystems.”  Formal self-organized regional 
cooperation among the “U.S. affiliated islands of Micronesia,” as they sometimes refer to 
themselves collectively, re-merged in 2003 through the Western Micronesian Chief 
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Executives’ Summit (Guam, CNMI, Yap, Palau) and the Micronesian Presidents’ Summit 
(FSM, Marshall Islands, and Palau). In 2007, the two groups merged to form one 
Micronesian Chief Executives Summit.  Since 2007, the U.S. affiliated islands of 
Micronesia have met biannually through the Micronesian Chief Executives Summit to 
“form an emerging foundation of regional cooperation and governance” though “joint 
communiqués and related resolutions, letters and associated actions and arrangements” 
(MCSF Web Page 2013).  Following a distinct colonial trajectory – one that today defines 
their exclusion from contemporary regional cooperation among the U.S. affiliated 
islands of Micronesia, and subsequently, the Micronesia Challenge (Table 3) - Nauru, 
formerly a British-mandated territory administered by Australia, became a United 
Nations Trust Territory after World War II, with Australia as administering authority, 
while Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert Islands) remained a British colony from 1915 until 
becoming independent in 1979 (Campbell 2003).   
Table 3: The signatories to the Micronesia Challenge all U.S. affiliated islands of 
Micronesia, representing a subset of “orthodox Micronesia” that excludes the 
Republics of Kiribati and Nauru. 
Orthodox Micronesia U.S. affiliated islands of Micronesia / 
Signatories to the Micronesia Challenge 
Guam Guam 
Republic of Palau Republic of Palau 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands 
Federated States of Micronesia Federated States of Micronesia 
Republic of the Marshall Islands Republic of the Marshall Islands 
Republic of Kiribati X 
Republic of Nauru X 
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3.4.3 Contemporary status of Micronesia Challenge jurisdictions 
The Compacts of Free Association negotiated between the U.S. and FSM, the 
Marshall Islands, and Palau (herein referred to collectively as freely associated states) 
have been described as forced marriages (Aldridge and Myers 1990) that “offer a 
constrained almost neocolonial future” for the Freely Associated States (Hanlon 1998, p. 
217). While the unique details of these arrangements are beyond the scope of this paper, 
in simplest terms, the Compacts of Free Association tie the FSM, Marshall Islands, and 
Palau to the U.S. through unique packages of economic aid and U.S. federal services (i.e., 
postal, weather, aviation, defense) in exchange for specific and exclusive territorial use 
rights for U.S. military facilities and operations.  Freely associated states operate under 
their own constitutions and associated governments and citizenship requirements. Their 
populations are not U.S. citizens. Officially, the FSM, Marshall Islands, and Palau may 
conduct their own foreign affairs, including entrance into treaties and agreements; 
however, they must “consult” with the U.S. government before doing so.  The freely 
associated states are all members of the United Nations (FSM and Marshall Islands since 
1991, and Palau since 1994) and parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity. Their geopolitical power is relatively limited, however: 
“”Microstates” face severe disadvantages in their dealing with the rest of the 
world owing to low bargaining power and high fixed costs of negotiation. Owing 
to their small size, microstates do not usually possess the needed human and 
physical capacities to unilaterally conduct the various bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations that are typical for developing nations” (Andriamananjara and 
Schiff 2001, p. 42; see also Chapter 2). 
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Populations within the freely associated “microstates” range from about 21,100 in Palau, 
to 70,000 in the Marshall Islands, and 106,000 in FSM (CIA 2013).  
The governments of FSM, Palau, and the Marshall Islands are all federations.  
Traditional leaders and laws are also supported and exercised to varying degrees.  In the 
Marshall Islands, local atoll governments have jurisdiction over inshore marine 
resources within five nautical miles, “but decisions are often made under the guidance 
of traditional leaders” (Baker et al. 2011, p. 2).  In Palau, sixteen small state governments 
hold exclusive ownership of the ocean and its resources from the land to 12 nautical 
miles seaward, but the Palauan constitutions grants equal authority to statutes and 
traditional law such that states may not impair traditional fishing rights (Constitution of 
the Republic of Palau). Ownership and governance of land and marine areas varies 
among the four states of FSM; traditional tenure remains particularly strong in Chuuk 
and Yap.  
In contrast to the freely associated states, the political relationships between the 
U.S. and Guam and CNMI are closer to that of U.S. states  (Leibowitz 1989). Before the 
passage of the Guam Organic Act of 1950, the U.S. navy exercised complete control over 
Guam (Quimby 2011).  The Organic Act brought U.S. citizenship to Guam’s population, 
as well as a “modest degree” of self-government that includes a local government 
comprising executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Quimby 2011, p. 359). The 
ultimate governing authority is the U.S. congress, though the territory is represented in 
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the U.S congress by one non-voting delegate.  The head of state is the U.S. President 
while a locally-elected governor is the Head of Government.  
Customary governance akin to that still present in the freely associated states has 
long since eroded on Guam (Loerzel 2013). Similar to the U.S., governance of public land 
and marine areas is the task of local and federal government agencies. Near-shore 
marine areas from 0-3 miles offshore are managed by the territorial government’s 
Department of Agriculture, Division of Aquatic and Wildlife Resource, while the 3-200 
miles offshore is under the jurisdiction of the Western Pacific Regional Fishery 
Management Council, a quasi-federal agency under the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The territorial government controls 
approximately 20 to 25% of land on Guam, while the US federal government holds 32%, 
29% of which is military bases (Quimby 2011). The United Nations regards Guam as one 
of the world’s 16 remaining non-self-governing territories, and, as such, in need of 
independence and self-determination (Quimby 2011). Indigenous Chamorro activists, 
including the current Governor, have led controversial decolonization and cultural 
renewal movements in Guam since the late 1960s (Quimby 2011).  
The Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in 
Political Union with the United States of America entered into force in 1975, granting the 
people of CNMI American citizenship (Leibowitz 1989).  The Commonwealth status 
confers greater autonomy than the territorial status of Guam through “a contradictory 
mixture of confederation and federation under a quasi-independent guise, but without 
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providing either union with, or independence from the U.S.” (Statham 2002, p. 328). 
With exceptions, the U.S. legal system applies to the locality, though the CNMI also 
operates under its own constitution (since 1978) and a locally elected head of 
government and legislature. Similar to Guam, the U.S. President is head of state, the 
CNMI is permitted one non-voting delegate in the U.S. congress, and the U.S. has “full 
authority” over foreign affairs (Leibowitz 1989, p. 67).  All waters from 0 to 200 miles 
surrounding CNMI are considered federal, though marine and coastal governance is 
coordinated among both CNMI and federal government agencies, including the CNMI 
Coastal Resources Management Office, the CNMI Division of Environmental Quality, 
and the Western Pacific Regional Fishery Management Council.  Because the United 
States is not a signatory to the CBD, neither Guam nor CNMI are parties, unlike the 
freely associated states. See Table 4 for an expanded summary of the information 
presented in this section.  
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Table 4: Basic statistics about Micronesia Challenge signatories (Population, political status, land area, per capita GDP, 
and language data from: CIA 2013.) 
 
Micronesia 
Challenge 
Jurisdiction 
 
 
Population 
 
GDP 
Per 
capita2 
 
 
Languages 
 
 
Land 
Area 
 
 
Political 
Status 
 
Party to 
the CBD 
Governing Authority 
for Near-shore 
Marine Areas 
Palau 21,108 $10,500 Palauan,  
English, 
Sonsoralese, Tobian 
459 km2 Constitutional 
government in free 
association with the US 
Yes Local government/ 
Traditional leaders 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
106,104 $3,000 English,  
Chuukese, Kosrean, 
Pohnpeian, Yapese,  
Ulithian, Woleaian, 
Nukuoro, 
Kapingamarangi 
702 km2 Constitutional 
government in free 
association with the US 
Yes Various 
Marshall Islands 69,747 $3,200 Marshallese, English 181 km2 Constitutional 
government in free 
association with the US 
Yes Local government/ 
Traditional Leaders 
Guam 160,378 $28,700 Chamorro, English 544 km2 Unincorporated 
territory of the US 
No Territorial 
government  
Commonwealth of 
the Northern 
Mariana Islands 
51,170 $13,600 Chamorro, English 464 km2 Commonwealth in 
political union with the 
US 
No Territorial 
government/ 
US Federal 
government 
                                                        
2 Lower GDP per capita within Palau, FSM, and Marshall Islands, in part, reflects the higher prevalence of subsistence lifestyles. 
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3.5 Emergence of the Micronesia Challenge 
I approach institutional emergence as a political process shaped by the situated 
rational choices of policy actors who are embedded in particular historic, cultural, and 
political situations in which “money, power, or influence ‘talk’” (Mccay 2002, p. 384). In 
applying the concept of embeddedness (Polanyi 1944), I draw attention to both agency 
and structure in the process of institutional emergence. However, recognizing that 
“policy ideas are important less for what they say than for who they bring together” 
(Mosse 2004, p. 649), the following account of the evolution of the Micronesia Challenge 
focuses on key institutional or policy entrepreneurs (Rosen Olsson 2013) and their 
synergistic, albeit diverse, motivations as shaped by historical, institutional, and political 
processes. I rely heavily on quotations to tell the story of emergence primarily from the 
perspective of those individuals who experienced it.   
3.5.1 Incentives for regional cooperation among the U.S. affiliated 
islands of Micronesia 
The emergence of the Micronesia Challenge centered around two high-level 
policy–making events that took place within a four month period: the 14th U.S. Coral 
Reef Task Force meeting in Palau in November of 2005, and the CBD CoP 8, in Curitiba, 
Brazil in March of 2006.  The 14th meeting of the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force was to be the 
first one held in a freely associated state. High-level representatives from U.S. federal 
grant-making agencies, among others, would be travelling across an ocean to Palau, and 
the President of Palau, Tommy Remengesau, “knew that he needed to come up with 
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something big, you know, [for them] to come all the way to Palau” (INGO11).  Around 
that same time, TNC was gearing up for the biennial CBD CoP 8 in 2006, where a new 
program of work on island biodiversity was to be adopted. At the previous CoP meeting 
in 2004, the CBD CoP7 had set a target of protecting 10% of the earth’s ecological regions 
by 2010, and adopted an associated program of work on protected areas for guiding 
implementation (CBD/CoP7, Decisions VII/30; VII/28). TNC was heavily invested in the 
formulation and adoption of the program of work on protected areas, and was looking 
for implementation success stories to highlight at the upcoming CoP 8, “to put some 
muscle into the COP7 program of work, because most countries weren’t even paying 
attention to it” (INGO11).  
As these two meetings approached, there was shared understanding among a 
very small network of key policy entrepreneurs based primarily in Palau – specifically, 
the President of Palau, Tommy Remengesau, his top advisors, and a handful of TNC 
staff – that “there was an opportunity to essentially give the president something to 
launch or announce” (INGO14). More specifically, from the perspective of the Palauan 
government, these upcoming meetings represented international stages upon which to 
“enhance Palau’s abilities in the international arena, in the regional arena, and at home 
to protect environment” (ROP3).    
The “thing to launch” would coalesce around the agendas of key policy 
entrepreneurs, protected area targets set by the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force and the CBD, 
historically institutionalized regionalism, and pre-existing conservation efforts in the 
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freely associated states of FSM, Marshall Islands, and Palau. One of the key objectives 
for the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force is “to protect at least 5% of all coral reefs and 
associated habitat types in each major island group and Florida by 2002; at least 10% by 
2005, and at least 20% by 2010” (National Action Plan to Conserve Coral Reefs 2000, p. 
20). Progress toward these targets in the U.S. mainland was lagging and “Tommy, you 
know, thought, well, we could offer Micronesian states, so they could meet their goals. 
And of course, then you know, this was kind of backroom talking in DC” (INGO11). 
TNC was similarly interested in a target-driven initiative that could also demonstrate 
globally significant progress toward CBD protected area targets and associated program 
of work on protected areas: “We needed something to say the program [of work on 
protected areas] is working, cause everybody was saying oh, the COP7 plan was a total 
waste of time …. we needed something in 2006 to make a splash” (INGO11). 
 The incentive to construct a regional level initiative was thus drawn from 
externally generated pressure to convey progress at a globally significant spatial scale.  
From the perspective of TNC,  
“[The region] was a larger slice of the planet, and there is a certain amount of 
attention that gets paid when you know, dealing with global resources and 
actions of global significance, when you can define a large area or a significant 
slice of biodiversity or a significant number of people” (INGO14). 
 
 The Palauan government similarly  
“[R]ealized the reality that we were talking about a small percentage of the 
Pacific Ocean resources, and that a more effective voice would be to do it on a 
regional basis, and from a regional we could go international” (ROP10).   
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Here, the ability to “go international” is shorthand for leveraging financial resources 
from the international donors:  
“If we were to go to GEF, the UN, like the Global Environmental Fund, or 
approach The Nature Conservancy or these NGOs [as individual jurisdictions], 
they could probably give a minimum amount here, a minimal amount there, you 
know. But, our goal was a bigger goal. It was something that was not just limited 
to a small entity” (ROP10).  
 
As another official summarized,  
“[T]here was potential for bigger money would come if we make it a regionally 
effort, instead of just a Palauan effort so to speak, so the more support that we 
got for it not only regionally but internationally, the more support and more in 
terms of funding, so that is where the thought of Micronesia Challenge began” 
(ROP15). 
 
 Of course, the idea for regional level cooperation on environmental issues did 
not arise in a vacuum.  As many interviewees emphasized:  
“[The Micronesia Challenge] didn’t just appear out of nowhere – there was 
already some regional effort going on on the part of the government and other 
organizations that were working with them” (INGO6).   
 
In particular, interviewees highlighted the contemporary platform for cooperation 
among the U.S. affiliated states of Micronesia – one built on the enduring legacy of 
shared colonial ties—to which the Micronesia Challenge could be conveniently attached. 
This included the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force; the Micronesians in Island Conservation 
peer-learning network supported by TNC and the Packard Foundation (Bruton-Adams 
et al. 2011); and the summits - the Western Micronesian Chief Executives’ Summit and 
the Micronesian Presidents’ Summits, which would merge in 2007.  
  
 
83
 While there are examples of more inclusive institutionalized regionalism in 
orthodox Micronesia (such as the Micronesian Games, a quadrennial international multi-
sport event that brings together athletes from Palau, Guam, CNMI, Marshall Islands, 
FSM, Nauru, and Kiribati), political cooperation through the Micronesia Challenge was 
built upon an existing foundation of existing political and institutional infrastructure. 
That the Micronesia Challenge originated from a U.S. freely associated state in 
connection with the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force meant that there was no serious 
consideration of including Kiribati and Nauru within the Micronesia Challenge in the 
earliest stages of its development. As one policy entrepreneur reflected:  
“[A]lthough [they are] quote, Micronesian, there’s really almost never any 
political coalition discussion with Kiribati or Nauru [ . . .]. We just wanted to 
keep it in our tight regional group and that probably had something to do with 
practicalities. We know each other, were already doing the [Micronesian] Chief 
Executive Summits” (ROP3).  
 
 The other practicalities interviewees referenced included shared currency, and 
especially, the geography of transportation infrastructure. The U.S. affiliated islands of 
Micronesia are serviced by a major U.S. airline, making travel among them relatively 
direct and affordable. Kiribati and Nauru are excluded from this route and thus air 
travel across the colonially-delineated boundaries is exceedingly expensive (often 
prohibitively so (see Bruton-Adams et al. 2011)), and circuitous. The exclusion of Kiribati 
and Nauru from the Micronesia Challenge thus reflects another component of the 
historically contingent and contested social processes through which regions are 
reconstructed, and maintained over time. Though politically and logistically practical, 
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according to a few interviewees, the exclusion of Kiribati and Nauru from the Micronesia 
Challenge “has really deepened that line in the sand [between the U.S. affiliated islands 
of Micronesia and Kiribati and Nauru]” (ROP9). While most interviewees matter-of-
factly explained the exclusion of Kiribati and Nauru with reference to practicalities – i.e., 
“it just made sense” (INGO7) – a small minority characterized the act as a quiet and 
enduring source of tension: 
“The implications of what that did, what that single mishap or that move or lack 
thereof did to our relationship with Kiribati and Nauru has really been 
underplayed [. . . ]. It’s like the white elephant in the room between us now. If we 
were really trying to get support in the [wider Pacific] region for the Micronesia 
Challenge at a SPREP meeting or we’re trying to really go to the Pacific Islands 
Forum it’s a little bit uncomfortable right? Because we’re going ‘blah blah blah’ 
and we’ve [got] two of our cultural siblings in the room kind of going, ‘yeah well 
we’re not [part of that]’. So, you know, we’re not going to do a song and dance 
for that because you kind of dissed us’” (ROP9). 
 
3.5.2 A regional target-driven initiative is born 
 For the policy entrepreneurs, the task at hand was to build on pre-existing 
regional cooperation and local conservation initiatives to produce conservation success 
stories for the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force, the UN CBD, TNC, and the Palauan President.  
With funding from TNC’s “Early Action Grants” in support of the CBD program of 
work on protected areas, nascent protected area networks (PANs) were already under 
development in FSM, Marshall Islands, and Palau.  Of the three, Palau was by far the 
most developed, with a national Protected Area Network Act in place since 2003.  As the 
two international meetings approached, key policy entrepreneurs engaged the Palau 
Conservation Society to identify a set of regional area-based conservation targets that 
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were within reach for Palau and other U.S. affiliated islands of Micronesia. At the same 
time, they strategically chose targets higher than those in other international 
environmental agreements:  
“[T]he idea was we go beyond what anyone else was committing – we show that 
we, the dispossessed islands of the world, who have more to lose in all of the 
issues of biodiversity and climate change, are ourselves going to make these 
commitments as an indicator to you the rest of the world that you should do this 
too” (ROP3).   
 
The regional targets ultimately agreed upon reflected an internal calculus of progress 
underway, particularly in Palau:  
“For Palau it was, those are very low, in fact we already met them, but we had to 
consider Guam, Saipan, FSM, and Marshalls. [ . . .] The thing is we wanted this to 
succeed, not be something with an unrealistic goal only to fail later” (ROP10).  
 
With the confidence of guaranteed success, President Remengesau stood up at 
the 14th meeting of the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force and declared that he would protect 
30% of Palau’s reefs and 20% of their terrestrial areas, publicly challenging his 
Micronesian colleagues in the room to do the same (INGO11). In that moment, the 
situational pressure to at least informally accept this challenge loomed large:  
“You have all these big shots from DC there, and um, [Tommy Remengesau] 
stood up and he said, and ‘I declare the Micronesia Challenge, you know, and I 
challenge everybody else at the table to do the same.’ So, you know, I think the 
Vice President of the FSM was there, the Chief Minister…from the Marshalls. 
And they were kind of caught […] And what are they going to say, no? [ . . .] I 
mean the governors of both  [Guam and CNMI] were [also] sitting there. And it 
would have been very embarrassing for them to go, ‘no, we’re not going to.’ So, 
the NOAA [U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] head [. .. ] 
was there, and you know, and the head, number two guy at DOI [U.S. 
Department of Interior] was there and [….] [Guam and CNMI] get major money 
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from NOAA and DOI. And obviously NOAA and DOI were on this thing” 
(INGO11).  
 
Others described the decision to verbally acquiesce in that moment with reference to 
“peer pressure” (GM5), “solidarity” (CNMI7; RMI13), “brotherhood” (CNMI8), and the 
“nice island way” (ROP3), all of which one interviewee summarized thus:  
“if I go to your homeland [and] you ask me for something, if I say no, I am 
disrespecting you [. . .]. Island culture 101, I don’t come into your house and 
disrespect you, I come to your house and I say I will do everything” (GM5).  
 
 After the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force meeting, TNC drafted text for the formal 
declaration of commitment.  The diplomatic task of leveraging oral, informal agreements 
from FSM, CNMI, Guam, and Marshall Islands into a formal, signed declaration of 
commitment before the fast approaching CBD CoP 8 fell largely to the administration of 
Tommy Remengesau, who had long-established personal relationships and political 
suasion within the community of Micronesia leaders. My use of the term community is 
deliberate and empirically grounded. Multiple interviewees stressed the critical political 
outreach undertaken by Tommy Remengesau, which was enabled in part by the 
personal and political ties among leaders in U.S. affiliated islands of Micronesia, several 
of whom attended boarding school together and served together in the Congress of 
Micronesia (INGO11; RMI8; INGO14). The expediency and success of Remengesau’s 
diplomatic effort was further aided by financial incentives, which some described as a 
major “selling point” (ROP3). While there was no formal commitment of funding to 
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support the Micronesia Challenge until the CBD CoP 8, “behind the scenes there might 
have been some, you know, expectations raised” (INGO14).   
In their rush to announce the Micronesia Challenge at CBD CoP 8, policy 
entrepreneurs did not consult the government agencies, conservation NGOs, resource 
users, and resource owners who would be tasked with interpreting and implementing 
the Micronesia Challenge commitment: 
 “[T]hey didn’t consult with the conservation community really at all. They just 
sort of did it in a vacuum and yeah, they came up with the language themselves. 
None of us were asked to even look at the language before they finalized it” 
(ROP7).  
 
As one interviewee reflected, 
 “[I]f we’d gone through all the, the proper channels it may not have actually 
come out in time [ . . . ] So we knew, all of us knew that our colleagues are going 
to be kind of burned” (INGO11).   
 
This was a prescient insight, as the top-down approach to policy development would 
indeed strain local engagement with the Micronesia Challenge in the participating 
jurisdictions. In the four months between the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force meeting and the 
CBD CoP 8, however, the decision to press forward was a calculated one tied to a 
specific historical conjuncture and associated political interests of policy entrepreneurs. 
As one interviewee put it, “there was a lot of opportunity to connect all these things and 
I think there are sometimes you do have the perfect storm … and that was it” (INGO14).   
Indeed, TNC knew “Curitiba [CoP 8] is coming up, so we can do a high level side event 
and invite the world, and that was the thinking” (INGO14).  On the part of participating 
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governments, a sense of urgency was also drawn from fear of losing international 
resources and attention to other large ocean regions with higher biodiversity and larger 
populations: 
“I think there was a sense of urgency because had they waited they might lose 
the support of those big agencies and also other regions might be the ones who 
do it, and because of our size. If you look at the population of Micronesia it’s 
200,000 people, that’s it. And despite its size when you compare it to Coral 
Triangle, Indonesia alone is 300 million, Caribbean is even bigger, so it was 
trying to race against others doing it first because whatever leverage we can have 
will be because we are first. So I think those things had a big influence on the 
decision to announce” (INGO6). 
 
The Palauan government delivered a signed declaration of commitment, TNC 
lined up pledges of financial support, and the Micronesia Challenge was announced to 
the world in the celebratory high-level side event described in the introduction to this 
chapter. For Palau, the announcement at CBD CoP 8 was  
“[A] way to get ourselves on the map and then to be known internationally as 
someone moving forward in the right direction. It’s very difficult to do that when 
you’re in Micronesia, no one even knows where you are or who you are” (ROP3). 
 
For some at TNC, the announcement was more broadly aimed at energizing the global 
conservation agenda: “it wasn’t about making a splash for Micronesia, [. . . ] it was a 
way to get the CoP 7 network moving” (INGO11).  On his speech during the high-level 
side event at CBD CoP 8, the vice president for external affairs for TNC positioned the 
Micronesia Challenge as an example of successful implementation for the CBD program 
of work on protected areas: 
“This is what the protected areas plan of action should be – the Programme of 
Work should be this collaborative effort between political commitments on the 
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one hand by governments and support from all of their partners. We very much 
hope that the pledges that have been made today, both political and financial, 
will stimulate an even greater effort at the next Conference Of Parties, with more 
challenges by many more governments” (Nigel Purvis, vice president for 
external affairs for TNC, High Level Event on “'Islands, Marine Biodiversity and 
Livelihoods: A Global Island Partnership,” CBD CoP 8, March 28, 2006). 
 
3.5.3 Discussion  
 From the moment it was borne, the Micronesia Challenge had enrolled the 
support of a network of powerful international policymakers and donors – including 
high-level Micronesian leaders, TNC, CI, GEF, the CBD Secretariat, and U.S. agencies 
within the Coral Reef Task Force – for whom it produced success and legitimacy, 
instantly, simply by virtue of its existence. This insight challenges nascent explanations 
for “the rise of the region in global environmental politics,” which identifies regional 
environmental governance as a substitute for failed global environmental governance 
(Conca 2012, p. 127). While this may be true in some cases, this empirical analysis of the 
emergence of the Micronesia Challenge offers a somewhat different explanation that 
instead highlights the mutually constitutive relationship between levels of 
environmental governance. Where the regional is the Micronesia Challenge and the 
global is the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, the pull of the regional 
is rooted not in the failure of the global, but rather, in the production of its success. It is 
also rooted in a foundation of institutionalized regionalism along post-colonial political 
boundaries, a close partnership between the president of a microstate and an 
international conservation NGO, and the political-economic aspirations of key policy 
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entrepreneurs who opportunistically pursued them through higher level policy 
processes, agendas, and stages. 
3.6 Form 
“Early on the Micronesia [Challenge] is more just for gesture, [a] commandment to 
help sustain certain things, and it’s just nice. But I just, I’m just saying that over 
time as the Micronesian Challenge evolves, it will probably lead to real policies, you 
know? And when those policies start coming, then we’ll start to get in some tension 
from the departments” (CNMI8).  
 
 In the context of its emergence, the Micronesia Challenge may be understood as a 
symbol of progress and legitimacy that aligns the interests of powerful actors through 
the production of conservation policy success. This section continues to answer the 
deceptively simple question of: what is the Micronesia Challenge? Specifically, this 
section and the next consider how the Micronesia Challenge has taken shape during the 
implementation phase, when, as the introductory quote and Mosse (2004, p. 664) 
suggest, “all the diverse and contradictory interests that were enrolled in the framing of 
an ambiguous policy model and project design, all the contests and contradictions that 
are embedded in policy texts, are brought to life.”  Toward this end, I engage Balsiger 
and VanDeever’s (2010) typology of regional environmental governance to broadly 
characterize the form of the Micronesia Challenge with reference to its (1) territoriality 
(political, with nature-based representations), (2) thematic focus (multi-issue, dynamic), 
and (3) coordinating agency (critical role for environmental NGOs). My analysis 
includes attention to both representation and practice, given that both, together, 
constitute policy (Yanow 1996). As in Chapter 2, my attention to representation, 
  
 
91
especially in the subsections of 3.6, is not intended to expose or criticize, but rather, to 
enhance our understanding of the myriad social processes through which regional 
environmental governance takes shape.  
My focus on the regional within regional environmental governance, and my 
interest in the (re)distribution of authority and responsibility through multi-level 
environmental governance has also led me to the related questions of: how is the 
Micronesia Challenge regional, and how regional is the Micronesia Challenge? (see 
Debarbieux 2012, who poses this question more generally in his article, “How Regional is 
Regional Environmental Governance?”).  In other words, which governance activities are 
being regionalized, and which have been delegated to participating jurisdictions, and 
why?  In order to flag the locus of decision-making as an important focus for analysis 
and future comparative research, I propose the addition of governance to Balsiger and 
VanDeever’s (2010) typology, with a descriptive continuum ranging from regionalized to 
decentralized (Figure 5). Again, I use the term governance to encompass the broadest range 
of activities and actors through which the work of regional environmental governance is 
carried out, including both state and non-state actors and their interventions of research, 
communication, decision-making and agenda-setting, convening, reporting, fundraising, 
etc. (Lemos and Agrawal 2006).  
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Figure 5: Modified typology of regional environmental governance, with the 
additional descriptor of governance on a continuum between regionalized and 
decentralized. (Modified from: Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010, p. 6183). 
3.6.1 Territoriality 
 The territoriality variable in Balsiger and VanDeveer’s (2010) typology concerns 
the basis for delineating the geographic scope of cooperation – with political boundaries 
on one end of the spectrum, naturally delineated ecosystem boundaries on the other, 
and space in between for various amalgamations. While Balsiger and VanDeever (2010) 
take a realist approach to territoriality, I take a more constructivist approach that calls 
attention to representations of territoriality, and the politics inherent in the scaling of 
conservation territories along the boundaries of apparently natural systems such as 
watersheds, ecosystems, or eco-regions (Campbell and Godfrey 2010; Cohen 2012; 
Sievanen et al. 2013). As described in Section 3.5, the territoriality of the Micronesia 
Challenge was shaped along historical and contemporary political boundaries as 
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opposed to natural ones. As one interviewee aptly summarized, “I don't think there was 
even any consideration originally about ecological [boundaries]” (GM2). However, this 
does not mean that current Micronesia Challenge policy actors aren’t considering the 
possibility for biologically significant regional connectivity, or representing their 
connected geographic space as an ecologically relevant basis for cooperation. 
 While there is a large literature examining connectivity in marine and island 
systems (i.e. via coral and fish larvae, migratory species, etc.) (e.g., Palumbi 2003; 
Almany et al. 2007; Cowen 2000; Cowen 2006), there have been very few scientific 
studies of ecological connectivity among the Micronesia Challenge jurisdictions 
(interviewees referenced one unpublished study demonstrating genetic connectivity 
among populations of unicorn fish between FSM and Guam). While interviewees with 
scientific backgrounds acknowledged, “I don’t know if we are tied ecologically” 
(ROP13), they also generally assumed at least some degree of connectivity. As another 
interviewee suggested,  
“I mean we know there’s connectivity between jurisdictions but there hasn’t been 
a whole lot of work done on how many species do travel that distance across the 
oceans from Chuuk to Guam or whatever the case may be.  [ . . .] Even though 
we don't know for sure all of them, we can assume that there are going to be 
some kind of connectivities” (GM2).  
 
 Regardless of the scientific unknowns, interviewees recognized strategic value in 
leveraging assumptions of natural connectivity into representations that articulate with 
global conservation discourses that prioritize the maintenance of ecological connectivity 
over large spatial scales through marine governance approaches such as ecosystem-
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based management, protected area networks, and ecoregional conservation (Sievanen et 
al. 2013).  One may readily find representations that resonate with global conservation 
agendas both implicitly and explicitly in the outreach materials produced to advertise 
the Micronesia Challenge to potential donors.  The glossy brochure produced by the 
Office of the President of Palau states: “Recognizing this regional connectivity and the 
need to address the problems across borders spurred the birth of the Micronesia 
Challenge” (2007).  A more common representation is implicit, however, in maps and 
statistics that boast the “unprecedented scale” of action, and global significance of the 
region’s collective biodiversity (Micronesia Challenge Fact Sheet 2011). Though the 
Micronesia Challenge commitment explicitly applies only to near-shore marine 
resources, representations of the geographic scope of action include contiguous 
polygons on global maps (Figure 6) and associated statistics boasting that the Micronesia 
Challenge covers “6.7 million square kilometers of ocean” and “represents more than 
20% of the Pacific Island region - and 5% of the largest ocean in the world” (Micronesia 
Challenge Fact Sheet 2008).  A 2011 fact sheet similarly reflects a geographical unity by 
reporting the aggregate biodiversity across the region: “The Micronesia Challenge spans 
2.5 million square miles of ocean, an area nearly the size of the continental U.S. that 
supports the livelihoods of: 650,000 people and protects 66 threatened species on the 
IUCN Red List, 480+ coral species & 1,300+ reef fish species, 85 bird species & 1,400 plant 
species” (Micronesia Challenge Fact Sheet 2011). Similar representations may also be 
found in project documents. The project document for the $6 million GEF project “The 
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Micronesia Challenge: Sustainable Finance Systems for Island Protected Area 
Management,” for example, states that “The coral reefs of Palau are part of a massive 
interconnected system that ties together Micronesia and the Western Pacific” (2010, p. 
11). In summary, the territoriality of the Micronesia Challenge is simultaneously political 
(in emergence) and ecoregional (in representation). Though the territoriality was 
decidedly political at the onset, in the context of global conservation agendas and the 
relative subaltern status of Microstates therein (Chapter 2; see also Fry 2005), 
representations of territoriality during later implementation stages are strategic, 
elaborating on the geographic and ecological basis of cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Representations of the large and connected geographic scope of cooperation 
through the Micronesia Challenge (Micronesia Challenge fact sheet 2008). 
3.6.2 Thematic focus 
 The declaration of commitment for the Micronesia Challenge is simultaneously 
broad, vague, and specific. The text includes objectives relating to biological diversity, 
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livelihoods, cultural protection, sustainable development, and references to global 
targets set forth in the Millennium Development Goals, the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development, the Mauritius 
Strategy for Small Island Developing States, and relevant Programmes of Work of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (see Figure 7 for an excerpt).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Excerpt from Micronesia Challenge Declaration of Commitment (2006). 
 While the 2006 declaration commitment may have included “pretty much 
everything in the kitchen sink” (INGO4), there were two notable omissions. The first, 
climate change, would be formally incorporated in 2012 without contest. In the context 
of increasing global attention to and local concern for climate change, especially in the 
low-lying atolls comprising the Marshall Islands, the thematic breadth of the Micronesia 
Challenge formally grew to encompass objectives of climate adaptation and resilience: 
We the Chief Executives of Micronesia, in order to: 
 
 Sustain our unique island biodiversity; 
 Ensure a healthy future for our island people; 
 Protect our unique island cultures; 
 Guard the foundations of our future development, our pristine island 
environments; 
 Sustain the livelihoods of our island communities; 
 Contribute to global targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals, the  
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation for the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, the Mauritius Strategy for Small Island Developing States and the  
relevant Programmes of Work of the Convention on Biological Diversity; and 
 Expand our commitment to preserve our marine and terrestrial environments, 
 
Agree to “effectively conserve at least 30% of the near-shore marine and 20% of the 
forest resources across Micronesia by 2020.” 
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“Micronesia Challenge was all about biodiversity conservation, but we said, and the 
other thing is we want to do this as an adaptation, to build our adaptation, adaptive 
capacity to impacts from climate change. So they were like, ‘ahh, that’s a big one’” 
(RMI1). A workshop on “Climate Change and the Micronesia Challenge: Ways forward 
in Collaboration and Adaptation” was convened in the Marshall Islands in 2009, and the 
chief executives adopted a resolution in 2012 at 17th Micronesian Chief Executives 
Summit “To Address the Global Environmental Impact of Climate Changes in 
Micronesia and to Coordinate and Implement into the Micronesian Challenge our 
Region’s Response to this Challenge” (Resolution No. 17-03).  
 The second omission would become a subject of debate and a source of conflict, 
particularly in Guam and CNMI. While the declaration text “recalls” the “targets and 
timetables agreed to under the Convention on Biological Diversity to establish 
comprehensive systems of protected areas by 2010 for terrestrial and 2012 for marine 
habitats,” it does not explicitly commit signatories to establishing protected areas or 
protected area networks. Recall from the introduction to this chapter that President 
Remenegsau characterized the Micronesia Challenge at the CBD CoP 8 as “a shared 
commitment by the countries and territories of Micronesia to a comprehensive system of 
protected area networks” (Tommy Remengesau, President of the Republic of Palau, High 
Level Event on “'Islands, Marine Biodiversity and Livelihoods: A Global Island 
Partnership,” CBD CoP 8, March 28, 2006; italics added). TNC publicized a similar 
characterization on its website years later, in 2011: “The Challenge calls for a network of 
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effectively managed protected areas linked across the region” (TNC “Micronesia” 
webpage, accessed September 15, 2011).  Although key policy entrepreneurs initially 
envisioned the primary implementation mechanism for the Micronesia Challenge to be 
just that, the broad and vague commitment to “effective conservation” left room for 
debate: 
“[D]on’t kid yourself, it was always about protected areas whether Guam, CNMI 
and others want to see it differently, the intent was protected areas  [ . . .] when 
the thing was launched the percentages meant protected areas. They talked 
about effective conservation because they were trying to soften it a little but it 
was always about protected areas” (INGO4). 
 
 Drawing on Bruno Latour, Mosse (2004, p. 646) observes that the process of 
translating policy text into some form of established order relies on “authoritative 
interpretations.” These observations are perhaps especially true for a policy text with the 
thematic breadth of the Micronesia Challenge. As many interviewees would suggest, the 
Micronesia Challenge language can encompass just about anything: “Anything you do 
could be implementing the Micronesia Challenge” (RMI12). As another put it,  
“The Micronesia Challenge is such a comprehensive concept that all projects that 
have to do with the resource management, climate change, or sustainable 
development sort of fall under that framework. [. . .]. Like I can’t think of a 
project that I worked on prior to the Micronesia Challenge that wouldn’t qualify 
as a Micronesia Challenge initiative” (INGO5).  
 
This means that in practice, the thematic foci of the Micronesia Challenge are continually 
under negotiation by a diverse network of policy actors ranging from the GEF to the 
Guam Fishermen’s Coop. The focus of attention and resources on particular ‘themes’ – 
fisheries, biodiversity, climate change, sustainable development, and protected areas – 
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through the Micronesia Challenge is contingent on context, and continually negotiated 
through more or less authoritative interpretations that are “made and sustained socially” 
through the enrollment of actors into a supporting interpretive community (Mosse 2004, 
p. 646). Later sections explore how the broad thematic mandate of the Micronesia 
Challenge is functioning in practice across multiple levels of governance, demonstrating 
how thematic breadth can become a source of opportunity and conflict. 
3.6.3 Coordinating agency 
 Balsiger and VanDeever (2010) use coordinating agency to broadly refer to the 
nature of actors who are cooperating through regional environmental governance 
arrangements, conceptualized on a continuum between exclusively state actors and 
exclusively non-state actors. I employ a more specific interpretation of coordinating 
agency focuses on the principle actors who sustain cooperation at the regional level over 
time.  
 In December of 2006, nine months after the Micronesia Challenge was 
announced at the CBD CoP 8, 80 representatives from across the region and beyond 
gathered in Palau for a “Micronesia Challenge action planning meeting” to negotiate the 
formal organizational structure of the Micronesia Challenge. Participants represented 
government agencies, research and education organizations, traditional leadership, local 
and international conservation NGOs (i.e. Palau Conservation Society, TNC, CI), 
international foundations (ie. Packard Foundation), and Pacific-wide regional 
organizations (i.e., Pacific Islands Forum, Secretariat of the Pacific Community). As a 
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result of decisions taken at this meeting, the Micronesian chief executives endorsed the 
establishment of five new regional working groups over the next few years to coordinate 
the regional-level work of the Micronesia Challenge, including the Micronesia Challenge 
Communications Working Group; Micronesia Challenge Measures Working Group; 
Micronesia Challenge Regional Support Team3; Micronesia Challenge Steering 
Committee; and the Micronesia Challenge Regional Office. All except the Micronesia 
Challenge Regional Office included participation from both state and non-state actors 
who have full time jobs elsewhere.  In 2007, an NGO based in FSM, the Micronesia 
Conservation Trust, was designated the host for the regional sustainable finance 
mechanism – a single regional endowment comprising financial pledges from TNC, CI, 
GEF, and matching funds from Palau, FSM, and Marshall Islands (endowment funds 
were not pledged to Guam and CNMI). The designation of an NGO to manage the 
endowment was deliberate, based on state actors’ understandings of donor preferences:  
“You have to have an effective vehicle like the Micronesia Challenge that donors 
are going to be comfortable that they’re putting their money into a system that 
directly makes a difference. That Micronesia Challenge is the vehicle. That the 
governments, the Micronesian governments, that were going to put in their 
money in there. It’s the donors that were going to put their money in there. It’s 
the international organizations that were going to put their money in there, 
knowing that it’s effective, foolproof; governments were not going to dip their 
                                                        
3 Comprised of regional, international, and U.S. federal agencies and organizations that provide technical 
and policy advice, and in some cases, funding: TNC (Chair), CI,  the Secretariat of  the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme, RARE International, Palau International Coral Reef Center, the Global Island 
Partnership, the Pacific Marine Resources Institute, the Locally Managed Marine Areas Network, the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, the United Nations Environment Programme, the U.S. Department of Interior, 
Office of Insular Affairs, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Environment 
Protection Agency , the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service , the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community, and the local conservation NGOs in each island (A Report on Progress to Implement the 
Micronesia Challenge 2006-2011).  
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hands into that money to fund other things. [. . .] That was the critical 
component” (ROP10). 
 
 Officially, the overall coordination bodies are the interlinked Micronesia 
Challenge Steering Committee and the Micronesia Challenge Regional Office, the 
characteristics of which I sketch below to convey intended roles for state and non-state 
actors:  
(1) Micronesia Challenge Steering Committee:  
• Comprised of state and non-state actors: five “focal points” 
designated by the chief executives from each of the participating 
jurisdictions (all government officials at the time of writing), the 
executive director of the Micronesia Conservation Trust, and the chair 
of the regional support team (TNC at the time of writing).  
• Official mission: “leading regional coordination and communication, 
securing sustainable funding, linking leadership with stakeholders, 
engaging policy makers, and enabling jurisdictional staff and partners 
to engage and support communities in their effective resource 
management” (Micronesia Challenge Steering Committee and 
Regional Office Strategic Action Plan 2010).   
• Meets biannually alongside the Chief Executive Summits to review 
and reporting progress, and set priorities for the regional level 
activities of the Micronesia Challenge. 
• Focal points are also responsible for overseeing the development of 
jurisdictional level implementation strategies. 
(2) Micronesia Challenge Regional Office 
• A legally designated intergovernmental agency that is supported by 
participating governments ($10,000 each per year, decreased from 
$22,000, which was too burdensome). 
• Functions as a semi-autonomous body in support of the Micronesia 
Challenge Steering Committee. 
• Staffed by one or two full time regional coordinators since its 
inception in 2008.  
 
 In practice, two non-state members of the Micronesia Challenge Steering 
Committee – TNC and the Micronesia Conservation Trust – are widely recognized as the 
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key drivers for sustained regional coordination. TNC unofficially served as the 
Micronesia Challenge secretariat before the Micronesia Challenge Regional Office was 
established in 2008 (INGO11).  TNC in particular has played and continues to play a 
critical role in organizing, facilitating, and raising funds for meetings of the regional 
organizations mentioned above. The two NGOs have also contracted consultants to 
formulate and carry out marketing and “branding” (INGO1) for the Micronesia 
Challenge, and to produce sustainable finance plans for each jurisdiction and the region. 
Both TNC and the Micronesia Conservation Trust are also the main fundraisers for the 
Micronesia Challenge. They apply for grants on behalf of the participating governments 
and themselves, and even broker the exchange of votes from Palau, FSM, and the 
Marshall Islands in UN policy-making processes for foreign aid in support of the 
Micronesia Challenge, as one individual explained: 
 “[T]his year we were visited by several countries including Belgium, who told 
[the Micronesia Conservation Trust] to submit a proposal for up to 1.5 million 
dollars in support of the Micronesia Challenge in return for a vote [for a seat on 
the UN security council] [ . . .] from all three [countries]” (INGO6).   
 
The critical role of NGOs in sustaining regional cooperation was emphasized by many, 
as reflected in the following: 
“They really, really, really are the backbone to this operation. [ . .. ]   The concept 
of what it would take it terms of developing a business model, developing the 
sustainable financing plan, and developing the strategies, and creating the 
workshops, understanding measures, having them really look for the funding for 
that [ . . .]  is really what I think is the what is the, what is keeping…they're the 
glue really” (GM1). 
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Though the signatories to the Micronesia Challenge are exclusively heads of state – 
specifically, the presidents of Palau, FSM, and Marshall Islands, and the governors of 
Guam and the CNMI – non-state actors maintain an influential, arguably critical, role in 
sustaining regional cooperation. 
3.6.4 Governance 
“The biggest challenge is that all of the countries and all of the states are very, very 
different [. . .]. The environments are different, the resource is different, the people are 
different, how they use [resources] are different” (INGO10). 
 
 The cooperative governance tasks explicitly agreed to in the declaration of 
commitment are fairly general, and include: reviewing progress on a biennial basis at 
the chief executive level (at the Micronesia Chief Executive Summits); sharing 
experiences, tools, and techniques; establishing a regional financing mechanism; and 
engaging Pacific Island programs and facilitates to help with regional coordination and 
financing (Figure 8). Importantly, the text also sanctions local, national, regional, and 
international activities as appropriate means of implementation. This section focuses on 
the key implementation activities that coordinating agents are attempting to regionalize 
and decentralize in practice.  
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Figure 8: Implementation activities agreed to in the text of the Micronesia Challenge 
Declaration of Commitment (2006). Cooperative implementation tasks are bolded. 
3.6.4.1 Regionalizing governance 
 In practice, regionalized activities have included most of those agreed to in the 
declaration text and more: biannual reporting of progress from the Micronesia 
Challenge Steering Committing to chief executives at the Micronesian Chief Executive 
Summits; sharing of experiences, tools and techniques, particularly as they relate to the 
development of regional monitoring protocols and indicators of collective progress 
toward the Micronesia Challenge targets; and the development of regional financing 
mechanisms and associated marketing campaigns. Attempts to regionalize governance 
In order to implement this Micronesia Challenge, we further agree to:  
 
  Undertake and follow through on local, national, regional and   
international conservation strategies and plans, including National Biodiversity 
Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs); 
 Establish and expand local partnerships between Government agencies and  
NGOs engaged in the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity; 
  Expand communication and interaction with local communities and traditional  
       leadership; 
 Share experience, tools and techniques among Micronesian officials,  
  conservation practitioners and community leaders; 
 Establishment sustainable financing mechanisms for the conservation and  
sustainable use of island biodiversity; 
 Engage the region’s development and trading partners as well as NGOs  
and private foundations in appropriate financial and technical support to  
ensure the effective implementation of the Micronesia Challenge, including  
through a Regional Financing Mechanism;  
 Further engage Pacific Island programs and facilities, such as the Pacific  
Island Forum and associated organizations such as the Secretariat for the Pacific 
Community (SPC) and the Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (SPREP) to optimize regional coordination and financing; and 
 Agree to review progress to achieve the Micronesia Challenge on a biennial basis 
at head of government/chief executive level 
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activities fall within three interrelated categories: finance, communications, and 
monitoring/evaluation.   
 Finance: In the first Micronesia Challenge planning meeting in 2006 “the group 
highlighted the importance considering of truly regional options for fundraising for the 
Challenge” (Micronesia Challenge action planning report 2006, italics added).  Six years 
later, interviewees would conclude:  
“trying to bring two types of different jurisdictions together within a single 
region to move forward, with totally different abilities to raise funds and to share 
funds? Very, very complicated” (ROP3).  
 
As it happens, there are few truly regional options for fundraising due to the differential 
political status and associated eligibility for international funding between the U.S. 
jurisdictions of Guam and CNMI on the one hand, and the freely associated states of 
FSM, Palau, and Marshall Islands on the other.  Thus far, the “regional” finance 
mechanism falls into two categories that almost exclusively serve Palau, FSM, and the 
Marshall Islands: (1) the regional Micronesia Challenge endowment, and (2) large “pass-
through” grants that TNC and Micronesia Conservation Trust apply for and redistribute 
on behalf of the governments of freely associated states. Below I briefly describe the 
details of these two finance mechanisms because they are an important point of 
reference for some perceived functions (and dysfunctions) of the Micronesia Challenge 
described that arise in Section 3.7. 
 TNC and the Micronesia Conservation Trust, often together, apply for “pass-
through” grants from foundations and foreign governments in support of the 
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Micronesia Challenge.  The Micronesia Conservation Trust redistributes these funds 
through calls for proposals, which are primarily focused on the development and 
management of protected areas within the three freely associated states (Table 5).  The 
largest of these is a $6 million GEF project that provides some pass-through funding to 
the Micronesia Conservation Trust to redistribute in support of national protected area 
networks (PANs) within the freely associated states, identifying PANs as their “primary 
strategy for achieving the goals of the Micronesia Challenge” (the majority of that grant, 
$5 million, is invested directly in the regional endowment, however, as described 
below). The stated objective of the GEF project is: “to establish sustainable finance 
systems and policies to provide long-term core resources to support Protected Area 
Networks that are well coordinated within and between the three country proponents of 
the Micronesia Challenge.” Thus far, the on-the-ground projects that are funded through 
pass-through grants focus on protected areas and biodiversity conservation : 
“It has to relate to protected areas so [. . . ] I mean invasive species is fine [. . .]  
but as it relates to a protected area. So I mean its most, yeah, I would say it’s all, 
its biodiversity conservation. That’s the big thing. But all as it relates to protected 
areas. So like we’re doing, we just launched, started doing all this climate change 
stuff. But it’s still as it relates to protected areas. Like our main message from the 
climate change is that why we can’t actually mitigate or stop climate change, the 
best thing we can do is make sure that our resources are as healthy and resilient 
as they can be in order to withstand the impacts of climate change. And by doing 
that, if you create…a network of protected areas, you have a better chance of 
doing that. And so in the end it’s still protected areas” (INGO8). 
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Table 5: Examples of Micronesia Challenge “pass-through” grants that are 
redistributed by the Micronesia Conservation Trust to fund protected area related 
projects within Palau, FSM, and the Marshall Islands (Source: Micronesia 
Conservation Trust, May 2012). 
Grantor Grant Title Total Grant  Example sub-award 
U.S. National 
Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration 
Building sustainable 
coral reef monitoring 
and management 
capacity for the 
Micronesia Challenge, 
and Beyond 
$1,380,000  Advancing the Micronesia 
Challenge through 
Community-Based 
Management of Marine 
Resources in Piis-Paneu, 
Chuuk ($30,797) 
German Ministry for 
the Environment, 
Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety 
(through the CBD 
Lifeweb Initiative) 
Advancing the 
Micronesia Challenge 
through new protected 
areas:  Reducing 
ecosystem vulnerability 
to climate change and 
sea-level rise through a 
new network of resilient, 
locally managed 
conservation areas 
across the islands of 
Micronesia. 
€1,551,739 Capital purchases and 
telecommunications for 
Nimpal Marine 
Conservation Area and 
Ngulu Atoll Marine 
Conservation Area 
($37,746) 
Margaret Cargill 
Foundation 
Advancing the 
Micronesia Challenge by 
strengthening and 
sustaining management 
of local protected area 
networks across 
Micronesia. 
$250,000 Advancing the Micronesia 
Challenge through an 
increased and efficient 
network of Marine 
Protected Areas (MPA) in 
Pohnpei, Federated States 
of Micronesia ($49,760)  
 
David and Lucile 
Packard Foundation 
To expand sustainable 
financing mechanisms 
for protected area 
networks in Micronesia 
$500,000 Training in Monitoring 
Birds in Terrestrial and 
Marine Protected Areas 
($9,700) 
 
 The regional endowment hosted by the Micronesia Conservation Trust is 
envisioned as a permanent sustainable finance mechanism for Micronesia Challenge 
activities. Thus far, pledges of support have come from TNC ($2 million to Palau, $1 
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million to FSM, $0 to Marshall Islands, Guam, and CNMI) and CI ($1 million each to 
FSM, Palau, and Marshall Islands, $0 to Guam and CNMI). All pledges required a two to 
one match by recipient countries. A regional GEF grant supplied FSM, Palau, and the 
Marshall Islands with $1.68 million each toward their matching requirements, which left 
Palau to raise $4.32 million, FSM to raise $2.32 million, and the Marshall Island to raise 
$320,000 to trigger the full pledges from TNC and CI. As of March 2013, the partially 
capitalized endowment totals $11,628,164.69, and country matches have come from a 
variety of domestic and international sources, including a tourist departure fee and 
foreign aid from Taiwan (Palau) and domestic coffers (FSM and Marshall Islands).  
 Although the Micronesia Conservation Trust tracks three country-specific sub-
accounts to account for the differential financial commitments to and from the FSM, 
Palau, and the Marshall Islands, there is one single endowment invested as a whole for 
the sake of efficiency and economies of scale:  
“[T]he Micronesia Conservation Trust would house the endowment so we could 
invest together so we could have enough money to actually get a good 
investment rather than each country start their own trust fund which would take 
years, and we’d all be investing separately and we wouldn’t get the great 
interest” (INGO11).  
 
With the exception of RMI, the countries are still in the process of raising their matching 
requirements and none have yet accessed interest from their sub-accounts. According to 
memoranda of understanding between the Micronesia Conservation Trust and the freely 
associated states, future disbursement of interest from the endowment will be subject to 
guidelines and strategies that each country may individually establish in conjunction 
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with the MCT, as well as any donor guidelines attached to their pledges.  For example, 
the memorandum of understanding between Palau and the Micronesia Conservation 
Trust states:  
“The Republic of Palau will develop a Country Program Strategy, inline with the 
adopted MC sub-regional strategies, which will serve as the overall guiding 
policy for the management and disbursement of Palau's portion of the MC 
endowment fund by the MCT” (Memorandum of Understanding between the 
Micronesia Conservation Trust and the Government of the Republic of Palau 
2008).  
 
At the time of writing, none of the freely associated states had prepared formal 
disbursement guidelines or strategies (though these were informally specified to varying 
degrees), and the Micronesia Conservation Trust was planning to contract this task to a 
consultant.  
 A regional plan for sustainable finance was officially endorsed at the 17th 
Micronesian Chief Executives Summit (Resolution No. 17-02). The plan identifies 
financing gaps and potential sources for all five jurisdictions, including Guam and 
CNMI, to estimate a total regional funding gap and fundraising target. However, there 
has been no endowment funding yet committed to or by the two U.S. jurisdictions. 
Guam and CNMI have not substantially benefitted from “regionalized” fundraising. In 
addition, their inclusion in the Micronesia Challenge has complicated international 
fundraising for the FSM, Palau, and the Marshall Islands: 
“[W]e’re not successful in getting China to give their stimulus grant toward the 
endowment, that was unsuccessful but that’s again because of politics with the 
U.S., that’s a case where having Guam and CNMI in the Challenge actually hurt 
us because no matter how many times we can confirm to them that none of this 
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money goes to Guam and CNMI for some reason I don’t know if that was the 
only sticking point but it was a sticking point” (INGO4).  
 
 Communications:  In 2008, the Micronesia Challenge Communications Working 
Group developed a regional communication plan “that emphasizes the unique nature of 
the Challenge and garners further financial and technical support internationally, 
regionally, and at the jurisdictional level” (Micronesia Challenge Communications Plan 
2008).  Toward this end, the plan advocated the “branding” of a regional identity:  
“The need for regional branding or identity is widely acknowledged by the 
Communications Team and associated Support Team members. [ . . .] the MC 
requires a strong identity that jointly promotes the goals of the MC [ . . .]. It is 
agreed that the regional identity needs to capture the ‘essence of Micronesia’” 
(Micronesia Challenge Communications Plan 2008, p. 3).   
 
TNC contracted a marketing firm, the Micronesian Image Institute, to implement the 
plan, which it has since achieved through a “One Micronesia” fundraising and 
awareness campaign that endeavors to “distill the mission of the Challenge” (INGO1) 
through a message of unity, both in identity and territory: 
“The message [of the One Micronesia campaign] is one of unity.  That even 
though Micronesia spans over 6.71 million square kilometers of the Pacific, we 
are a singular community of island nations with one oceanic legacy” (Micronesia 
Challenge Web Page N.D.). (See also Figure 9.) 
 
For external audiences, this representation conveys administrative simplicity and an 
opportunity to make a large impact investment:  
“I think they feel like they’re going to maybe get more bang for their buck, right? 
Like if you’re helping this, you’re contributing to the improvement of this whole 
region as opposed to just one specific island. I think that that is uh…donors like 
to see that” (INGO10).  
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Thus, the regional Micronesia Challenge communications are shaped in part by an 
objective of being seen and heard by an international donor community that has a 
particular agenda and a number of incoming messages competing for their interest. 
 The message of “One Micronesia” is directed not only outwards, but also 
inwards, to an audience including “The Native Micronesia Islander” (Micronesia 
Challenge Web Page N.D.)  This inward marketing was motivated in part by recognition 
that unity doesn’t exist. As Hanlon (2009, p. 103) has convincingly argued,  
“Local conceptualizations or reconceptualizations of identity focused on the 
island environment, the past, and the larger ocean world, for example, suggest 
far more complex and diverse realities than the term Micronesia can 
accommodate.”  
 
Notwithstanding diverse and complex local conceptualizations – or perhaps, more 
accurately, because of them – the goal of the “One Micronesia” campaign is, as one 
interviewee explained, 
“[P]robably more intended to combat than it is to convey. I think it’s sort of a no 
brainer that you know, Micronesia is what it is, you know, geographically and 
politically, but what I think it hopes to combat is this idea that you know, 
Chamorros [indigenous people of Guam] can work together with Chuukese 
[from the FSM] because just socially speaking there’s a lot of tension that exists” 
(INGO1).  
 
The Micronesia Challenge communications campaign raises a number of interesting 
questions regarding the incentives for and means through which regions are 
constructed. For the purposes of this section, however, I focus on the critical role of scale 
and region within the regional communications campaign.  Much like the Pacific Region 
described in Chapter 2, the concept of a large oceanic Micronesian region - united 
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spatially and socially - is being put to work to garner support for the Micronesia 
Challenge at all levels.  
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 9: Images associated with the One Micronesia Campaign (Micronesia 
Challenge Web Page ND). 
Monitoring/Evaluation: The last key governance activity that coordinating 
agents are attempting to regionalize is the monitoring and reporting of collective 
progress toward the goal of effectively conserving 20% of forest and 30% of near-shore 
marine resources across Micronesia. The rationale for regionalizing evaluation is to be 
able to communicate and document regional progress, especially to donors: “at the 
regional level lots of people have given money at that scale and want to know sort of 
what’s happening” (INGO4). As another interviewee similarly explained,  
“I think for the kind of results that [donors] wanted, they didn’t just want good 
results in one place they wanted good results in a region. I mean in terms of 
measuring the success I think you’re better off with regional success than with 
individual success. And that’s the whole idea to catch fire with this concept” 
(ROP10).  
 
 Although most donations have in fact been at the sub-regional level, the 
regionalization of evaluation is being pursued as a summation of jurisdictional level 
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progress across all five participating jurisdictions.  The regionalization of evaluation 
included developing minimum common definitions for the terms effective conservation, 
terrestrial resources, and near-shore marine resources (Micronesia challenge action 
planning meeting report 2006). Notably, the agreed upon definition of effective 
conservation stresses sustainable use, and does not specify a particular implementation 
mechanism: 
“Effective Conservation entails the Social, Traditional, Biological, Financial, and 
Legal Terrestrial aspects of sustainable use of at least 30% of our Marine 
Resources and 20% of our Terrestrial Resources keeping in mind the overall 
management of surrounding areas, and finding a right balance between resource 
utilization by communities to sustain their cultural values, socioeconomic 
development, and prosperity” (Micronesia Challenge action planning meeting 
report 2006). 
 
The Micronesia Challenge Measures Working Group is also in the process of developing 
a set of broad terrestrial, marine, and socio-economic indicators of effective conservation 
that can be monitored according to a standard protocol within each jurisdiction. The 
ultimate goal is to house this data in a regional database.   
Tensions have arisen throughout the attempt to regionalize evaluation, stemming 
from diverse environmental and social contexts, jurisdictional priorities, and especially, 
capacity. For example, the initial set of indicators that the Micronesia Challenge 
Measures Working Group were deemed to be “extremely ambitious and may not be 
possible for all jurisdictions” (A Report on Progress to Implement the Micronesia 
Challenge 2006-2011). As a result, the Micronesia Challenge Measures Working Group is 
working to define a more narrow and basic set of indicators for measuring collective 
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progress. That has meant that for jurisdictions with higher technical and scientific 
capacities, such as the CNMI and Guam, 
“[I]t’s almost asking us to slow down. You know, it’s like okay, don’t necessarily, 
you know, do what you’ve been doing.  [ . ..]  we're in weird situation because, the 
monitoring program I coordinate is actually not at all, what they want. It has a 
different purpose and [ . . .] It's designed in a way that is more statistically robust 
and requires a lot more capacity than most of the jurisdictions have” (GM2).  
 
3.6.4.2 Decentralized governance  
 Two key governance tasks have been decentralized to the national or equivalent 
levels of government. First, as already mentioned, the freely associated states have to 
raise matching funds to trigger financial pledges from CI and TNC to their endowment 
subaccounts. Second, the governments of FSM, Marshall Islands, Palau, CNMI, and 
Guam independently identify and implement on-the-ground conservation activities that 
count toward the effective conservation targets within each of their jurisdictions. As one 
interviewee reflected,  
“[T]hat actually came out very early on, all five of them originally said we want 
to make the decisions locally, we’re not making decisions regionally on how 
we’re going implement this, we will make those at our jurisdictional level” 
(INGO4). 
 
This is not to say that regional processes don’t influence local implementation 
mechanisms in practice – as mentioned, regional funding is being used to support 
protected areas throughout the FSM, Palau, and Marshall Islands, for example – but 
rather, that there is no explicit regional approach to reaching “effective conservation.” 
As I will discuss in Section 3.7, the scope for localized interpretation (and conflict) in 
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practice is arguably widest in Guam and CNMI, where CBD targets and regional 
funding has little influence and where I found the most vociferous interpretive debate. 
3.6.4.3 Discussion  
Before turning to the localized sites of interpretation and implementation, I briefly 
return to the interlinked questions: how is the Micronesia Challenge regional, and how 
regional is the Micronesia Challenge? In characterizing the form of governance 
attempted through the regional environmental governance, I do not advocate for 
pinpointing a position on a continuum between regionalized and decentralized. Rather, 
I suggest using the continuum as a point of reference for conceptualizing the different 
ways in which regional environmental governance is and is not regional, both in practice 
and representation. I conclude that the Micronesia Challenge has regionalized 
environmental governance in practice, in particular, through the development of a 
formal intergovernmental coordinating body, multiple regional working groups and 
associated decision-making, goal-setting, standard-setting, and fundraising processes. 
The Micronesia Challenge has also been made regional through representations that 
invoke shared regional identity and a comprehensive, coordinated system of resource 
management. 
However, regional diversity resists the institutionalization of regional environmental 
governance at every turn. The regionalization of fundraising is challenged by political 
diversity. The regionalization of evaluation is challenged by diverse scientific and 
technical capacities. The branding of “One Micronesia” is inherently challenged by the 
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reality of culturally diverse peoples, some of whom “Do not want to be recognized as one” 
(Emelihter Kihleng “The Micronesian Question” 2005, as quoted in Hanlon 2009, p. 99). 
Participating jurisdictions blocked formal regionalization of conservation strategies for 
meeting the Micronesia Challenge targets from the beginning (though regional 
fundraising is supporting and in some cases, asserting, protected area-based approaches 
within the freely associated states in practice). In representations, however, this diversity 
is glossed.  The Micronesia Challenge presents regional progress toward a collective goal 
by a version of “One Micronesia” that external actors have long found “administratively 
convenient” (RMI11), or legible (Scott 1998). In summary, the regionalization of the 
Micronesia Challenge in practice is uneven and tenuous, while the external 
representation thereof is absolute, and strategically so.  Section 3.7 offers further 
evidence for this assertion. 
3.7 Function 
 Finally, this section attends to the localized engagement and experiences of 
policy actors who are embedding, defending, and/or contesting the Micronesia 
Challenge within the five participating jurisdictions. The analysis highlights two aspects 
of functionality within each jurisdiction: (1) the delineation of “local” implementation 
mechanism(s) for meeting the Micronesia Challenge targets, (2) the contextually specific 
ways in which policy actors envision regional cooperation through the Micronesia 
Challenge to benefit, burden, and/or undermine local practice and priorities. I 
characterize the latter as functional “interplay,” drawing attention to the cross-level 
  
 
117
interactions between regional and local institutions and priorities. This analysis reflects 
the most salient experiences and interpretations of the relatively small number of state 
and non-state actors within the participating jurisdictions who are actively engaged in 
the interpretation and implementation of the Micronesia Challenge. It is important to 
recognize that the Micronesia Challenge was not widely known or debated among the 
local publics at the time of this research. 
3.7.1 Palau: Local Implementation 
 Palau is the only jurisdiction to have a legally specified implementation 
mechanism for its commitments to the Micronesia Challenge: a national protected area 
network (PAN) established through the national PAN Act of 2003. As discussed earlier, 
Palau’s PAN predated, and to some extent, motivated and shaped the regional regime. 
While there has been debate in Palau concerning the form and function of the national 
PAN itself (see Chapter 4 for a detailed analysis of Palau’s PAN), there was little 
question as to whether it would serve as Palau’s national implementing mechanism. 
Later amendments and regulations to the 2003 PAN Act reference and endorse the 
Micronesia Challenge, and there is widespread agreement among national government 
officials and locally-based NGOs that, in Palau, “the PAN is the Micronesia Challenge” 
(ROP6), and that the regional initiative should not and does not change local priorities 
and policy.    
 While Palau’s “country program strategy” for disbursing interest from their 
Micronesia Challenge endowment sub-account has not yet been formalized, there is a 
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shared assumption that it will be the PAN:  “the PAN was always assumed to be a 
primary component of [ . .. ] channeling funds from the Micronesia Challenge to 
communities” (ROP3).  This means that it is likely that community owned and managed 
protected areas (a historical norm in Palau) must be enrolled in the national network to 
access Palau’s Micronesia Challenge endowment funds, as is the current requirement for 
them to access to the national “PAN funds” generated locally through a visitor 
departure tax called the “Green Fee.” Enrollment in Palau’s PAN is voluntary, and 
despite pervasive hesitation, most communities are moving forward to join the national 
program, primarily to access financial resources (these dynamics are explored in depth 
in Chapter 4). Multiple interviewees suggested that the Micronesia Challenge targets 
have given more directed impetus to the PAN: “what it does is sort of like put a number 
there, like a vision [for the PAN]” (ROP1). For those who are critical of the PAN, this 
impetus was not especially welcome: 
 “no, actually, Micronesia Challenge wasn’t designed to [. . . ] change policy. It 
was designed to attract donors. But because of the commitment that we put in 
under the Micronesia Challenge, the 20% terrestrial and 30% marine by 2020, 
we’ve been forced to move forward with some conservation measures [such as 
the PAN] so that we can meet our obligation under Micronesia Challenge by 
2020” (ROP5). 
 
As of March 2013, Palau’s subaccount within the Micronesia Challenge endowment 
totaled $11.6 million; TNC’s pledge of $2 million has been awarded in full, with 
matching funds sourced from foreign aid ($500,000 from Taiwan), Palau’s Green Fee 
($1.4 million), and the GEF ($1.68 million).  Palau will need to raise another $2 million to 
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trigger the $1 million pledge from CI.  At the time of research, Palau’s national congress 
was considering a controversial amendment to PAN regulations that would direct 5% of 
the Green Fee plus any unallocated Green Fee funds to Palau’s subaccount within the 
Micronesia Challenge endowment for future exclusive use toward the PAN.  
3.7.2 Palau: Functional interplay  
 When news of the Micronesia Challenge declaration first reached resource 
owners (also referred to as “states” and/or “communities”, see Chapter 4) and 
conservation practitioners in Palau, it was not met warmly. While most resource owners 
in Palau had little awareness of the Micronesia Challenge, prominent traditional leaders 
expressed dismay on their behalf: 
 “[There was] not much done on the ground in terms of Micronesia Challenge to 
educate local people in, people who owns the resources that they’re committing 
to preserve by 2020. Rather, they took this initiative and ran outside of Palau, 
and went all over the world selling it [. . .].  Good, we find ways to look for 
funding to support our local effort. But when we start to talk about conserving 20 
and 30 percent of local resources, which are owned by local people, without even 
come to them and then get their nod on the idea, it’s a little bit, to me, an 
awkward move. And I kind of took that back as, ‘hmm, how can you sell my, my 
resources without even coming to me first?’” (ROP5).  
 
Another traditional leader articulated a similar reaction: 
“[T]he water is owned by the states. The constitution provides that water, 
nonliving and living, within 12 miles is the property of the states, not the 
national government. And here you are giving one third of the water to the MC 
and you have not consult the states! [. . . ] [the national government is acting] as 
if we are still in the trust territory days.” (ROP2).  
 
Conservation practitioners, too, expressed dismay at the lack of consultation: 
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“[I]f they had just been open enough and respectful enough to call one meeting 
with all of us that you know are in resource management and conservation just 
to get some feedback. Just a ‘hey, here’s a draft of the declaration, what do you 
guys think?’ [ . . .] It would have been I think very, very different but it didn’t 
happen that way” (ROP9).  
 
Despite initial hostility and some lingering resentment, these same individuals also seem 
to recognize opportunity in the Micronesia Challenge, conceding “I have to see the 
positive side” (ROP5); or describing their feelings toward the Micronesia Challenge as 
“tough love” (ROP9).  
 Most interviewees in Palau interpreted the Micronesia Challenge foremost as a 
tool for mobilizing international resources: “it was mainly like a marketing tool, um, to 
raise awareness about Micronesia and our conservation efforts, mainly as a marketing 
tool to get financial support” (ROP7). The Micronesia Challenge is primarily understood 
as a “fundraising gimmick” (ROP6) that could attract donors who are interested in 
“bigger” (ROP1) spaces.  As another interviewee summarized, the main function of the 
Micronesia Challenge is “to attract donors by regionalizing” (ROP5).   
 There was less agreement about how regionalized marketing and fundraising 
through the Micronesia Challenge would affect Palau specifically. A high level 
government official explained his hesitations with reference to Palau’s recently attained 
independence: “it sort of contradicts our move to be separated and now we’re going 
back again” (ROP8). While all interviewees recognized that the “benefits” of 
regionalized fundraising would accrue locally to support the activities of the PAN, 
several people also felt that Palau could successfully raise their own resources 
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unilaterally, and that regional cooperation was being mobilized primarily to the benefit 
of others:   
“I think Palau alone would have been able to send Palau to outside world and 
get funding for it because people know already where Palau is. People know the 
biodiversity values of Palau. It's for these other Micronesia jurisdictions, which 
has lesser biodiversity values” (ROP6).  
 
Other interviewees agreed: “we’ve been really successful at getting money. [. . . ] We’re 
sort of helping. That’s my perception anyway. We’re helping them [other islands in MC] 
out” (ROP7).  
 The idea that the region needs Palau more than Palau needs the region came 
connected to a concern that regionalizing fundraising would crowd out local 
fundraising efforts:  
“So, that was another big worry [ . . .] it’s going to actually make it more difficult 
for us to get conservation [funding] now because everybody’s like, ‘we’re 
already giving to the Micronesia Challenge,’ you know” (ROP7).  
 
 As will be described later, interviewees in the FSM and the Marshall Islands raised 
similar concerns about the (re)distribution of international resources first ‘up’ to regional 
NGOs and then ‘down’ to local organizations and governments. Regional coordinating 
agents are aware of this potential, and counter with the argument that they avoid 
competing with jurisdictions by targeting larger sources of funding that may otherwise 
be inaccessible to Micronesian governments: 
“What TNC has tried very hard not to do is take the low hanging fruit you know. 
[TNC has] tried to focus on the bigger multiyear regional grants that perhaps 
wouldn’t, that the others are not eligible for or not potentially capable [of 
applying for]” (INGO4). 
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“I think we’ve kind of gotten past the real dangers of competing with partners 
kind of phase now, and we’re kind of at a [ . . .] level where you know, we’re, 
we’re going after things that our partners don’t really have the capacity to go 
for” (INGO10).  
 
When there is competition, however, the region typically “wins”:  
“[I]f like MCT [Micronesia Conservation Trust] apply and PCS [Palau 
Conservation Society] applies, MCT usually beats them out because we’re 
achieving so much more work in so many different places and theirs [PCS] is 
more specific” (INGO10). 
 
 Locally based NGOs, however, are not only concerned about competition. There 
is also some concern about being forced to align priorities with the Micronesia Challenge 
and calls for proposals from the Micronesia Conservation Trust, which some view as an 
unwelcome “middle man” (ROP7). One interviewee summarized this issue thus: 
“The anti-Micronesia Challenge argument I just heard from within Palau, within 
organizations where they say ‘look you we have this conservation thing going 
ourselves and now we are being…our fundraising efforts are being crowded out 
or overshadowed by the Micronesia Challenge and its going to be harder for us 
as a conservation organization to raise funds because we’ve got overshadowed 
by this huge regional thing…there’re taking up all of the attention span of the 
donor base out there and we can’t get anything we have to get now through 
Micronesia Challenge.’  I think that the counter argument to that is that again ‘ok 
fine but the Micronesia Challenge is going to bring far more funding into this 
region then your efforts along could ever bring.  And so the Micronesia 
Challenge is a great vehicle for you to get funding.  You just have to make sure 
that you are aligned with the Micronesia Challenge and maybe that’s the big 
problem.  If you don’t want to be aligned with it, then…’” (INGO12). 
 
3.7.3 Republic of the Marshall Islands: Local Implementation 
 While the $6 million GEF project delineates national PANs as the local 
implementation strategy for the Micronesia Challenge within the freely associated states, 
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local policy actors within the Marshall Islands and FSM are responding with more 
complex, locally specified visions. Prior to the declaration of the Micronesia Challenge, a 
group now known as the Coastal Management Advisory Council (CMAC) – an ad hoc 
working group comprising national government and locally based civil society 
organizations4  – had been supporting the development of community-based 
conservation areas throughout the Marshall Island atolls. The group has served as a 
gatekeeper of sorts, defining the bounds of regional influence on local practice and the 
Marshall Islands’ terms of engagement with the Micronesia Challenge.   
 Initially, CMAC leaders felt that representatives from TNC were attempting to 
impose their vision for a national PAN as the local implementation mechanism for the 
Micronesia Challenge in the Marshall Islands: 
“[L]ook, the name [PAN] is a negative. It was negative before. Cause I think a lot 
of very, very committed, I say committed environmentalists, wanted it done. 
Nevermind what [local] people thought. They just wanted it done [. . . ] it was 
presented like that. Kind of like, uh, ‘the way you implement the Micronesia 
Challenge is…through PAN’. And we’re like, ‘who are you to say that to us?’” 
(RMI12). 
 
The CMAC group reasserted their control over the local interpretation of the Micronesia 
Challenge, expressing their willingness – even eagerness – to engage with the 
Micronesia Challenge and its regional coordinating agents on their own terms:   
                                                        
4 Including: Marshall Islands Marine Resources Authority, Marshall Islands Environmental Protected 
Agency, College of the Marshall Islands, Marshall Islands Visitors Authority, Office of Enviornmental 
Planning and Policy Coordination, Marshall Islands Conservation Society, and Natural Resources 
Assessments Surveys Marshall Islands (Reimaanlok: National Conservation Area Plan for the Marshall 
Islands 2008) 
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“[W]hen they talked about the Micronesia Challenge, it was nothing new to us. It 
was something that we were already doing. But, it was exciting because they 
were willing to raise funds to support the work we were doing. So one of the first 
things that we wanted to explicitly state to TNC was that ‘we’re doing this, we’re 
already doing this, we will support it, we will get our governments excited and 
support this, provided you’re raising funds and you’re helping us, supporting 
the work we’re doing on the ground, not bringing in your own idea on how we 
should do it’” (RMI1).  
 
The strong commitment to developing a “Marshallese” implementation mechanism was 
drawn in part from past experiences with foreign consultants: 
“[W]e want to learn from mistakes we’ve had before. We had a number of 
consultants coming here, preparing…documents that were put on the shelf. It 
wasn’t done of the people, the Marshallese people. It was done… you know, 
there was no benefits” (RMI12). 
 
It was also linked to perceptions that TNC was too heavy-handed in the development of 
PANs within the FSM and Palau: 
“TNC sort of driving what protected should be in FSM and Palau. For RMI we 
told them [ . . .] I said ‘look, you support me or get the fuck out. I don’t want an 
office here, I don’t want a TNC office here. Support me, support the local effort, 
support the NGOs, but don’t come. Let me do it my way’” (RMI1).  
 
Local actors successfully asserted their vision of the Micronesia Challenge as “a 
commitment of ensuring that we continue to do the things that we’ve been doing all 
along” (RMI12). In 2008, the CMAC group formally documented ‘what they had been 
doing all along’ in the “Reimaanlok: National Conservation Area Plan for the Marshall 
Islands,” a legible national strategy for achieving the Micronesia Challenge: 
“[T]he Reimaanlok, the process had already been developed. It wasn’t 
documented but it was already developed, so in 2006 when the MC was 
launched you know when we came together to say we need a conservation area 
plan and document all our work” (RMI1).  
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Interviewees describe the Reimaanlok (“Looking to the Future” in the Marshallese 
language) as a process for community engagement and “people-centered” conservation 
planning. This is echoed explicitly in the document itself: 
“[T]his plan does not attempt to identify specific sites for conservation areas, but 
rather, develops the principles, process and guidelines for the design, 
establishment and management of conservation areas that are fully owned, led 
and endorsed by local communities based on their needs, values and cultural 
heritage” (Reimaan National Planning Team 2008).  
 
The document includes a locally specific definition of “effective conservation” and an 
explicit goal of achieving the Micronesia Challenge targets for effective conservation “of 
at least 30% of Near-shore Marine Resources and 20% of Terrestrial Resources on every 
atoll” (Reimaan National Planning Team 2008, p.27). The application of the Micronesia 
Challenge targets at the atoll level was intended to affect socially meaningful 
conservation in inhabited areas:   
“The Micronesia Challenge just became an overarching goal for us, but we had 
our own goals [. . .] It’s so easy to reach 20/ 30 [targets]. One, because we don’t 
have much land area. So, we can just set aside one atoll and say we’ve met our 20 
percent. But we wanted to make sure that conservation was improving the lives 
of people – not conservation being a hindrance to people’s prosperity and 
security, but conservation meaning something to the people” (RMI1).  
 
Despite initial resistance to adopting a PAN in the Marshall Islands, interviewees now 
seem to be acquiescing to regional pressure to do so: 
“[Micronesia Conservation Trust] wants to use these, the established PANs as 
another leverage to try and get additional funding support for these islands. And 
we all understand the need for PAN, and each country and each jurisdiction has 
their own perspective of what their protected area should look like” (RMI1).  
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As another interviewee explained, 
“[I]n order to make the Micronesia Challenge more effective and more efficient 
we, I think, kind of agreed that it would be better if we [the Marshall Islands] got 
a, one integrated system for dealing with all of the protected areas” (RMI6).  
 
The Micronesia Conservation Trust and TNC are currently facilitating learning 
exchanges between Palau and the Marshall Islands to support the development of 
similar national level PAN legislation in the Marshall Islands:  
“Palau is now a model for how the Micronesia challenge can be effectively 
managed and so we’re using the Palau experience to ask sort of a guideline as 
how we establish the necessary legal framework in FSM and Marshalls to ensure 
they are successful in their Micronesia Challenge” (INGO6).  
 
The national legislation is in early draft form, but most interviewees envision the PAN 
as an eventual mechanism for dispersing funding from the Micronesia Challenge 
endowment to support the Reimaanlok-related activities. As of March 2013, the Marshall 
Island’s sub-account within the Micronesia Challenge endowment totaled $2.6 million; 
they have met their matching requirements through the $1.68 million GEF grant, and 
$265,000 from foreign fishing licenses, allocated by the Marshall Islands Marine 
Resources Authority. CI has dispersed half of their $1 million pledge thus far.  
3.7.4 Republic of the Marshall Islands: Functional Interplay 
The Micronesia Challenge is understood as a means to diverse ends for the 
Marshall Islands. Similar to Palau, almost all interviewees viewed the Micronesia 
Challenge as a tool for mobilizing international resources to support pre-existing 
conservation initiatives: “it is a commitment of ensuring that we continue to do the 
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things that we’ve been doing all along” (RMI12). The Micronesia Challenge has already 
enabled the Marshallese to access new sources of biodiversity-focused funding: 
“[A] lot of donors also fund areas with high biodiversity and RMI [Republic of 
the Marshall Islands] is kind of an outlier in terms of their biodiversity 
significance when you compare them to the coral triangle and Palau and FSM are 
just kind of right outside that. So in fact Packard has never really funded any 
RMI focused projects but the only reason that they’re getting Packard money is 
because they’re lumped into the Micronesia Challenge so in that way they’re 
benefitting from the Micronesia Challenge. [. . . ] And if the countries have not 
come together, Packard money would never have gone to RMI because they’re 
not part of their portfolio” (INGO5). 
 
At the same time, however, one interviewee raised a concern similar to that in Palau: 
“one of the downside of doing a regional [fundraising] because you sort of give up most 
of your bilateral leverage for the greater cause of the region” (RMI1).  
In addition to fundraising for local conservation initiatives, interviewees 
articulated visions for an even broader function for the Micronesia Challenge as a means 
for focusing international attention on two major domestic concerns: the legacy of U.S. 
nuclear bomb testing in the Marshall Islands and climate change. As one interviewee 
summarized: “[the Micronesia Challenge] gave us new forums to bring up unfinished 
business, the environment as it affects humans rights” (RMI11). Other interviewees 
similarly reflected, “I think the Challenge has an opportunity, if used wisely, to talk 
about these other issues” (RMI1).  
Between 1946 and 1958, the U.S. military conducted 67 nuclear tests in the 
Marshall Islands; the most powerful explosion was the infamous “Bravo” test on Bikini 
atoll in 1954, which was roughly equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshima bombs.  Most of the 
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atolls within the country received some radiation from the fallout, and the small island 
nation is still seeking reparations in multiple venues – from the U.S. congress to the 
United Nations Human Rights Council – primarily to fulfill outstanding personal injury 
claims from damages incurred due to U.S. nuclear testing. Two interviewees suggested 
that the Micronesia Challenge offers a mechanism to direct international attention to the 
“unfinished business” (RMI11) associated with historic nuclear testing. According to a 
high level official in national government, 
“[T]he problem with trying to reach closure on the nuclear issue is that there is 
not enough public knowledge of it outside. There is not enough conscious 
knowledge of it on the part of the American public, for example, about what was 
done here and what it cost. In order to get the powers that be to turn their heads, 
you’ve got to have this upwelling of conscience, of not just information, but 
information that moves the heart and the mind to do something. And what I’m 
saying is that, in terms of the environment, overall environmental issues - and of 
course the nuclear issue is one of them -  Micronesia Challenge provided that 
overall and overlapping avenue” (RMI11).  
 
The power of the Micronesia Challenge in this context lies in its positive image:  
“[T]he Micronesia Challenge allows us to approach these very scary issues 
without becoming threatening. It’s a cleanliness, it’s the health, it’s the 
sustainability and restoration that we’re after. Not the blame or the liability or 
the legal you know, culpability” (RMI11).   
 
He continued, 
“[I]t’s sexy to the big guys, it really is. [ . . .] the approach that we’ve made to 
world with Micronesia Challenge is it’s not going to harm anybody. It’s a 
friendly, eco-friendly but also people friendly, big country friendly challenge. It’s 
not going to expose your dirty fingers and dirty hands and what all that stuff 
that you’ve been doing. It’s going to give you an opportunity to reverse it” 
(RMI11).  
 
 Local actors also identified potential in leveraging the Micronesia Challenge to 
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draw attention to domestic climate change concerns. According to multiple 
interviewees, the Marshall Islands has also been “using the Challenge to advocate for 
better understanding and awareness on the impacts that these small islands are having 
from climate change” (RMI1), particularly within United Nations policy-making 
processes.  In this context, interviewees envision leveraging regional ties to the FSM and 
Palau through the Micronesia Challenge into geopolitical strength: 
“[A]t the bilateral level, you’re not as effective as if you had more friends , like-
minded friends, saying the same thing. And saying it louder. Because, say at the 
UN General Assembly, instead of just the Marshall Islands readying a prepared 
statement on climate change and the importance of the Micronesia Challenge, 
now we have, Marshall Islands, FSM, and Palau all saying and singing the same 
tune at the UN” (RMI10).  
 
The “tune” that the Micronesia Challenge enables something like a “moral high ground” 
(RMI10) that allows the Marshall Islands to say:  
“[T]his is what we are doing. But, you know, if you are not doing your part, then 
you know… our islands will be covered with water. Where are we going to live? 
And we use the Micronesia Challenge, you know, because …we are doing the 
best we can to protect our environment” (RMI5). 
 
In short, the rationale is to leverage the Micronesia Challenge to shame others into 
action:   
“[L]ook, we small countries, no money, little people, little contribution to the 
emission, and this is what [we’re] doing [. . . ] So what do you do? The rest of the 
world, what are you doing?” (RMI1).  
 
 In summary, at the broadest level, the Marshallese interpret the Micronesia 
Challenge as “a way for us to get the attention of the world” (RMI11). The concerns 
interviewees raised were few and muted. One person mentioned that there was initially 
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some debate about re-regionalizing, similar to that in Palau: “there were people who 
said hey we separated from these guys before. Why are we getting back together?” 
(RMI11). Another point of concern related to the uneven allocation of endowment 
pledges from TNC and CI throughout the FSM, Palau, and Marshall Islands. The 
Marshall Islands received the smallest pledge ($1 million total), which created a 
lingering “sore point” (RMI6) that did not go unnoticed: “my only concern was, why is 
that Palau got the big share of the lion’s share? For a smaller country” (RMI10). In 
general, however, interviewees within the Marshall Islands were quite supportive of the 
Micronesia Challenge, arguably because they had been able to strategically identify 
ways by which to put it to work for their local priorities. 
3.7.5 Federated States of Micronesia: Local Implementation 
 Despite the authoritative declaration within the GEF project document of a 
national protected area network as the implementation strategy for the Micronesia 
Challenge in the FSM (and Palau and Marshall Islands), there is as yet no coherent local 
implementation mechanism conceptualized or institutionalized within the FSM.  As one 
interviewee summarized: “So we’re struggling, we don’t have a strategic plan or a 
document, a process in place” (FSM11). Unlike in the Marshall Islands, however, the 
struggle in the FSM is largely internal.  Recall from Section 3.4.2 that the FSM as a nation 
represents a tenuous amalgam of the relatively less powerful islands comprising the 
former U.S. Trust Territory that failed to negotiate independent political status. Today, 
the FSM is a federation of four semi-autonomous states (Pohnpei, Kosrae, Yap, and 
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Chuuk) comprised of more than 600 islands spread out across a vast swath of ocean, and 
united loosely under a weak national government.  Discerning what the Micronesia 
Challenge means to and for the FSM as a collective political unit has not surprisingly 
been “a little bit tricky” (FSM8). 
 As in Palau, the top-down announcement of the Micronesia Challenge from a 
weak national government was not met warmly by those who control natural resources 
in the FSM, namely, the state governments, traditional leaders, and/or communities:  
“[T]hey feel like they should have been given more time to say what they 
thought of it before signing on, the states did. I know Kosrae was like why didn’t 
they do consultations before entering into this?” (FSM5).  
 
Resource owners were particularly concerned about how the Micronesia Challenge 
targets could affect their rights to access their resources: 
“[Y]ou know MC just says ok 20% terrestrial, 30% near shore marine.  And some 
of the islands, say Yap or Kosrae, their terrestrial areas are like, tiny compared to 
some of the larger islands so it’s like, wait a minute that’s like almost the whole 
island for one place. And so it worries, it worries the local communities and 
some of the state leaders” (FSM5).  
 
Resource management agencies at the national and state levels, too, were critical of a 
national directive for what they perceived to be extra work for them:  
“[I]n the beginning a lot of our resource management agencies thought that was 
extra work for them. They didn’t like the idea that we’re going to be giving them 
another program of work. And they were like saying no” (FSM1).   
 
 In this context, and despite continuing efforts by TNC and Micronesia 
Conservation Trust to invest in the development of a national PAN, the national FSM 
government apparently has had a limited ability and/or desire to authoritatively 
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delineate a specific implementation strategy – through a PAN or otherwise: “To be 
realistic with you, FSM is not in a position to....I think [we] have to be very conservative” 
(FSM1).   Interview data also suggest that national officials are more interested in how 
the Micronesia Challenge may contribute to sustainable development and food security 
than biodiversity conservation through protected areas:  
“[T]o us? It’s sustaining the livelihood. At the end of the day our people look at 
the resources it’s not for the species alone but it’s also for their livelihoods them 
as also another species [ . . . ] if we keep just focusing on protected areas, you 
sometimes lose sight of the bigger picture. And for most of us, I can’t speak for 
the other countries but for FSM it’s all about sustainable development although 
sometimes development side supersedes the sustainable issues which becomes a 
problem we have do work on” (FSM1).  
 
As one interviewee echoed, “you can tell [the PAN is] not something that they’re 
passionate about.” (INGO5). 
When asked how the FSM is meeting its Micronesia Challenge commitment, 
policy actors cite a broad slough of pre-existing activities, including but not limited to 
protected areas, and suggest that “everything that we do, it’ll just feed into the 
Micronesia Challenge”(FSM11) or that “for FSM it’s really a mixed bag” (FSM1). Similar 
to those in the Marshall Islands and Palau, interviewees shared the interpretation that 
the Micronesia Challenge is “not something new” (FSM1). As another put it,  
“[N]othing that we speak of in the Micronesia Challenge in my view is all new 
stuff, these are all things that we, it’s part of the way that we live, but you’re just 
naming it a little bit differently” (FSM8).  
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At this point it is unclear how the FSM portion of the Micronesia Challenge 
endowment will be spent.  As one interviewee suggested, this decision should inform 
discussion as to whether the FSM should move forward with a PAN: 
“[W]hat exactly is the PAN for? Because it’s been talked about prior to launching 
the Micronesia Challenge, but one thing that we need to figure out in the FSM is 
the mechanism in which the funds that are being raised for the Micronesia 
Challenge is going to actually get down to the community where the work is 
being done. So if the PAN framework is that mechanism, then it makes sense for 
us to actually invest our time in creating the PAN. But if that’s not the 
mechanism, then why are we doing it?” (FSM11).  
 
Despite the lack of clarity, the FSM government has been willing to allocate $300,000 
(generated through bilateral aid) to their subaccount within the regional endowment, 
which along with their $1.68 million from GEF, will trigger the $1 million pledge from 
TNC. As of March 2013, the FSM endowment totals about $2.4 million. They will need to 
find $2 million to trigger the $1 million pledge from CI.  Similar to the Marshall Islands, 
interviewees in the FSM mentioned the “unfair” distribution of financial pledges from 
CI and TNC: 
“[W]e never got any formal justification as to why there was that distribution, 
but the initial, like informal discussions we got from TNC was the fact that it was 
Palau that steered it in the beginning, so they should be the ones to [get the 
most], but that’s not a good enough justification for, you know, because this is an 
equal, no we’re all gonna be trying to meet that threshold that we committed, so 
this challenge is for all of us, so why is it that some are getting more than the 
others? But that was after the launch that we found those kind of issues” 
(FSM10).  
 
  
3.7.6 Federated States of Micronesia
 Interviewees within the FSM, similar to those in Palau, interpreted the 
Micronesia Challenge foremost as a mar
resources, including funding
“[I]t’s just giving it more of a, I guess a marketing term for it sort of to profile our 
work, showcase and also like bring their resources to us [ . . .] it hi
communities needs and issues at a high scale, a more of a global scale” (FSM
 
Other interviewees similarly 
“So in a way Micronesia Challenge, if you could put it as that, you could put it as 
an initiative to attract or leverage resources [ . . .] FSM can try any kind of idea, 
and it wouldn’t score as well as the Micronesia Challenge. But the attraction is by 
having all the region band together and go out and, I guess if you want to say 
market it or market our approach to those who are willing to give money to 
conservation” (FSM8). 
 
Interviewees focused on how the region enables a “visibility” the FSM could not 
on its own. When asked what a regional environmental governance arrangement could 
achieve for FSM that a national arrangement could not, for example, an interviewee 
replied: 
 “[M]ore visibility, and a bigger area, more visibility, I guess people wi
seriously. And if they treat you like one group of islands, you know Pohnpei and 
Kosrae, it’s just a drop in the ocean. Through the Micronesia Challenge, they will 
say, wow it’s about as big as the continental US as an area. It’s bigger than 
Europe [ . . .]  Because it’s a bigger group, hopefully we can have more
in accessing funding”
 
Another interviewee similarly suggested, 
just one site in Yap … or one site in Palau, Guam, CNMI,
Islands], FSM” (FSM11). 
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 At the same time, local NGOs in the FSM have experienced competition with 
coordinating NGOs for funding.  One interviewee cited an example in which his 
organization agreed not to submit a grant that the Micronesia Conservation Trust (MCT) 
was applying for on behalf of the three freely associated states, even though his 
organization would have received more funding unilaterally than it would as part of the 
regional grant:  
“MCT was competing with us by combining all the states and the other 
jurisdictions to go in as one. So for CSP [Conservation Society of Pohnpei] 
competing with MCT we kindly backed down” (FSM6). 
 
He continued: 
 “[B]ut the fact that we’re now part of the entire territory the money is, so it has to 
 split evenly [ . . .] [so the money coming to the Conservation Society of Pohnpei 
would be ] much much less through the partnership with MCT” (FSM6).  
 
Despite this experience, this person still felt that, overall, the Micronesia Challenge 
expanded rather than restricted his organization’s access to donors: 
“[J]ust by using the Micronesia Challenge as our, one of our pitch, it helps. [ . . .] 
For Conservation Society of Pohnpei, definitely yeah we got exposed to various 
donors through MCT [Micronesia Conservation Trust] and just by that we 
started to… not only leaning on MCT to reach those donors, we can now go 
directly to those donors instead of going through MCT because of the work that 
we’ve done and you know the lessons, successes, and I would say that goes also 
to the other NGOs in FSM” (FSM6). 
 
Another interviewee similarly explained how local NGOs are leveraging the Micronesia 
Challenge to attract resources: 
“You know, we would write grants and say how we’re connecting to the 
Micronesia Challenge, and how our efforts are directly contributing to the 
Micronesia Challenge efforts. And that attracts donors” (FSM8).    
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3.7.7 Guam: Local Implementation 
The delineation of a local implementation strategy for the Micronesia Challenge 
in Guam has been deeply controversial, resulting in divisive and enduring conflicts 
among representatives of resource management agencies and fisher organizations, 
including the Guam Coastal Management Program, the Guam Fisherman’s Cooperative, 
the Western Pacific Fisheries Management Council, and the U.S. National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. The conflict has focused exclusively on the 30% near-shore 
marine target. Guam’s implementation strategy for the terrestrial target is area-based 
and a political non-issue because it focuses on improved management of the 22.12% of 
terrestrial resources that had already been slated as conservation areas prior to Guam’s 
commitment to the Micronesia Challenge: 
“Although on paper, Guam has reached the goal of 20% for terrestrial resources, 
these areas are not yet under effective conservation and may be considered for 
development to support the DoD [Department of Defense] expansion. Strategies 
to strengthen and expand terrestrial resource protection include conservation 
improvements of recreational parks, restoration of native flora and fauna, 
watershed planning, conservation easements, and incorporation of green 
infrastructure in developed areas” (Report on progress to implement the 
Micronesia Challenge 2006-2011). 
 
 Although Guam is not a party to the CBD, and thereby not tied to global 
protected area targets, five marine protected areas were established there in 1997, with 
enforcement ramping up in 2001.  Initial assessments of Guam’s implementation status 
were based on the spatial extent of MPA coverage: “we first sat down we really, we 
started off with an area based approach too, like some of the other islands” (GM4). 
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Implementing agencies concluded that 15.45% of Guam’s near-shore marine resources 
were under protection and that “To reach the goal of 30%, placement of the additional 
16% of near-shore marine resources under effective conservation in Guam will require a 
variety of strategies” (Micronesia Challenge action planning meeting report 2006).  
While multiple interviewees suggested that the addition of new MPAs was never 
a realistic option in Guam – e.g., “I think Guam always had a recognition that any new 
protected areas, new marine protected areas would be an uphill battle and unrealistic” 
(INGO4) – there was at least some initial consideration of expanded marine protected 
areas as a potential component of their local implementation strategy. As one 
interviewee reflected, “initially we were thinking, similar to other places, with protected 
areas or whatever” (GM1).  An undated document entitled “Guam’s Strategy for the 
Micronesia Challenge” lists seven strategies for meeting the 30% target, including the 
following: strengthen existing MPAs, strengthen MPA enforcement, identify areas for 
infrastructure improvements, explore new strategies to address recreational overuse, 
explore new strategies to facilitate positive use of marine resources, and identify 
additional areas for possible MPA establishment.  
 As in the other jurisdictions, resource users were not part of the 
conceptualization of the Micronesia Challenge: “when they created this Micronesian 
Challenge, we were flabbergasted, we were freaking out, where did this come from?” 
(GM3). Representatives of the Guam Fisherman’s Cooperative quickly became vocal 
public opponents of the Micronesia Challenge, interpreting the initiative as a “top-
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down” mandate for marine protected areas that would further restrict indigenous 
fishing rights in Guam: 
“Yes they had every intention of creating more preserves because the marine 
preserves only accounted for 13% of the coastline” (GM5). 
 
“Our sense is that they’re trying to take away limited fishing resources we have 
left” (GM8). 
 
One vocal opponent, who publicly refers to himself as the “challenged Micronesian,” 
similarly explained: 
“I use the term challenged Micronesian because it’s not a bottom up approach, 
it’s a top down approach. It’s government telling us that this is good for us. And 
every time we have a meeting all we talk about is, hey, we have conservation 
that is already in place, you guys, we gave you five MPAs” (GM4). 
 
 These perspectives were sometimes associated with distrust of international 
conservation organizations and their connection to the Micronesia Challenge (note that 
this interviewee misidentifies The Ocean Conservancy as Conservation International): 
“I feel that the Micronesia Challenge is just another effort that The Nature 
Conservancy and other NGOs who care not about the indigenous people, but to 
further their resource grab to further their cause of acquisition at the least cost to 
themselves. Just imagine that the TNC total investment for the Micronesia 
Challenge is only $3 million as The Ocean Conservancy [TOC] chipped in the 
other $3 million to fulfill the $6 million commitment.  This $6 million in exchange 
for 30% of the near-shore and 20% of the Terrestrial resources of Micronesia. This 
is tantamount to the purchasing of the island of Manhattan for some beads.  The 
TNC and TOC will now use this achievement to raise more money for their 
coffers as if they didn't already have enough. The real losers are the islanders 
who have had the access to the resource and their livelihood and culture taken 
away from them” (GM5). 
 
Supporters of the Micronesia Challenge in Guam on the other hand, felt that is a 
misrepresentation of the Micronesia Challenge: 
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“I think that they've totally misrepresented, intentionally, what the MC is, and 
use it as a way to make people fear you and what you're doing. Immediately set 
people against you” (GM2). 
 
The interpretive debate surrounding the local implementation mechanism for the 
Micronesia Challenge in Guam eventually led to the removal of additional MPAs from 
the implementation strategy text, 
“Guam’s Micronesia Strategy was recently updated to ensure that it reflects the 
need to effectively conserve our resources for future generations while balancing 
the needs of the community. One of the major changes from the original strategy 
and the updated strategy is the removal of increasing of marine conservation 
areas. The Guam MC strategy does not support any additional marine 
conservation areas or MPAs” (A report on progress to implement the Micronesia 
Challenge 2006-2011). 
 
Instead, implementing agencies have delineated a non-spatial “watershed approach” to 
meeting the targets: 
“We're going to be doing it from a watershed approach. Guam has five protected 
areas, three of them are under the jurisdiction of Guam. But we are nowhere near 
going to, in terms of like, if we take the geographic area of these places, that 30 
percent is not going to be met through the marine protected areas we have now. 
But we don't want to open up new MPAs, we don't establish new MPAs, we 
don't want to do any of that things because of right now we're having a real 
struggle with fisherman saying ‘oh you're preventing us from fishing’ [. . .] So 
that's our approach is from a more of a watershed approach in terms of 
restoration to improve coral reefs and  marine resources” (GM1). 
 
The watershed approach focuses on reducing pollutants, including land-based sources 
of sediment, into coastal waters: 
“It is clear that the people of Guam are not in favor of establishing additional 
MPAs. In light of this, Guam’s strategy focuses on effectively conserving marine 
resources by reducing pollutants, including sediment, into Guam’s coastal 
waters in order to enhance the habitat and health of coral reef ecosystems” (A 
report on progress to implement the Micronesia Challenge 2006-2011). 
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Committing to a politically benign watershed approach has led some interviewees to 
conclude that local implementation of the Micronesia Challenge in Guam has 
“stagnated” (GM4) or that “we're in a little bit of a slump” (GM2).  As mentioned earlier, 
Guam currently has no sub-account within the Micronesia Challenge regional 
endowment.   
3.7.8 Guam: Functional interplay  
 Perhaps the most conspicuous function of the Micronesia Challenge in Guam is 
conflict.  Some interviewees interpreted the Micronesia Challenge exclusively as a 
source of local conflict: “I mean, what benefit? There’s only been detriments” (GM5).  
Interpretations among Micronesia Challenge supporters, however, were more diverse.  
 Fundraising is not a local priority for Guam, which enjoys a guaranteed source of 
funding for environmental management from the U.S. federal government:  
“[W]e have enough money right now [. . . ] We're not asking for any money [ . . . ] 
Our concept is to utilize the existing funds to do the work necessary for the 
Challenge” (GM1).  
 
Some supporters interpreted the Micronesia Challenge as a tool for resource 
mobilization for others, concluding that other jurisdictions stand to benefit more from 
the Micronesia Challenge: 
“I think FSM and the Marshalls probably have, probably FSM to tell you the 
truth, has probably the most to gain from the Challenge. [ . . .] And I think Palau 
is benefiting too, but Palau already had kind of harnessed a lot of benefits and 
attention already, so I think that they were already fairly well placed, even 
without the Challenge, [ . . .] but FSM probably has the most to gain from the 
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whole project. I think Guam and CNMI have something to gain from it, but I 
don’t think it’s gonna be the same level as some of the others” (GM4). 
 
What does Guam stand to gain from the Micronesia Challenge? Interviewees envisioned 
mobilizing regional cooperation through the Micronesia Challenge to serve two key 
local priorities relating to self-determination goals.   
 First, multiple interviewees envisioned mobilizing horizontal ties to the freely 
associated states – nations that are members of the United Nations – to represent 
Guam’s interests within global environmental policy-making fora in which the U.S. does 
not provide locally relevant representation.  The Guam Strategy for the Micronesia 
Challenge articulated this potential function thus: 
“Through the Micronesia Challenge Guam will receive help from others working 
throughout the Micronesian region to achieve our conservation goals.  Such 
linkages allow Guam to participate in global activities with our neighbors in 
matters which are not of such interest on the U. S. national level but are more 
important to Guam.   [ . . .] It is most appropriate for Guam to be involved in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development and the Millennium Development Goals from the perspective of a 
resource-limited small island, not the perspective of a world economic and 
political leader, the United States.  Greater involvement in regional organizations 
and appropriate representation in such global groups will result from Guam’s 
participation in the Micronesia Challenge” (Guam Strategy for the Micronesia 
Challenge, ND). 
 
This potential function also came up during interviewees:   
“[T]hrough the Micronesia Challenge and through the region, the regional 
partners, they can get points across into those kind of venues, so I think, like I 
said, one of the big benefits of the Micronesia Challenge is just tying everyone in 
the region a little closer together on those issues like climate change, and CBD, 
and other things. And maybe Guam and CNMI won’t have a seat at that table 
because we’re overshadowed by the U.S. and we’re still U.S. territories, but it 
does allow some of the challenges from the region to be voiced and the regional 
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partners can voice for those two jurisdictions as well. [ . . .]  Climate change is 
going to affect Guam and CNMI too, but we’re stuck behind the U.S. in those 
conversations” (GM4). 
 
 Interviewees also suggested that regional cooperation institutionalized through 
the Micronesia Challenge could contribute to related movements of self-determination 
and cultural renewal. One interviewee explained that former Governor Camacho was 
attracted to the Micronesia Challenge because he wanted to “be back part of Micronesia, 
see Guam as Micronesia again” (INGO4). Reinvigorating ties to other Micronesia Islands 
was described as part of a local strategy for “tapping into cultural identity and 
increasing the sense of ownership and pride for the resources, which I think that we’re 
lacking here” (GM4). The Guam Strategy for Implementing the Micronesia Challenge 
similarly states:  
“Micronesian’s (sic) from outside of Guam have kept stronger ties to their 
natural resources in their daily lives and can help revive the awareness and 
understanding of our environment among the people of Guam.”   
 
This re-imagined regional relationship was perceived not only in Guam but also in other 
jurisdictions such as Palau: 
“[F]or the first time Guam was actually more as a partner instead of a big 
brother, that’s always been a historical problem Guam being sort of this 
obnoxious big brother who thinks he’s better than the younger brother and 
you’re not quite ready to deal with me, but Governor Camacho was very good at 
trying to act as an equal, and so it was building it back” (ROP3). 
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3.7.9 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Local 
Implementation 
 The CNMI has outlined a non-controversial area-based approach to meeting the 
terrestrial portion of the Micronesia Challenge targets, committing to effectively 
conserve “at least 20% of total land area containing priority terrestrial types” within 
each island of the archipelago (Report on progress to implement the Micronesia 
Challenge 2006-2011). Priority areas are defined as those with “high biodiversity” or 
“high level of ecosystem services” (A report on progress to implement the Micronesia 
Challenge 2006-2011).  Similar to Guam, “the marine is a little bit more controversial” 
(CNMI1). In fact, the CNMI experience in delineating a local implementation strategy 
for the near shore marine targets very closely parallels that of Guam, with divisive 
interpretive conflict emerging among representatives of locally-based resource 
management agencies and environmental NGOs.  Unlike in Guam, however, the conflict 
in CNMI was expressed through a scientific debate about measures of progress, and 
associated differential conclusions as to whether or not the CNMI had met the targets 
with pre-existing policies. 
CNMI had already established a number of controversial marine protected areas 
prior to the declaration of the Micronesia Challenge. Representatives of the CNMI 
fisheries management agency, the Division of Fish and Wildlife, resisted what they 
viewed as the interpretation of the Micronesia Challenge target that was expected of 
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them: an imperative to establish additional marine protected areas.  As one interviewee 
summarized,  
“[J]ust within the government, there was some disagreement about how we’re 
going to go about managing resources, because, if you don’t know, Micronesia 
Challenge was mainly an area based type proposal. Well that’s what we were 
thinking was being expected of us. And we didn’t necessarily agree that area 
management was the only way to go in respect to getting to this so-called 30% 
that everybody wanted to put in as a good percentage to reach [. .. .] We, we had 
to show a different perspective on how resources were being managed and it’s 
not necessarily always area based. And, because the Micronesia Challenge was 
based on that, it made it seem that that was the only way to manage resources” 
(CNMI4). 
 
A few interviewees specifically identified TNC as a source of pressure for interpreting 
the Micronesia Challenge targets as spatial: 
“[A TNC representative] tried to force her version, her thoughts about what the 
Micronesian challenge was, on us. And so we butted heads big time and said 
we’re doing it this way and that’s it, we’re not following her MPA route, we 
didn't want to do that. We want to look at it in a different way” (CNMI7). 
 
As another interviewee pointed out, the CNMI (and Guam) was already implementing 
non-spatial forms of marine management: 
“Guam and the CNMI are U.S. We have a shitload of federal laws and 
regulations that we are, that we have to comply with. [. . .] Effective conservation 
is a big deal for RMI [Republic of Marshall Islands], ROP [Republic of Palau], 
and FSM. For Guam and CNMI, we’re almost there already. We’ve got the CZM  
[coastal zone management] program. We’ve got EPA [environmental protection 
agency]. Even in CNMI, we’ve banned scuba with spear, we’ve banned net 
fishing. But yet, the environmentalists, oh no, we want 20% MPAs. And there’s 
been a big fight here in the CNMI. There’s two groups of people here in the 
CNMI. And we’re at each other’s throats all the time” (CNMI9). 
 
The Division of Fish and Wildlife decided “to approach [the Micronesia Challenge] in a 
different way” (CNMI7) in an effort to preempt further restriction of fishing through 
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additional marine protected areas. Specifically, the agency developed a complex model 
that qualitatively estimated effective conservation of near-shore marine areas as a 
function of diverse management approaches, including marine protected areas, fisheries 
regulations, moratoria, and public awareness in the most populated islands, including 
Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. The model incorporated management measures in place and 
qualitatively estimated how much of a conservation benefit they provided. The model 
concluded that the CNMI was effectively conserving 22-32% of marine resources and 
thereby meeting the Micronesia Challenge commitments without a need for additional 
marine protected areas or changes to local marine management. The model attributed 
effective conservation success largely to gear restrictions on nets and scuba, and 
supported the Division of Fish and Wildlife’s argument that the CNMI fishery stock is 
healthy despite some localized depletion. 
The results of the Division of Fish and Wildlife’s model complemented a 
conviction among several high level government officials that the Micronesia Challenge 
was not designed to change local policy but rather, to quantify pre-existing success: 
“[I]t is not so much designed to change policy [. . .] The policy exists, conserve, 
we know that.  It simply gives a quantification that had not existed” (CNMI3). 
  
“[T]he Micronesia Challenge at least for us is that it’s not really asking us to do 
anything new, you know. [. . . ] it’s almost more of a political show game, the 
Micronesia Challenge, it seems like, than it is on-the-ground active conservation. 
You know?” (CNMI5). 
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However, there was another interpretive community of resource managers in the CNMI 
who felt that the Micronesia Challenge provided political impetus to transform local 
management, including through the addition of new marine protected areas:  
“I did see it as a policy in order to get conservation done. I saw it as a tool to 
actually push for more conservation” (CNMI6).   
 
“I do see setting up networks of marine preserves that encompass 30% of the reef 
would be an ideal thing” (CNMI14). 
 
This group argued that the aforementioned model and its conclusions were flawed, and 
that the CNMI had work to do in order to meet the Micronesia Challenge near-shore 
marine targets 
“[The Division of Fish and Wildlife] felt that CNMI has already met the 
Challenge and in terms of like marine. But [others say] we haven’t met the 
challenge. They [Division of Fish and Wildlife] can say all they want about fish 
and all the laws that they’ve implemented, but looking at our data, I think we’re 
only 18%, you know. We still need to do more work to effectively conserve our 
near-shore marine.” (CNMI1) 
 
“I have a ten year data set on thirty regions of CNMI that shows major declines 
in like 40-50% of them. 10 years of scientific data. You cannot argue a declining 
trend” (CNMI14).  
 
Conflicting interpretations about the state of marine resources and how to measure 
effective conservation eventually led local resource management agencies to split the 
marine target into “fisheries” and “benthic corals” groups, largely corresponding to the 
Division of Fish and Wildlife and the CNMI Division of Environmental Quality 
respectively, which would pursue separate local implementation strategies: 
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“So what they did was they split up the fisheries and the benthic corals, and so 
fisheries are saying that they’ve met it while the benthic coral side said no, we 
still have deficiencies” (CNMI1). 
 
“It’s been really hard because we had to basically draw yet another line [. . . ] 
What the positive side is, what the people doing the Challenge or implementing 
it has been to basically, unfortunately, just ignore the other side and move 
forward” (CNMI14). 
 
The “benthic group” is not currently pursuing additional marine protected areas, given 
the context of political opposition in CNMI. Similar to Guam, they will undertake a 
watershed approach that articulates with pre-existing management efforts and focuses 
on reducing land-based sources of pollution to coral reefs in priority watersheds. As 
mentioned earlier, the CNMI currently has no sub-account within the Micronesia 
Challenge regional endowment. There is, however, interest in building an endowment 
that could support locally-based environmental NGOs. 
3.7.10 Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Functional 
interplay  
The most conspicuous function of the Micronesia Challenge in the CNMI, as in 
Guam, has been conflict. Many interviewees in the CNMI understood the Micronesia 
Challenge as a tool for mobilizing resources for others, questioning the uneven benefits 
accruing to participating jurisdictions.  Compared to the freely associated states, the 
CNMI and Guam arguably “don’t need a huge amount of new resources” (INGO4) 
because they “can access a lot of funding sources for conservation and marine and 
terrestrial lands from NOAA or from US Fish and Wildlife Services” (CNMI2).  
However, several interviewees felt that their engagement with the Micronesia Challenge 
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through regional and local activities was a drag on their agency’s resources, without 
recompense or just cause: 
 “[I]t took up a lot of our time. It was one of those things, it was another one of 
those things [ . . .] these people coming in from the outside, trying to get us to do 
something they want to do on our time. You know, it’s a drag. So it was a deficit, 
definitely for Fish and Wildlife, and probably for other agencies too” (CNMI7).  
 
In this context, multiple people expressed resentment that the CNMI would not benefit 
from so-called “regional” fundraising:  
“[T]hat was one of the major concerns.  So you got to get money from all these 
sources and these entities.  What about us?” (CNMI3).  
 
 “[W]hen we first found out that we weren’t going to get any money for this [ . . .] 
that angered Guam and that angered most of us. So what are we doing here? [. . 
.] It basically, the bottom line was, well you’re here to help the Micronesia 
Challenge. You’re basically here to help FSM, Guam, or Palau, Marshalls, get 
money. That didn’t sit very well” (CNMI7).  
 
One high-level government official linked this concern about differential financial 
benefits to his broader concern about regional difference and how it would play out 
through the Micronesia Challenge: 
 “[T]he concern there was the extent to which CNMI would be an equal partner 
and member.  We are U.S. related and are we Micronesian? Can we actually get 
funding? We're U.S.  And so our concern there was how we would be treated.  
Are we the foster, stepchild?  Are we an equal partner in this?  So not that there 
was objection to the goals, the objectives and the mission.  But the role was a 
major concern.  [ . . .] Are we equal?  Are we considered equal to Palau?  Are we 
considered equal to FSM? Are considered equal to Micronesians?  Or are we U.S. 
and Guam, then we are apart and set off.  We’re different in that sense, that we 
don’t belong” (CNMI3).  
 
Micronesia Challenge supporters in the CNMI articulated a broader 
conceptualization of benefits similar to those envisioned in Guam. Two interviewees in 
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the CNMI suggested that horizontal ties could be leveraged to bring the voice of CNMI 
more directly into global environmental policy-making meetings: 
“[F]or the like, the United Nations, like if there’s a CoP [Conference of the 
Parties] meeting somewhere, we could tag on to Palau or FSM as part of their 
delegation to get our foot in the door” (CNMI1). 
 
While hopeful, another interviewee felt that increased access to international fora would 
ultimately be limited by the political status of the CNMI: 
“[T]he relation that we have right now with Micronesia challenge, may provide 
us the means to be more engaged and connected to this other [international 
policy-making fora] that we’re not privy to at this point in time, such as 
biodiversities and all that stuff  [ . . .]  My concern is as we move forward in time, 
like the next ten years, I’m not sure what level of, I guess, of involvement we’ll 
have into the point where also it becomes a foreign issue, a foreign affairs kind of 
thing. And the [U.S.] Department of States steps in, says ‘wait a minute, you 
gotta go through me before you do this or do that’ you know” (CNMI8). 
 
Other interviewees focused instead on how the Micronesia Challenge could be  
leveraged to improve relations with U.S. federal resource management agencies. Three 
interviewees suggested that one of the most important functions of the Micronesia 
Challenge for the CNMI is increasing international awareness, including within the U.S., 
of local realities in the CNMI:  
“[T]here is an arrogance that NOAA, the US Fish and Wildlife, EPA, they know 
everything. But they don’t know here.  [. . . .]  So a major, a major importance of 
Micronesia Challenge is education, outreach and modeling.  So that persons in 
the region and beyond the region are able to have information about who we 
really are” (CNMI3). 
 
“[I]t allows us to be part of this bigger framework, you know. And, I mean, if 
you talk to people on the Hill, and you have, I think…you know, a lot of times 
they’re not aware of a lot of the activities that are happening in all the local 
agencies and all the stuff that we’re doing. You know, cause we don’t necessarily 
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um, put enough stuff in the media and do enough outreach and make it clear 
enough, you know all the various activities that we’re doing. [ . . .] Whereas 
Micronesia Challenge does. So it’s become, it’s also become a vector for how to 
get the message out about some of the things that we’re doing” (CNMI10). 
 
Another interviewee envisioned mobilizing political ties to the freely associated states to 
put pressure on the U.S. government in support of local goals in the CNMI and Guam: 
“The United States can do whatever it wants with CNMI or Guam for that 
matter. They can implement whatever policy they have in place, and have us 
comply with it. But if you have partners such as Palau, FSM, the Marshalls, you 
have to do better than what you’re doing right now for the CNMI, you gotta step 
up to the plate and do a lot more management measure for Guam. The U.S. may 
listen more that way” (CNMI8). 
 
Finally, a small number of interviewees envisioned the Micronesia Challenge as a 
vehicle for reinvigorating lost cultural ties to natural resources in the CNMI through 
horizontal networking with “brothers and sisters” in more culturally ‘traditional’ 
Micronesian islands: 
“I think the biggest benefit would, um, and what I hope would come out of it is 
to get the local community to have a stronger tie with its resource, like what the 
rest of Micronesia has. [. . .]  And I hope that the Micronesia Challenge would, 
there’d be a lot of dialogue between not just the monitoring teams, not just the 
focal points, not just the young champions, but the jurisdiction as a whole, like 
this big exchange of ideas and information so that the stuff that we’ve lost 
culturally that we can regain from maybe our brothers and sisters in Yap or in 
Chuuk” (CNMI12).  
 
3.7.11 Discussion 
The above analysis reveals the Micronesia Challenge to be a source of tensions 
and possibilities shaped by heterogeneous local political contexts, interpretations, and 
priorities.  As local interpretive communities consider how to engage with the 
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Micronesia Challenge, they wrestle with questions of what their governments, NGOs, 
and/or communities stand to gain and lose from regional environmental governance – 
often in relation to what others throughout the region stand to gain, including 
international environmental NGOs. They also think creatively about how to mobilize the 
region in support of locally specified goals, and critically about how regional 
environmental governance may impose externally generated priorities, limit resource 
access, and/or restrict hard-won political autonomy.  As the above analysis suggests, 
they reach varied, sometimes conflicting conclusions. 
In summary, local implementation strategies are defined to varying degrees of 
coherence, and may coarsely be grouped into watershed-based approaches (Guam and 
CNMI), protected area-based approaches (Palau, RMI), and undecided (FSM). While 
these implementation mechanisms differ in name, all are based on pre-existing practice 
and an authoritative interpretation of the Micronesia Challenge as a thing that conveys 
rather than compels; this is, it conveys regional progress without, as yet, substantially 
reshaping local or regional resource management approaches.  Its lack of influence on 
local management begs the question, if the Micronesia Challenge does not translate into 
changes in resource management, what functions does it serve? 
The definition of a local implementing mechanism is only part of the story of 
localized engagement with the Micronesia Challenge. One of the most compelling 
insights from this analysis of localized perceptions of and engagement with the 
Micronesia Challenge is how its function transcends traditional understandings of 
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environmental governance and stated thematic foci, however broad they may be. 
Interviewees rarely referenced specific goals of biodiversity conservation, climate 
change adaptation, or sustainable development when describing the overall function of 
the Micronesia Challenge. Instead, they focused on resource mobilization (for 
themselves or others), and broader horizontal and vertical linkages that they leverage to 
approach diverse and highly contextualized aspirations for political self-determination, 
international agenda-setting, bargaining power within international relations, or the 
construction of a particular Micronesian identity, for example.  
Results also indicate that institutionalizing regional environmental governance 
embodies potential tradeoffs and dysfunctions, such as local conflicts, intraregional 
resentment tied to perceptions of uneven benefits, and the bottlenecking of (a larger pool 
of) international funding at the regional level. While the Micronesia Challenge may 
attract a larger overall pool of resources to the region, it also empowers two 
international environmental NGOs, as one person put it, “to direct how and why that 
funding should come to this region” (INGO7).  The mobilization and distribution of 
international funding through the Micronesia Challenge is clearly reshaping 
relationships among Micronesian governments, local and international NGOs, and 
donors in complex ways, with as yet unclear consequences.   Continued research is 
necessary to evaluate the impacts of regionalized fundraising on the thematic trajectory 
of local priorities and practice, accountability for local governance (upward vs. 
downward), and the redistribution of resources throughout the region. Surprisingly, few 
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people in the freely associated states commented on what I suspected would be a major 
source of local concern: the short-term opportunity costs associated with diverting 
domestic funding to the regional endowment in order to match pledges from CI and 
TNC.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis of the emergence, form, and function of 
a new and influential form of regional environmental governance. First, I describe the 
emergence of regional environmental governance in Micronesia, linking its development 
to U.S. and global conservation agendas, historically institutionalized regionalism, and a 
close partnership between state and NGO actors - so close that a high-level official in the 
Palauan national government characterized his NGO partners (primarily TNC) as “an 
extension of Palau government” (ROP10).  Moreover, in linking the emergence of the 
Micronesia Challenge to interest in demonstrating large-scale progress toward the CBD 
Program of Work on Protected Areas, I challenge emerging explanations for “the rise of 
the region in global environmental politics” (Conca 2012, p. 127). Specifically, I argue 
that the emergence of the Micronesia Challenge represents the production of success for 
global environmental governance more so than its failure.  
 Next, I engage Balsiger and VanDeever’s typology of regional environmental 
governance to characterize the form(s) of the Micronesia Challenge, in practice and in 
representation, with reference to its territoriality, thematic foci, and coordinating agency 
(Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010).  I identify governance as an important focus for analysis 
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and future comparative research, and propose its addition to the typology with a 
descriptive continuum ranging from regionalized to decentralized.  The addition of 
governance to the typology is embedded in a constructivist recognition that “regional” 
environmental governance may be more or less regional in practice; adding governance 
to the typology guides the researcher’s gaze to the essential question of which aspects of 
environmental governance are being regionalized and which are not, given that calling 
or representing an arrangement as regional does not make it so in practice.  
 Overall, my analysis of the form(s) of the Micronesia Challenge highlights its 
mutability. I explain how the territoriality of the Micronesia Challenge is political, 
though representations thereof imply an ontologically “natural” basis of cooperation.  I 
suggest that its formal thematic focus is deliberately broad, and a subject of continual 
negotiation through more or less authoritative interpretations. I show that official 
coordinating agents comprise both state and non-state actors, though in practice, two 
international NGOs, the Micronesia Conservation Trust and TNC, are key drivers for 
sustained regional coordination. Finally, I convey how the Micronesia Challenge has 
attempted to regionalize environmental governance in three interrelated categories of 
finance, communications, and evaluation, and call attention to the ways in which 
inherent regional diversity renders regionalization of governance uneven, dynamic and 
contingent; it is constantly being molded to serve diverse interests. My analysis reveals 
that the Micronesia Challenge, as a mutable policy, falls along multiple points of 
individual axes on the revised typology of regional environmental governance, shifting 
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with respect to sites of implementation, and analytical focus on representation vs. 
practice.  Therefore, I suggest that a typology of regional environmental governance is 
perhaps most useful as a framework for generating research questions about regional 
environmental governance (comparable to the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework, see Ostrom (2005)).  
Finally, I examine the interactions of the Micronesia Challenge with local 
institutions, interpretations, and priorities within Palau, FSM, Marshall Islands, Guam, 
and the CNMI. This analysis reveals the Micronesia Challenge to function as a locally 
specific source of tension and opportunity shaped by heterogeneous political contexts 
and interpretations. Key insights suggest that local actors, including local environmental 
NGOs, are putting the Micronesia Challenge to work for highly contextualized functions 
beyond most conceptualizations of environmental governance.  Results also reveal the 
potential for unintended and/or adverse functions, such as divisive local interpretive 
conflicts, intraregional resentment tied to perceptions of uneven benefits, and the 
alleged bottlenecking of international funding for freely associated states at the regional 
level.  
In conclusion, I return to the title of this chapter: “the reconstruction of Micronesia 
through regional environmental governance.”  In the context of the colonial construction 
and post-colonial destruction of Micronesia, the reconstruction of “One Micronesia” 
through the Micronesia Challenge may be understood in part as a strategic attempt to 
co-opt a historically imposed regionalism and put it to work for (some) Micronesians 
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and environmental NGOs. It is likely the case that the region as institutionalized 
through the Micronesia Challenge has “given these little countries a voice at a level that 
they’ve never had before.” (INGO11). However, similar to the Pacific Region (Chapter 
2), the version of Micronesia that is remade through the Micronesia Challenge is also 
shaped in part by external actors and agendas that both complement and contradict 
heterogeneous local priorities. 
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4. Multi-level governance for large marine commons:  
Politics and polycentricity in Palau’s protected area 
network 
The material in Chapter 4 is reprinted herein with permission, and may be cited as:  
Gruby R., and Basurto, X., In Press. Multi-level governance for large marine commons: 
Politics and polycentricity in Palau’s protected area network. Environmental Science and 
Policy.1 
4.1 Introduction 
Common pool resource (CPR) theory as defined by the Bloomington School (Aligica 
and Boettke 2011) emerged mainly from research in local, small-scale settings (Ostrom 
1990). A critical research frontier is the governance of larger CPRs, which requires 
analysis of interdependencies among different levels and scales of more complex 
systems (Heikkila et al. 2011; Ostrom 2009). We take Elinor Ostrom’s design principle of 
polycentric, nested enterprises in long enduring, larger CPR systems as a starting point 
for interdisciplinary research on the governance of large CPRs (Marshall 2008). 
Specifically, this paper brings together institutional theories of polycentricity and critical 
human geography theory on scalar politics to contribute to emerging research and 
policy agendas on the governance of larger CPRs by advancing our understanding of the 
form and function of nested, polycentric regimes. We highlight complementarities 
between scalar politics and polycentric theoretical approaches in agreement with Lejano 
(2006) that multiple analytical lenses can reveal different aspects of a policy situation. 
                                                        
1 The authors thank Kenji Dengokl and Dirremeang Oiterong for research assistance, and Abigail Bennett, 
Lisa Campbell, Catherine Corson, Luke Fairbanks, Tarita Holm, Kimberly R. Marion Suiseeya, and two 
reviewers for helpful feedback. 
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A well-suited policy arena in which to explore these issues is marine conservation 
governance, particularly marine protected areas networks (MPAs).  Marine ecologists 
have concluded, “if marine reserves and other MPAs are to provide significant 
conservation benefits to species, they must be scaled up” (Gaines et al. 2010, p. 18286). 
As an alternative to scaling up the geographic extent of individual MPAs, 
conservationists are increasingly promoting large scale marine governance through 
networks of smaller MPAs that may spread the costs of conservation across resource 
owners and/or users, and “can have emergent [ecological] benefits that make the 
network more than the sum of its individual parts” (Gaines et al. 2010, p 18286).  The 
most prominent global policy-making fora (i.e., World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, the World Parks Congress, the World Conservation Congress, and the 
United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity) have all called for ecologically 
representative MPA networks.   
In theory, an MPA network stretching across a large marine CPR is networked in 
both biophysical and social dimensions. As Agardy (2005, p. 244) has pointed out, an 
MPA network has “a dual nature” of “connecting biophysical sites deemed ecologically 
critical (ecological networks), and linking people and institutions in order to make 
effective conservation possible (human networks).” While there has been a proliferation 
of research on the biophysical dimensions of MPA networks (e.g., Airamé et al. 2003; 
Botsford et al. 2003; Gaines et al. 2010; Moffitt et al. 2011; Roberts et al. 2003), there has 
been comparatively little research on the political and institutional dimensions thereof 
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(but see Grilo 2011; Lowry et al. 2009; Sievanen et al. 2013). To be clear, institutions 
herein refer to the formal and informal rules, norms, and strategies that structure human 
interactions (Ostrom 2005). 
To address this gap and explore our theoretical interests in multi-level governance 
for larger CPRs, we focus on institutional changes and politics associated with a national 
protected area network (PAN hereafter) in the western Pacific island nation of Palau, a 
context in which communities of resource users own and manage marine resources. 
Through the PAN, national government and NGO actors are providing financial 
incentives to resource users/owners to voluntarily enroll pre-existing and new protected 
areas2 into an ecologically-relevant national network. Although resource users maintain 
ownership of PAN sites, there are significant changes to the process of governing those 
sites. As the PAN attempts to increase the spatial scale of marine governance to 
accommodate goals of biodiversity conservation, national government and conservation 
NGOs gain more influence in local decision-making processes. We conclude that the 
pursuit of large-scale marine conservation governance in Palau has led to a more nested 
but less polycentric governance system, and caution that decreased local autonomy may 
reduce the institutional diversity upon which the long-term sustainability of CPRs may 
depend. Results are broadly relevant to other geographic contexts as Palau’s PAN is 
being promoted as a model for other nations seeking to meet their commitments to 
                                                        
2 While the PAN includes terrestrial areas, our concentration on the marine component reflects the focus of 
the PAN and historic local conservation on marine environments. 
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multilateral environmental agreements3. 
4.2 Complementary perspectives on multi-level CPR governance 
According to Giordano (2003, p. 365), “the field of geography has been relatively 
silent in the commons literature, especially on the theoretic front.” This is beginning to 
change.  There is an emerging foundation of interdisciplinary theoretical dialogue 
regarding the relationships between physical geography, resource users, and 
institutional arrangements for CPR governance (e.g., Araral 2013; Brewer 2010; Giordano 
2003). However, there remains little constructive engagement between Bloomington 
School institutional theorists and critical human geographers interested in the scalar 
dimensions of CPR governance (hereafter, institutional theorists and critical human 
geographers) (Armitage 2008; Clement 2010; Poteete 2012), arguably due to divisive 
tensions about core questions, values, epistemologies, assumptions and methodologies 
(Johnson 2004; Mosse 1997).  
While Johnson (2004) concludes that co-existence is more likely than convergence4, 
there is emerging interest in a third option: complementarity (e.g., Armitage 2008; 
Clement 2010; Campbell 2007; Poteete 2012). Poteete (2012) for example, brings together 
concepts across multiple disciplines, including critical human geography and 
Bloomington institutional analysis, to argue for broader perspectives on the multi-level 
institutions and multiple scale linkages characterizing CPRs.  Research taking an 
                                                        
3 Palau received the high profile 2012 Future Policy Award for having the world’s policies to protect oceans 
and coasts. 
4 Johnson (2004) describes tensions between “collective action” and “entitlement” schools of thought that 
generally correspond to what we refer to here as institutionalist and critical human geography perspectives.  
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interdisciplinary perspective, she argues, “is less likely to overlook important elements, 
relationships, or processes” (Poteete 2012, p. 147). Armitage (2008) similarly advocates 
for “critical reflection” on multi-level governance for CPRs, calling for the exchange of 
ideas from common property theory, resilience thinking, and political ecology central to 
those disciplines (Armitage 2008, p. 7).   
In agreement that “continued cross-fertilization of ideas is crucial for the evolution of 
commons governance” (Armitage 2008, p. 26), we explore complementarity between 
“Bloomington institutionalism” (Aligica and Boettke 2011, p. 29), grounded in the 
seminal work of Vincent and Elinor Ostrom and colleagues, and critical human 
geography theory on scalar politics.  This section describes arguments and analytical foci 
within each literature, demonstrating that they share key concerns with power, scale, 
and multi-level governance. We argue that key components of the theoretical 
perspectives fit together to structure a more comprehensive analysis of multi-level 
governance regimes for larger CPRs, such as networks of marine protected areas.  
4.2.1 Polycentricity 
 
In 1961, influenced by the study of federalist systems, V. Ostrom et al. observed 
that some federalist systems were organized as polycentric political systems, arguing 
that they could constitute a potential alternative to the theoretical ideal of monocentric 
systems with a dominant center of decision-making power. The term polycentric 
“connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally independent of each 
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other” (Ostrom et al. 1961, p. 831).  In polycentric political systems, multiple centers of 
decision-making “may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable 
patterns of interacting behavior” (Ostrom et al. 1961, p. 831).  Throughout the 1990s and 
2000s, the empirical research agenda on polycentricism focused on the role of local 
institutions for the governance of CPRs, although few studies have used polycentrism as 
a framework for analysis (Araral 2013).  
In its theoretical ideal, a polycentric system is thought to be more likely to 
enhance the ability of resource users to craft and adjust their own institutions over time, 
which can increase the likelihood of those institutions leading to effective, equitable, or 
sustainable outcomes because they are more likely to be well matched to particular 
social-ecological contexts (Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Ostrom 2012). Ostrom’s eighth 
design principle holds that for CPRs that are part of larger systems, enduring 
polycentric governance is “organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises,” where 
“smaller-scale organizations tend to be nested in ever larger organizations” (Ostrom 
2005, p. 269).  Note, however, that a nested governance system in which decision-
making power is not distributed among different actors does not constitute a polycentric 
system. A nested system where decision-making is centralized is less likely to succeed in 
supporting sustainability and resilience of the resources it governs. In theory, a nested 
polycentric system is advantageous because, through the involvement of resource users, 
local knowledge can inform the design of diverse, context-specific rules, while larger 
organizations (including but not limited to governments) can enhance local capacity to 
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deal with non-contributors or local tyrants, share and invest in information, and 
coordinate cross-boundary problems (Ostrom 2010; see also Mansbridge In Press).  
However, there is still limited understanding of the operational characteristics of 
such systems. Ostrom (2012, p. 140) concluded, “[o]ur own research supports more 
complex, adaptive designs that do enable the users to have a substantial voice in the 
design and monitoring of the rules in use but also involve larger units in a polycentric 
system.” While a defining concept in polycentricity is the level of autonomy local 
participants have from larger units, there is little guidance on what constitutes a 
“substantial voice,” how nesting affects the polycentricity of a given system, and how 
varying levels and forms of autonomy affect the function and overall trajectory of the 
system. Depending on the autonomy local units have, a given governance system may 
be “more or less polycentric” (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, p.  77). More polycentric 
systems will show significant autonomy for decision-making among local units and 
units operating over larger jurisdictions.  In less polycentric systems, for example, nested 
enterprises may engender partial or complete dominance of local groups by government 
regulators or other powerful actors (Adger et al. 2005; Marshall 2008; Young 2006).  
4.2.2 Scalar Politics 
Critical human geographers, including political ecologists, are similarly 
interested in the relationships among actors, institutions, and spatial scale in multi-level 
CPR governance (often referred to as “multi-scaled” environmental governance in this 
literature) (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003). As part of this research agenda, critical human 
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geographers are engaging a body of literature articulating as “politics of scale” or  
“scalar politics” (scalar politics herein) (MacKinnon 2010, p. 22) to analyze the social 
construction and manipulation of social and biophysical scales as part of “social 
strategies to combat and defend control over limited resources”  (Swyngedouw 2000, p. 
70). In this sense, social and biophysical scales are understood as dynamic, historically 
contingent tools of politics that actors wield as part of strategies to pursue particular 
agendas, such as gaining control over space, limited natural resources, and/or a 
governance process (Brown and Purcell 2005; Gruby and Campbell, In Press; McCarthy 
2005). While this literature includes critical realist recognition of the biophysical and 
social processes that co-produce scales of social and ecological organization (Sneddon 
2003), there is increasing awareness that biophysical scales (i.e., watershed, ecosystem, 
eco-region) may also be identified and invoked in support of particular political projects, 
such as biodiversity conservation (Campbell 2007; Campbell and Godfrey 2010; Cohen 
2012; Sievanen et al. 2013).  
Critical human geographers engage theory on scalar politics to critically assess 
social and biophysical scales and consider the role of scalar constructions and narratives 
in efforts to reconfigure and legitimize new forms of multi-level CPR governance 
(Sievanen et al. 2013).  For example, Campbell (2007, p 327) shows how sea turtle experts 
invoke spatial scales of sea turtle distribution and migration of sea turtles to “override 
local rights of withdrawal, management, and exclusion, and to assign these rights at 
other sociopolitical scales.” Analytical attention thus focuses on “who produces scale, 
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how, and for what purposes” (McCarthy 2005, p. 733). This literature recognizes that 
rescaling environmental governance may result in significant social and ecological 
outcomes, but tends to focus on those associated with actor dis/empowerment 
(Campbell and Godfrey 2010; Norman and Bakker 2009; Sievanen et al. 2013; 
Swyngedouw 2000). While the literature contributes policy-relevant analysis, it 
generally does not engage with the institutional theory described in section 4.2.1 
4.2.3 Toward Constructive Dialogue 
We take shared concerns with scale, power, and multi-level governance as a 
point of entry toward constructive dialogue between institutional theorists and critical 
human geographers. We argue that complementary loci of attention advances a more 
complete, critical analysis of the form and function of large-scale CPR governance by 
directing analytical attention to the specific actors, agendas, and institutional changes 
associated with political projects to scale up and coordinate polycentric systems. The 
dual objectives of this study are thus to advance constructive theoretical dialogue by 
exploring how new configurations of participants and institutions in nested regimes for 
larger CPRs affects the degree to which the system is polycentric. In the following 
sections we illustrate how this theoretical dialogue can inform the analysis of polycentric 
governance for marine conservation in Palau as a contingent and dynamic construction. 
We evaluate the polycentricity of the PAN by asking who is initiating institutional 
change and why; how the change is legitimized with reference to ecological scale; and 
how the change redistributes rule-making authority and affects resource user autonomy.  
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We define autonomy as the ability of marine resource users to devise their own 
institutions for the governance of marine resources without being challenged by non-
local units (modified from Ostrom, 1990). Autonomy can foster (or not) the development 
of diverse, context-appropriate institutions, and as such is seen as a pivotal concept 
linked to the emergence and endurance of a local CPR regime (Basurto 2013; Ostrom 
2005; Schlager 2002). In recognition that there are few, if any, examples of completely 
isolated social-ecological systems, we approach autonomy relationally. Accordingly, our 
analysis examines the ways in which marine resource users’ autonomy changes over 
time through dynamic institutions-in-use. 
4.3 Methods 
The first author collected field data during three trips to Palau totaling four and a 
half months over the period 2010-2012. Data sources include 101 semi-structured 
interviews with 72 people (19 key informants were interviewed 2-4 times), observation 
of seven policy planning meetings, and documents related to protected area science and 
policy in Palau throughout the 1980s-2000s. Interviewees included two heterogeneous 
groups we refer to as resource users and PAN architects. These analytical groupings are 
not always mutually exclusive; three individuals spoke at length from both perspectives 
and are thus included in both groups.  
Interviews with 39 marine resource users from each of Palau’s 16 states, included 
13 out of the 16 state governors, other elected or appointed state officials, traditional 
leaders (chiefs), and volunteers on conservation committees. According to the Palau 
  
 
167
National Constitution (Article 1, Section 2, 1979), Palau’s states hold “exclusive 
ownership” of the ocean and its resources from the land to 12 nautical miles seaward 
(Section 4.4 discusses the meaning of ownership). Most Palauan states are small 
communities comprised of a few hundred people from historically unified social and 
political units (Graham and Idechong 1998). Nearly all households in Palau are involved 
in coastal fishing activities, so Palauan states may be understood as communities of 
resource owner/users (who we refer to as resource users herein) (FAO 2009; Freidman 
and Golbuu 2011). Interviews with resource users focused on the history of protected 
area designation and management in his/her state, interpretations of and experiences 
with the PAN, and decisions to enroll protected areas into the PAN.  
Interviewees also included 36 PAN architects who conceptualized, developed, 
and communicated the PAN, including 10 current and former members of Palau’s 
national government and 26 former and current NGO affiliates from The Nature 
Conservancy (TNC) and Palau Conservation Society. Interviews with PAN architects 
focused on drivers and rationales for the PAN, design of PAN institutions, and 
interpretations of PAN objectives, institutional processes, and participant roles. PAN 
architects are coded and cited as A1-A36, and resource users as R1-R39. 
Drawing from interviews, observations, and historical documents enabled us to 
triangulate data and undertake a “thick” approach (Geertz 1973 p. 3) to institutional 
analysis that recognizes embeddedness of actors and institutions within particular 
social, political, and environmental situations (Mccay and Jentoft 1998). Data collection 
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and analysis were guided by constructivist grounded theory, whereby data collection 
and analysis take place simultaneously, with emergent theory guiding the collection 
effort (Charmaz 2000). Analysis of institutional change is guided by four interlinked 
levels of institutions and action arenas: operational, collective choice, constitutional, and 
meta-constitutional (Ostrom 2005). Operational institutions directly affect the 
biophysical world and are crafted in collective choice arenas. Collective choice 
institutions determine eligible participants in operational arenas and specify how 
operational institutions may be changed. Collective choice institutions are crafted in 
constitutional arenas, and so on (Figure 10).  We complement observations and 
institutional analysis with interpretive analysis that focuses on the situated meaning of 
institutions to different actors (Yanow 1996).  
 
 
  
 
169
 
Figure 10: Levels of institutional analysis (adapted from Ostrom 2005) 
 
4.4 Pre-PAN polycentric marine governance (before 2003) 
Situated roughly 800 km east of the Philippines and 800 km north of Papua New 
Guinea, Palau is an archipelago comprising 586 small islands and an ocean territory of 
616,029 km2. The total land area of the largest island is about 400 km2. Palau’s population 
is around 20,000 and tourism their main source of revenue. Foreign vessels dominate 
industrial offshore export fisheries while coastal marine fisheries mainly support local 
subsistence and commercial uses critical to domestic food supply (FAO 2009; Freidman 
and Golbuu 2011). Palau’s marine environment has the most diverse coral reef fauna in 
Micronesia (Golbuu et al. 2007), and is part of Conservation International’s Polynesia-
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Micronesia Biodiversity Hotspot, described as the “epicenter of the current global 
extinction crisis” (CI 2012).  
In pre-colonial Palau, customary marine tenure was vested in traditional leaders 
and kin groups (Ueki and Clayton 1999). Customary marine tenure has been defined as 
“a situation in which particular groups of people [ . . .] have informal or formal rights to 
coastal areas and in which their historical rights to use and access marine resources are, 
in principle, exclusionary, transferable, and enforceable” (Aswani 2005 p. 287). In Palau 
this included bul or harvesting moratoriums, as well as religiously motivated taboos, 
practices that had the effect if not the sole intent of sustainable use. Violators could be 
fined, banished, shamed, or killed (Johannes 1978).  
Formal colonial administrations from Spain, Germany, Japan and the U.S 
governed Palau beginning in 1885. Imported legal and economic systems under U.S. and 
Japan administrations deteriorated customary marine tenure, leading to de facto open 
access fisheries conditions and perceptible fisheries decline (Ueki and Clayton 1999). 
Palau gained independence in 1994, but maintains a formal political association with the 
U.S. Today, Palau’s federated government mirrors that of the U.S., comprising a national 
government with an executive branch, a bi-cameral congress, and judiciary as well as 16 
state governments each ruled by a constitution, elected governor, and legislature. The 
national constitution delegates power to the states, including power to enact and enforce 
laws.    
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The national constitution is based on U.S. democratic ideals, but also seeks to 
invigorate custom by granting equal authority to statutory and traditional law, which is 
unwritten and based on titled elitism and highly decentralized decision-making 
(Graham and Idechong 1998). All states incorporate traditional authorities in their 
governments to varying degrees, and the strongest customary political power in Palau is 
arguably at the state level (Graham and Idechong 1998). Inconsistencies between dual 
democratic-egalitarian and customary systems are many, and underwrite ongoing 
power struggles among Palau’s traditional and elected leaders and also between state 
and national governments, given the role of traditional leaders in state governments 
(Graham and Idechong 1998). 
 These struggles extend to marine resources. The Palau National Constitution 
delegates to states “exclusive ownership of all living and non-living resources, except 
highly migratory fish, from the land to twelve (12) nautical miles seaward from the 
traditional baselines” (Article I, Section 2). Traditional baselines represent ownership as 
recorded through oral histories and use patterns, though boundary conflicts have arisen 
as most states have not mapped or strictly defined these baselines (Matthews 2007; Pulea 
1994). The national constitution also contradictorily grants congress the power to 
“regulate the ownership, exploration and exploitation of natural resources” (Article IX, 
Section 5.12).  Throughout the 1990s, traditional leaders, state governments, and national 
government fought for control over marine resources (Graham and Idechong 1998). The 
courts supported states’ authority to enact and enforce regulations for marine resource 
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use (Graham and Idechong 1998), effectively translating the clause for states’ “exclusive 
ownership” into full property rights of access and withdrawal, management, exclusion, 
and alienation (Schlager and Ostrom 1992).   
In institutional terms, resource users had a high level of autonomy and ultimate 
authority to make collective choice and operational rules regarding marine resources, 
with enabling collective choice rules-in-use that recognized and supported full property 
rights and governing authority. The only constraints on local autonomy in practice were 
national fisheries laws regulating exploitation of particular species and fishing methods 
(Palau National Code, Title 24, Chapter 13).  
4.4.1 Re-emergence of customary marine tenure as polycentric 
practice (1980s to early 2000s) 
Resource users started actively exercising their right to self-govern their 
resources in the 1980s. By the mid 1990s and early 2000s almost every state was 
establishing controls on fishing through buls and legislated MPAs, often with 
involvement from TNC and the Palau Conservation Society, a local NGO that TNC 
helped form in 1994. We refer broadly to buls and MPAs as conservation areas. Nearly 
all resource users interviewed cited perceived fisheries declines as the primary 
motivation for initiating harvest controls, though the resurgence of buls was also an 
expression of the chiefs’ desire to re-exert control over marine resources following 
independence (Graham and Idechong 1998). By 2003, 13 states had established at least 26 
conservation areas (Palau Conservation Society, unpublished data), and by 2007 all 
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states had established at least one (Figure 11). Ongoing disputes between some states 
over resource ownership and access has arguably limited cooperative marine 
governance across state boundaries (Matthews 2007). 
 
  
Figure 11: Conservation areas in Palau as of 2007, indicated by circles. Copyright by 
Palau Conservation Society and Palau Automated Land Information Resource 
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Services. Reprinted with permission.  
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 Collective choice rules provided rule-making authority for conservation areas to 
traditional chiefs and state governments, and in some cases, management boards 
comprising a mix of traditional leaders, state government leaders, and other community 
members. In most states, collective choice rules-in-use also permitted NGO involvement 
in the initiation, design, and implementation of operational rules to varying degrees. 
Nine state governors said that the Palau Conservation Society and/or TNC were 
involved in the initial designation of conservation areas in their state (the other four 
governors interviewed did not know). However, the extent of NGO involvement varied 
from state to state and was limited by small NGO staffs during this period. Operational 
rules governing conservation areas vary, but most include rules for boundaries, 
monitoring, conflict resolution, and graduated sanctions ranging from shaming to fines 
and imprisonment. Operational appropriation rules include no-entry and no-take 
regimes, season and species specific rules, and/or sustainable use for subsistence and 
education.  
 In summary, high local autonomy led to highly polycentric regimes for 
conservation areas characterized by limited non-local involvement, context-specific rule-
making, and institutional diversity. As one interviewee summarized: “when you went to 
one state conservation site it had a different policy from another” (A11).  Interviews with 
resource users revealed high awareness and support for marine conservation areas, but 
most also reported some poaching, poorly marked boundaries, and insufficient funding 
for fully implementing rules. The primary source of state revenue for government 
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operations is an annual grant from the national government; excluding the state of 
Koror, the average FY2011 allocation was US$237,000, which left insufficient funds to 
manage conservation areas according to some interviewees.  
4.5 Nesting polycentric systems through PAN (beginning in 
2003) 
4.5.1 Initiation and legitimization of PAN: Prioritizing ecological scale  
The initial PAN Act (2003) was primarily conceptualized and designed by about 
ten PAN architects, including Palauans and non-Palauans working for NGOs and 
Palau’s national government. Resource users reported limited involvement in the initial 
stages of institutional development. The main motivation for developing a national, 
science-based protected area network was the conservation of marine biodiversity, 
which arguably required management of ecological and social-institutional processes 
across larger, transboundary spatial scales. Coordination needs served as justification for 
shifting some local control over conservation areas to centralized agencies through 
institutional reforms that nested local institutions for conservation areas within new 
national institutions. The maintenance of natural processes at ecologically relevant scales 
served to legitimize this shift. 
PAN architects cited two main drivers for institutional change. The first was 
their heightened concern about marine biodiversity in Palau after a massive coral 
bleaching and mortality event in a particular ecosystem type in 1998 (Golbuu et al. 2007). 
In anticipation of future threats from climate change and ocean acidification, PAN 
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architects drew on resilience theory to conclude there was a mismatch between 
governance and the spatial scale of ecological processes considered relevant to 
conserving marine biodiversity. They reasoned that maintaining ecological connectivity, 
representation, and resilience required governing at larger spatial scales than individual 
state territories as was the current practice. This understanding justified expanding 
authority for national government to centrally coordinate the designation of 
conservation areas across Palau: 
“if you leave it up to the communities they're always going to think about 
fisheries resources mainly and they're going to think only within their state. And 
that's why you needed the national government to be a partner because the 
national government can look at the whole of Palau, and address issues such as 
biodiversity and other issues that the state can't think about, and connectivity. 
You know states cannot think about the ecosystem” (A3). 
 
PAN architects recognized that resource users did not necessarily share their goal of 
biodiversity conservation and would be wary of national involvement given historic 
politics of control over marine resources. They legitimized increased involvement of 
larger organizational units with scalar narratives articulating incontrovertible 
relationships among social-ecological processes, scale, and outcomes (Sievanen et al. 
2013), such as in the following: 
“Koror state or another State cannot protect its natural resources alone because 
our resources are connected and interdependent …. the National and State 
government should work together to identify the important or critical habitats or 
species to ensure their survival” (Senator Adalbert Eledui, Television 
advertisement). 
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The prioritization of ecological connectivity in justifications for institutional re-
arrangement may be understood as a form of anti-politics (Ferguson 1990) that 
naturalizes inherently political projects. In other words, the focus on natural scalar 
processes discursively skirts the reconfiguration of decision-making power necessary for 
PAN architects to accommodate a new set of national goals (biodiversity conservation) 
(Sievanen et al. 2013).  
 A secondary motivation for the PAN was to report progress toward Palau’s 
commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity, which has produced global 
biodiversity targets since 2002 and makes funding available through the Global 
Environment Facility for national implementation. One PAN architect reported that the 
PAN was designed to facilitate documentation of national-level progress toward 
international obligations so as to attract international recognition and associated 
financial support. 
4.5.2 Changing positions of non-local actors 
PAN architects restructured the existing polycentric regime to facilitate a more 
active role for national government and NGOs, thereby centralizing some aspects of 
decision-making. Specifically, the dynamic sequence of formal PAN laws, amendments, 
and regulations adopted between 2003 and 2008 created new action arenas and 
institutions in collective choice and constitutional levels that cumulatively restructured 
the process for designing operational institutions for state-owned conservation areas. 
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The approach allowed non-local actors to influence operational rules without overt 
persuasion or total control (see Li 2007). The logic was thus: 
“[T]he structure had to be seen on the one hand by the states to be advantageous 
to them, in the sense that they could control everything … [but] we had to make 
sure that at the national level it did deal with some of the national obligations 
and priorities, they would still have some degree of control over the broad 
things” (A34). 
 
Under the PAN Act (2003), states may voluntarily nominate new and/or pre-
existing marine and terrestrial conservation areas to the national network. Participating 
states would be eligible for technical assistance and financial support, and they must 
manage sites in consultation with the Ministry of Resources and Development 
(hereafter, the Ministry).  The PAN Act (2003) directed the Ministry to promulgate PAN 
rules and regulations for the operationalization of the PAN.  In 2004, the Ministry signed 
a memorandum of understanding with TNC to work together to do so. Through the 
memorandum of understanding, TNC also agreed to fund a range of supporting 
technical work within the network.  
Together, the Ministry and TNC designed a complex system of institutions 
through the PAN regulation (2007) that spelled out roles and rule-making procedures 
for PAN site selection, criteria and guidelines for PAN site management plans (which 
states must develop in conjunction with the Ministry within 12 months), and a technical 
committee that would review and comment on management plans and develop 
standardized environmental monitoring protocols for PAN sites. The process was 
designed to influence resource user decisions about conservation area designation as 
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well as management: “the role of the technical committee and this whole application 
process was to help ensure that the states sort of choose the right areas, or when they 
put their boundaries they put them in a way that makes sense ecologically” (A24).  
  By early 2008, no state had joined the PAN because a) resource users feared 
losing ownership and governance authority in PAN sites, and b) there was no 
discernable source of financial support (access to financial resources later proved to be a 
powerful incentive). The PAN law was amended in 2008 to more explicitly recognize 
state government ownership and governance of PAN sites, and scale back control of 
national government and NGOs through the creation of a “management committee” 
that would grant resource users formal authority in future constitutional arenas where 
overall PAN rules, regulations, and system-wide management plan would be 
developed. The amendment also created a financial incentive for states to join the PAN, 
outlining plans to collect a $15 “Green Fee” from each departing visitor to be distributed 
by a “PAN Fund Board” to resource users to develop and implement management plans 
funds in accordance with system-wide goals. Collection of the Green Fee began in 2009.  
4.5.3 Current nested polycentric structure for marine conservation 
area governance 
As of September 2011, much of the institutional infrastructure described in 
section 4.5.2 was not yet functional, including the technical committee, the management 
committee, the PAN Fund board, and the system-wide management plan (see Figure 
12).  
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Pre-PAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Post-PAN (applies to participating states only) 
 
 
Figure 12: Institutional structure in-use for conservation area governance before and 
after PAN. Italics denote informal positions and arrows denote directional 
connectivity between rule-makers in action arenas and institutions. Diagrams 
constitute simplifications of complex, highly dynamic governance systems also 
characterized by (unrepresented) informal institutional arrangements at all levels. 
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While TNC conducted an ecoregional assessment in 2007 to inform the network design, 
it has not been used in formal application and review processes, given the absence of a 
technical committee. Lacking a functional scientific review process, NGOs stepped in to 
provide technical and scientific input by working with resource users to develop the 
management plans necessary to be part of the PAN. This is a task that resource users felt 
they had limited capacity to do on their own:  
“[I]n order to become a member of the PAN, you have to have a state 
conservation management plan, in order to get the fund. That is what we need, 
we need the fund … we have a natural idea of what we think is the nature of our 
place but those people from there [NGOs], like they have a science background, 
they have an environmental background to put it [the management plan] 
together” (R24). 
 
Thus, by requiring a management plan, the PAN created a de facto leadership position 
in a collective choice arena for NGOs, which have the staff, funding, and technical 
means to provide it. As organizers of the management planning process, NGOs 
introduce scientific knowledge and biodiversity conservation goals as integral elements 
of operational rules for conservation areas:  
“We try to start with the biodiversity as the targets and then … you plan 
backwards … the structure is already decided. … you have to have a 
management group picked in a certain way, and they have to go through this 
certain routine” (A1).  
 
Given that the PAN Fund board was not functional, $1.4 million collected from 
departure fees remained in national government coffers and control. Eight states had 
confirmed PAN sites (all pre-existing conservation areas) and four had received $50,000 
each (a significant sum roughly equivalent to 20% of the average state’s annual 
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operating budget). Representatives from the remaining eight states said their state was 
moving forward to nominate at least one of their pre-existing conservation areas to the 
PAN. All resource users cited access to PAN funds as their main motivation for joining 
the PAN, a powerful incentive given that a majority of resource users interviewed 
expressed concerns about participating. As one person summarized: 
“[T]hese guys from national government level and PCS [Palau Conservation 
Society] are going after [states]- hey guys, would you like to be registered or not? 
We’ve been waiting for you! Come on, there’s money now! See, the [resource 
users’] perception is different because at the beginning [there was] no money… 
now when you say PAN, people think about Green Fee… And that’s maybe 
contribute to 95% of the reason why they now want to [be a] member of this” 
(R39). 
 
4.5.4 Resource user autonomy as a measure of polycentricity 
 Institutional analysis reveals the form of a given polycentric system: the 
participants, their relative positions, and associated rule-making authority. Our interest 
in autonomy, however, concerns the relationship between the form of a nested system 
and its functional polycentricism. Here we interrogate this relationship by exploring the 
ability of resource users to devise rules affecting the governance of PAN sites without 
being challenged by non-local actors. This section complements institutional analysis 
with a discussion of how resource users perceive institutional change and their current 
and potential ability (not only authority) to act within the new regime.  
 All resource users interviewed said that states would maintain ownership of 
PAN sites. However, when asked about how the PAN has or would affect their control 
over decision-making, 18 felt that it would be unchanged, 5 said that control would be 
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shared, 13 felt that it would greatly curtailed, and 3 were unsure. The 18 resource users 
who experienced and/or predicted retention of autonomy acknowledged the 
institutional changes cited above, but interpreted them as empowering. The logic of this 
group was generally: “I think [states] will just be able to implement what they wanted to 
do all along but didn’t have the resources to do” (R33).  
 Those who anticipated or experienced loss of autonomy felt that the PAN 
increased rule-making authority of non-local actors; prioritized science and written law 
over traditional knowledge and traditional law; and financial dependence. For example, 
one interviewee explained that the involvement of NGOs and national government in 
marine conservation area governance: 
“[H]as significantly increased by the way they advise, and the way activities 
have been carried out on the ground…when you come to community and talk 
about hard science, stats and data, you’re stuffing them back in a hole. They 
don’t see what you’re talking about, they don’t see their way out….So for 
example, our communities basically understand that the resources, they are the 
owner. But how do they manage it?  They felt that they’ve lost sight, lost their 
resources. They don’t have a much say over it any longer” (R35).  
 
Others focused on the complexity and permanence of legally designating PAN sites, 
which could limit their ability to design and change conservation area rules in a 
practical, “Palauan” way: 
“But whereas PAN, it’s going to depend on some writing that takes a whole big 
process to reverse it. It’s not as reversible as bul…. if PAN takes over, then maybe 
we can’t do anything like we could if a bul or just a state law that conserves a 
place…it doesn’t make sense that PAN has to come in and put it in writing” 
(R38). 
 
Finally, others in this group feared the financial dependence enacted through the PAN, 
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as expressed thus: 
“[O]nce you’re hooked to the strong hand of the money that they’re gonna to 
give you, it’s gonna be very hard to bite that hand. Who will bite the hand that’s 
feeding them? And to me, that’s our worry. That we will become reliant on the 
PAN fund and at some point they might say ‘oh, well but we want you guys to 
do this.’ And we will say ‘no, that’s not what our community wants.’ [Then they 
will say] ok, ‘then the funding stops.’ We don’t want to get to that stage but 
we’re fully aware of that” (R37). 
 
Many in this group used the dissociative language give or donate to describe the sale of 
their conservation area to outsiders through the PAN, i.e. “Now all the governors of all 
the states fighting to get the $50,000 and give their land for the PAN…. They say give us 
some money and we give you PAN site” (R23).  
Divergent interpretations of how the PAN has and will affect resource users’ 
autonomy in governing their conservation areas have led to conflict in one state. In 2010, 
50 people from Hatohobei state (roughly 25%) signed a petition to remove their 
conservation area from the PAN.  While petitioners were concerned about resource user 
autonomy, others felt those concerns were not justified:  
“One of the arguments that came up was that the PAN is run by outsiders, not 
from Tobi, and if they want to make changes or make rules that will affect Helen 
Reef they can do so, which is not true” (R28). 
 
The conflict in Hatohobei reflects the politics inherent in nested polycentric regimes as 
diverse actors negotiate changing roles both within and across action arenas controlling 
various aspects of decision-making.  
At this stage, our interpretive institutional analysis suggests that the PAN 
represents movement on a continuum of polycentricity toward centralization and 
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institutional homogenization. PAN architects control the financial resources that have 
motivated resource users to nominate areas to the PAN. As part of the PAN, resource 
users are beholden to new, deeper level rules set by PAN architects that reshape the 
process and objectives of institutional design. In particular, the requirement to have a 
conservation area management plan has made resource users dependent on NGOs who 
have the procedural and technical knowledge to produce one. As leaders in collective 
choice arenas, NGOs facilitate the design of management plans that are legible (Scott 
1998) to those tasked with documenting progress toward national and international 
biodiversity agendas (i.e., through written documents, management budgets, paid 
enforcement staff, etc.). However, resource users still have ultimate ownership and rule-
making authority in PAN sites as they may withdraw from the PAN should they choose 
to do so.  
  Finally, while our focus is on the social dimensions of the PAN, it is important to 
highlight that the institutional changes described above have not yet led to significant 
reform in conservation area boundaries or placement. As Agardy (2005, p. 245) has 
argued,  
“Identification of existing protected areas and tying them together into a regional 
initiative does not magically create large-scale conservation. [. . . ] Since individual 
MPAs were historically established opportunistically rather than strategically, 
functional networks will require the creation of new MPAs to fill remaining gaps, 
even in areas where MPAs are common.”  
 
At the time of research, the PAN only included pre-existing conservation areas. Thus, 
the network has yet to advance large-scale conservation through enhanced ecological 
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connectivity. To this point, tensions are also emerging among PAN architects about the 
foregrounding of ecological scale in the PAN, and associated roles for science, and 
national and NGO actors. Some envision a greater role for non-local actors and science 
through more strategic use of their control over PAN funds to influence the placement 
of PAN sites:  
“They can still do their fisheries thing but if PAN said we want PAN site to be 
resilient network then you know that can happen. If PAN said we want site now 
that’s going to be in the atmosphere then states would designate their 
atmosphere right now, they want the money now. I think it just…PAN needs to 
be active” (A30). 
 
Other key PAN architects envision a less influential role for non-local actors, 
understanding PAN foremost as a mechanism for supporting and empowering resource 
users:  
“What I disagree with is that we should impose the eco-regional assessment on 
our communities and say only these sites….  if it’s science driven it won’t last, it 
won’t be sustainable. The scientists aren’t going to manage these areas” (A25). 
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
If the success of a polycentric system is dependent in part on the ability of resource 
users to craft and adjust their own rules over time (Andersson and Ostrom 2008), there 
is need for critical reflection on how new configurations of actors, interests, and 
institutions in nested regimes for larger CPRs affect the autonomy of resource users – or, 
the degree to which the system is polycentric.  Toward this end, we demonstrate the 
potential for constructive dialogue between institutional theorists and critical human 
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geographers. We do not argue for complete theoretical integration, but rather, for the 
analytical utility of engaging key elements from each perspective.  
We engage scalar politics to contribute a critical perspective on the drivers and 
legitimization of nested, polycentric regimes for large-scale marine governance in Palau 
(see also Lee (2013) on the importance of legitimacy in the functionality of polycentric 
regimes). An institutional analysis informed by scalar politics draws attention to the 
actors and agendas that drive institutional rearrangement in accordance with particular 
governance goals that are not necessarily shared. Through the PAN in Palau, actors who 
held no property rights over marine resources rescaled a highly decentralized, 
polycentric marine governance regime because they felt that the existing regime did not 
and could not adequately conserve marine biodiversity. They legitimized governance at 
a larger spatial scale and higher jurisdictional level than individual state territories 
through an ecological connectivity argument, an expression of scalar politics that is 
reflective and productive of struggles for control over the goals and processes of 
governance (Swyngedouw 2000; Sievanen et al. 2013). These scalar politics are not 
circumscribed to the realm of national/local; in this case, global environmental 
governance agendas expressed through the UN CBD protected area targets, reporting 
requirements, and financial incentives also motivated and legitimated the rescaling 
project.  
Critical human geographers may also find useful analytical tools in Bloomington 
institutionalism. We engage institutional analysis underpinning ideas about 
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polycentricity to systematically identify the changes in operational, collective choice, 
and constitutional rules and arenas that both reflect and serve those scalar projects and 
associated priorities. Organizing analysis around levels of institutions enabled a more 
systematic, nuanced assessment of the control actors gain or lose over specific parts of 
decision-making processes, as well as their agency in shaping institutions in divergent 
ways.  Finally, we also draw from polycentricity to identify autonomy and institutional 
diversity as policy-relevant metrics by which to assess how scalar politics affects the 
outcomes of a governance regime.  
Our interdisciplinary analysis suggests that the prioritization of ecological scale in 
institutional reform resulted in nested but less polycentric institutional arrangements 
governing the network in Palau.  In a highly polycentric system where resource users 
can modify rules, CPR institutions are more likely to be tailored to local circumstances 
(Ostrom 1990).  Engendering feelings of lost local autonomy and devalued knowledge 
systems risks crowding out conditions that may contribute to enduring, diverse 
institutions that could yield intended outcomes – whether fisheries or biodiversity or 
both, in the case of Palau.  While we do not critique the general scientific argument for 
organizing marine biodiversity conservation at larger scales (e.g. Gaines et al. 2010), our 
case study results are cautionary, highlighting potential tradeoffs that may accompany 
the prioritization of ecological scale as a guide for institutional reform. These include 
tradeoffs between governance goals, tradeoffs between institutional nestedness and 
autonomy, and tradeoffs between biological and institutional diversity.  
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It is not yet clear how the degree of decreased autonomy in Palau will affect 
institutional innovation and diversity.  In the small island of Palau, national government 
and NGOs also include resource users, therefore, so-called “non-local” influence is 
exercised by people who hold a relatively high degree of contextual social and 
environmental knowledge. Moreover, “processes of rescaling do not entail the simple 
replacement of one scalar configuration with another fully formed one” (Sievanen et al. 
2013, p. 213); they are dynamic, continual processes of social negotiation. Continued 
research is necessary to track how the PAN will affect institutional innovation and 
diversity considered necessary to arrive at rules that are well matched to social and 
ecological contexts. 
We identify a series of inter-related questions for future research relevant to marine 
governance in Palau, the design of MPA networks, and interdisciplinary scholarship on 
the governance of larger scale CPRs. How does increased nestedness and decreased 
resource user autonomy in Palau affect institutional innovation and diversity? Are 
institutional monocultures the likely result of scaling-up MPA governance? Does 
increased jurisdictional nestedness necessarily decrease resource users’ autonomy in 
polycentric systems? If so, is there a tension between the argument for jurisdictional 
nesting as a design principle for larger CPRs and the argument for resource user 
autonomy in polycentric systems? In Palau and more generally, there is a need for long-
term institutional research on how the dynamic distribution of control in nested, 
polycentric regimes links to particular social and ecological outcomes.  
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In conclusion, interdisciplinary perspectives from institutional analysis and critical 
human geography can reveal how multi-level regimes change over time as people 
experiment, learn, and also struggle for control of the process. In research and policy 
agendas it will be important to consider how larger organizations may support as well 
as limit institutional innovation and autonomy while endeavoring to govern at 
ecologically-relevant spatial scales, given that “protecting institutional diversity related 
to how diverse peoples cope with CPRs may be as important for our long run survival 
as the protection of biological diversity” (Ostrom 1999, p. 282). 
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5. Conclusion  
This dissertation examines the scalar politics and associated institutional 
dynamics characterizing expanded ocean conservation in the Pacific Islands.  Case 
studies across global, regional, national, and local governance levels collectively 
demonstrate how networks of state and non-state actors pursue their contextually 
specific goals by working together to scale up the objects - the biophysical spaces - of 
ocean conservation. The means through which they achieve rescaling include discursive 
framings, performative acts, and/or institutional change. These ‘scalar practices’ are all 
shaped in part by broader political processes and structures, especially those relating to 
global environmental governance processes tied to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the relatively subaltern geopolitical status of micro states and territories.  
Results demonstrate how interlinked processes of rescaling ocean conservation in the 
Pacific Islands region, the Micronesia sub-region, and the nation of Palau have resulted 
in considerable – sometimes surprising, and/or unintended –social, political, and 
institutional outcomes. Corresponding biophysical outcomes, if any, are yet to be 
determined, and are acknowledged as an important area for future work.  The next three 
sections briefly review the key findings of Chapters 2, 3, and 4; the main theoretical 
contributions of this dissertation; and topics for consideration in future research. 
5.1 Summary of key findings 
Question 1: Why are state and non-state actors rescaling ocean conservation?  
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This dissertation engages the scalar politics literature to analyze the rescaling of 
ocean conservation as a “strategy used by political groups to pursue a particular 
agenda” (Brown and Purcell 2005, 608). Drawing on the concept of embeddedness, my 
analysis of the agendas driving particular rescaling projects also draws attention to the 
influence of historic and contemporary structures on the formation of those particular 
agendas (McCay 2002).  
Chapter 2 found that an alliance of state and non-state actors (including 
environmental NGOs and a regional organization, the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme) strategically enacted one large Pacific ocean region at the 
CBD CoP 10 in an effort to increase their collective capacity to participate in the meeting 
and influence negotiations, and also to increase their visibility to international donors. 
This collective effort was shaped in part by the CBD CoP10 meeting structure and rules 
of engagement for state and non-state actors, as well as increasing interest in oceans on 
the global conservation agenda. Chapter 3 traced motivations for institutionalizing 
ocean conservation at the regional scale through the Micronesia Challenge to state and 
non-state actors’ complementary interests in re-energizing the global protected area 
agenda with a large-scale conservation success story, and attracting international donor 
attention and resources to Micronesia. These interests were similarly embedded within 
global and international environmental governance processes, particularly those of the 
UN CBD and the U.S. Coral Reef Task Force.   Finally, Chapter 4 traces agendas for 
scaling up conservation governance to the national level in Palau to interlinked national 
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and global agendas to protect coral reef resilience and biodiversity. In this case, as well, 
a relatively small network of state and non-state actors conceptualized and pursued the 
rescaling project in partnership.  
Question 2: How are state and non-state actors rescaling ocean conservation?  
The scalar politics literature has outlined an agenda for research on the “scalar 
practices of social actors” (Moore 2008 p. 212, as quoted in Neumann 2009).  This 
dissertation focuses on the performative, discursive, and institutional dimensions of the 
scalar practices through which state and non-state actors, together, rescale ocean 
conservation.   
Chapter 2 focuses on the performative acts and discourses though which state 
and non-state actors enacted the Pacific Region at the CBD CoP 10.  This chapter 
describes how the Pacific Region was scaled through the formation of a regional 
delegation with “one Pacific voice” that conveyed a Pacific Region ordered around a 
shared regional identity, a common commitment to global biodiversity conservation, 
and a large and boundary-less ocean territory.  The relevance of the Pacific Region to 
ocean conservation in particular localities will become evident beyond the CBD;  the 
Pacific Region, once enacted, will continue to do work beyond the CBD, by scaling and 
rescaling the objects and agents of ocean conservation in the Pacific Islands, and by 
reshaping the nature of the funding, actors, institutions, and ideology already in place 
(or absent). Chapters 3 and 4 focused on formal and informal institutional changes as the 
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means through which state and non-state actors are scaling up ocean conservation to the 
regional level in Micronesia, and the national level in Palau.  
Question 3: What are the social, political and/or institutional outcomes of rescaling ocean 
conservation?   
Ultimately, theories of scale and scalar politics are conceptual tools for 
understanding the continual (re)ordering of ideas, participants, and decision-making 
processes that constitute environmental governance. While the conceptual tools are 
abstract, the outcomes they bring into focus are palpable, affecting a wide range of 
actors.  
Chapter 2 concludes that, for Pacific SIDS, the scaling of the Pacific Region 
served as a scalar fix (in the sense of problem-solving; see McCann 2003) for two forms 
of smallness in the context of the CBD CoP 10: the limited capacity of relatively small 
delegations to participate in meeting activities, and the global spatial imaginary of 
Pacific Island territories and populations as small, isolated, and somewhat irrelevant to 
achieving global conservation goals. This chapter argues that the Pacific Region 
enhances the capacity of Pacific SIDS to participate in the CoP10, as well as their ability 
to attract recognition, attention, and support from NGOs, foundations, and donors on 
the global environmental governance stage. NGOs representatives who participated in 
enacting the Pacific Region, particularly those included in formal delegations, also 
gained a more influential position in the CBD CoP10 than they may have as non-
delegate observers.  
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Chapter 3 argues that that the rescaling of conservation governance to the regional 
level through the Micronesia Challenge has resulted in both tensions and opportunities 
for state and non-state actors working within participating jurisdictions.  Specifically, 
these ‘local actors’ are mobilizing the Micronesia Challenge to serve diverse goals, 
including political self-determination, international agenda-setting, bargaining power 
within international relations, fundraising, and the construction of a particular 
Micronesian identity, for example.  However, local actors also identified the Micronesia 
Challenge as a source of local interpretive conflicts, and intraregional resentment tied to 
perceptions of uneven benefits. They also expressed concerns about the potential 
bottlenecking of international funding at the regional level.  Results also indicate that the 
rescaling of conservation governance through the Micronesia Challenge has led to 
influential fundraising, organizational, and policy-making positions for international 
environmental NGOs. 
Chapter 4 concludes that the prioritization of ecological scale in the rescaling of 
ocean conservation in Palau has reshaped the process and objectives of institutional 
design, and increased the influence of national government and environmental NGOs in 
local governance processes.  This chapter finds that the rescaling project resulted in 
nested but less polycentric institutional arrangements. The analysis highlights potential 
tradeoffs that may accompany the prioritization of ecological scale as a guide for 
institutional reform, including tradeoffs between governance goals, tradeoffs between 
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institutional nestedness and autonomy, and tradeoffs between biological and 
institutional diversity.  
While all chapters recognize scale and scalar arrangements as contingent and 
subject to continual negotiation (McCann 2003; Brown and Purcell 2005), it is also 
important to emphasize that scalar arrangements – particularly those which are 
institutionalized – may also be “routinized into relatively enduring and hegemonic 
structures for certain periods of time” (Brown and Purcell 2005 p. 610). The latter point is 
particularly relevant to Chapters 3 and 4, where outcomes tied to the institutionalization 
of rescaled ocean conservation may signal longer-term political trajectories. 
Finally, this dissertation has taken a particular interest in the role of 
environmental NGOs in the reconfiguration of scale within environmental governance 
(as called for in McCarthy 2005). All case studies suggest that the rescaling of ocean 
conservation has resulted in a marked increase in the roles, responsibilities, and/or 
authority of environmental NGOs within conservation governance processes across 
multiple levels. Chapter 3 quotes a high-level official in the Palauan national 
government who characterized an environmental NGO as “an extension of Palau 
government.” I argue that this assertion is becoming true more broadly throughout the 
Pacific Islands, whereby the rescaling of ocean conservation is reflective and productive 
of large ocean “governance states” (Duffy 2006, p. 740). 
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5.2 Theoretical contributions  
This dissertation demonstrates the analytical value in undertaking a critical 
approach to scale in environmental governance research. First, Chapters 2 and 3  
advance theory on the scalar dimensions of environmental governance, including 
regional environmental governance, by conceptualizing regions as strategically 
constructed tools of environmental politics. Together, these chapters help explain “the 
rise of the region in global environmental politics” (Conca 2012, p. 127) by 
conceptualizing the construction of large oceanic regions as means to diverse ends for 
partnerships of state and non-state actors embedded within global environmental 
governance processes. In addition, it has become clear that the construction of large 
oceanic regions reflects an expression of political agency that is both enabled and 
constrained by broader governance processes, agendas, and structures; the Pacific 
Region, for example, is simultaneously empowered and constrained (in form) by the 
increased global attention to the oceans within the global conservation agenda.  There is 
a need for more attention to the agency that is simultaneously gained and lost in the 
process of constructing regions, in part, in the image of global environmental 
governance structures and agendas.  
The second key theoretical contribution of this dissertation lies in its 
advancement of constructive theoretical dialogue between critical human geographers 
and institutional theorists (Chapter 4), who have much to learn form one another 
regarding the scalar, political, and institutional dynamics characterizing multi-level 
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environmental governance.  This chapter brings together key concepts from these 
literatures to expand understanding of the form and function of nested, polycentric 
regimes for the governance of large-scale common pool resources. This cross-
disciplinary engagement yields a systematic, politicized analysis of institutional 
emergence and formation in which the struggle to define the spatial scale of ocean 
conservation is shown to be part of a dynamic struggle for control over governance 
goals and processes. In so doing, Chapter 4 demonstrates that it is possible to move 
beyond historically divisive disciplinary tensions to identify complementary analytical 
tools and theoretical perspectives that together may structure more complete analysis of 
the scalar dimensions of environmental governance.  
5.3 Questions for Future Research  
Chapter 2 calls for continued research on the scalar politics associated with the 
enactment of the Pacific Region to understand the broader consequences of that 
particular version of Pacific regionalism. This chapter also raises questions about the 
sustainability of the state/non-state alliance observed at the CBD CoP 10, questioning the 
extent to which it is predicated on the support of partners and the willingness of the 
Pacific Region to promote itself and be promoted as in line with global concerns for 
marine biodiversity conservation.  
Chapter 3 calls for further research on the ways in which regionalized 
fundraising impacts the thematic trajectory of local priorities and practice, accountability 
for local governance (upward vs. downward), and the redistribution of international 
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resources throughout Micronesia.  I also wish to highlight the potential for comparative 
studies of similar models of regional environmental governance emerging in the 
Caribbean and Western Indian Ocean regions.  How has the ‘Challenge’ policy model 
being adapted to articulate with these disparate contexts? What functions is it serving 
therein, and for whom?  
Finally, Chapter 4 calls for long term institutional research in Palau and in 
general on how the dynamic distribution of control in nested, polycentric regimes links 
to particular social and ecological outcomes.  This chapter identifies a series of specific 
questions for future research relevant to marine governance in Palau, the design of MPA 
networks, and interdisciplinary scholarship on the governance of larger scale CPRs: 
How does increased jurisdictional nestedness and decreased resource user autonomy in 
Palau affect institutional innovation and diversity? Are institutional monocultures the 
likely result of scaling up MPA governance? Does increased jurisdictional nestedness 
necessarily decrease resource users’ autonomy in polycentric systems? If so, is there a 
tension between the argument for jurisdictional nesting as a design principle for larger 
CPRs and the argument for resource user autonomy in polycentric systems? 
With this project, I have examined the myriad ways in which scale matters for 
conservation governance.  Most significantly, I have shown how, in an era of ‘global’ 
crisis in the oceans, the enactment and institutionalization of large ocean states and 
regions reshapes the positions of and interactions among governments, resource users, 
and environmental NGOs within environmental governance processes across multiple 
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levels.  I hope that this work and the questions arising from it serve as a foundation 
upon which to further advance cross-disciplinary theory on the scalar dimensions of 
environmental governance, while informing the processes under study.  
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